CERT-SEI

Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)

Original release date: February 12, 2002
Last revised: February 13, 2008
Source: CERT/CC

A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

Products from a very wide variety of vendors may be affected.  See Vendor Information for details from vendors who have provided feedback for this advisory.

In addition to the vendors who provided feedback for this advisory, a list of vendors whom CERT/CC contacted regarding these problems is available from

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/854306
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/107186

Many other systems making use of SNMP may also be vulnerable but were not specifically tested.

Overview

Numerous vulnerabilities have been reported in multiple vendors' SNMP implementations. These vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized privileged access, denial-of-service attacks, or cause unstable behavior. If your site uses SNMP in any capacity, the CERT/CC encourages you to read this advisory and follow the advice provided in the Solution section below.

In addition to this advisory, we also have a FAQ available at

I. Description

The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is a widely deployed protocol that is commonly used to monitor and manage network devices. Version 1 of the protocol (SNMPv1) defines several types of SNMP messages that are used to request information or configuration changes, respond to requests, enumerate SNMP objects, and send unsolicited alerts.  The Oulu University Secure Programming Group (OUSPG, http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/) has reported numerous vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 implementations from many different vendors.  More information about SNMP and OUSPG can be found in Appendix C

OUSPG's research focused on the manner in which SNMPv1 agents and managers handle request and trap messages.  By applying the PROTOS c06-snmpv1 test suite (http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/testing/c06/snmpv1/0100.html) to a variety of popular SNMPv1-enabled products, the OUSPG revealed the following vulnerabilities:

VU#107186 - Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 trap handling

SNMP trap messages are sent from agents to managers. A trap message may indicate a warning or error condition or otherwise notify the manager about the agent's state.  SNMP managers must properly decode trap messages and process the resulting data.  In testing, OUSPG found multiple vulnerabilities in the way many SNMP managers decode and process SNMP trap messages. 

VU#854306 - Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 request handling

SNMP request messages are sent from managers to agents.  Request messages might be issued to obtain information from an agent or to instruct the agent to configure the host device.  SNMP agents must properly decode request messages and process the resulting data.  In testing, OUSPG found multiple vulnerabilities in the way many SNMP agents decode and process SNMP request messages.

Vulnerabilities in the decoding and subsequent processing of SNMP messages by both managers and agents may result in denial-of-service conditions, format string vulnerabilities, and buffer overflows.  Some vulnerabilities do not require the SNMP message to use the correct SNMP community string.

These vulnerabilities have been assigned the CVE identifiers CAN-2002-0012 and CAN-2002-0013, respectively.

II. Impact

These vulnerabilities may cause denial-of-service conditions, service interruptions, and in some cases may allow an attacker to gain access to the affected device. Specific impacts will vary from product to product.

III. Solution

Note that many of the mitigation steps recommended below may have significant impact on your everyday network operations and/or network architecture.  Ensure that any changes made based on the following recommendations will not unacceptably affect your ongoing network operations capability.

Apply a patch from your vendor

Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory. Please consult this appendix to determine if you need to contact your vendor directly.

Disable the SNMP service

As a general rule, the CERT/CC recommends disabling any service or capability that is not explicitly required, including SNMP. Unfortunately, some of the affected products exhibited unexpected behavior or denial of service conditions when exposed to the OUSPG test suite even if SNMP was not enabled.  In these cases, disabling SNMP should be used in conjunction with the filtering practices listed below to provide additional protection.

Ingress filtering

As a temporary measure, it may be possible to limit the scope of these vulnerabilities by blocking access to SNMP services at the network perimeter.

Ingress filtering manages the flow of traffic as it enters a network under your administrative control. Servers are typically the only machines that need to accept inbound traffic from the public Internet. In the network usage policy of many sites, there are few reasons for external hosts to initiate inbound traffic to machines that provide no public services.  Thus, ingress filtering should be performed at the border to prohibit externally initiated inbound traffic to non-authorized services. For SNMP, ingress filtering of the following ports can prevent attackers outside of your network from impacting vulnerable devices in the local network that are not explicitly authorized to provide public SNMP services.

snmp     161/udp     # Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
snmp     162/udp     # SNMP system management messages

The following services are less common, but may be used on some affected products

snmp               161/tcp     # Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
snmp               162/tcp     # SNMP system management messages
smux               199/tcp     # SNMP Unix Multiplexer
smux               199/udp     # SNMP Unix Multiplexer
synoptics-relay    391/tcp     # SynOptics SNMP Relay Port
synoptics-relay    391/udp     # SynOptics SNMP Relay Port
agentx                        705/tcp     # AgentX
snmp-tcp-port     1993/tcp     # cisco SNMP TCP port
snmp-tcp-port     1993/udp     # cisco SNMP TCP port

As noted above, you should carefully consider the impact of blocking services that you may be using.

It is important to note that in many SNMP implementations, the SNMP daemon may bind to all IP interfaces on the device.  This has important consequences when considering appropriate packet filtering measures required to protect an SNMP-enabled device.  For example, even if a device disallows SNMP packets directed to the IP addresses of its normal network interfaces, it may still be possible to exploit these vulnerabilities on that device through the use of packets directed at the following IP addresses:

  • "all-ones" broadcast address
  • subnet broadcast address
  • any internal loopback addresses (commonly used in routers for management purposes, not to be confused with the IP stack loopback address 127.0.0.1)

Careful consideration should be given to addresses of the types mentioned above by sites planning for packet filtering as part of their mitigation strategy for these vulnerabilities.

Finally, sites may wish to block access to the following RPC services related to SNMP (listed as name, program ID, alternate names)  

snmp       100122 na.snmp snmp-cmc snmp-synoptics snmp-unisys snmp-utk
snmpv2     100138 na.snmpv2     # SNM Version 2.2.2
snmpXdmid  100249

Please note that this workaround may not protect vulnerable devices from internal attacks.

Filter SNMP traffic from non-authorized internal hosts

In many networks, only a limited number of network management systems need to originate SNMP request messages.  Therefore, it may be possible to configure the SNMP agent systems (or the network devices in between the management and agent systems) to disallow request messages from non-authorized systems.  This can reduce, but not wholly eliminate, the risk from internal attacks. However, it may have detrimental effects on network performance due to the increased load imposed by the filtering, so careful consideration is required before implementation.  Similar caveats to the previous workaround regarding broadcast and loopback addresses apply.

Change default community strings

Most SNMP-enabled products ship with default community strings of "public" for read-only access and "private" for read-write access.  As with any known default access control mechanism, the CERT/CC recommends that network administrators change these community strings to something of their own choosing.  However, even when community strings are changed from their defaults, they will still be passed in plaintext and are therefore subject to packet sniffing attacks. SNMPv3 offers additional capabilities to ensure authentication and privacy as described in RFC2574.

Because many of the vulnerabilities identified in this advisory occur before the community strings are evaluated, it is important to note that performing this step alone is not sufficient to mitigate the impact of these vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, it should be performed as part of good security practice.

Segregate SNMP traffic onto a separate management network

In situations where blocking or disabling SNMP is not possible, exposure to these vulnerabilities may be limited by restricting all SNMP access to separate, isolated management networks that are not publicly accessible.  Although this would ideally involve physically separate networks, that kind of separation is probably not feasible in most environments. Mechanisms such as virtual LANs (VLANs) may be used to help segregate traffic on the same physical network.  Note that VLANs may not strictly prevent an attacker from exploiting these vulnerabilities, but they may make it more difficult to initiate the attacks.

Another option is for sites to restrict SNMP traffic to separate virtual private networks (VPNs), which employ cryptographically strong authentication.

Note that these solutions may require extensive changes to a site's network architecture.

Egress filtering

Egress filtering manages the flow of traffic as it leaves a network under your administrative control. There is typically limited need for machines providing public services to initiate outbound traffic to the Internet. In the case of SNMP vulnerabilities, employing egress filtering on the ports listed above at your network border can prevent your network from being used as a source for attacks on other sites.

Share tools and techniques

Because dealing with these vulnerabilities to systems and networks is so complex, the CERT/CC will provide a forum where administrators can share ideas and techniques that can be used to develop proper defenses. We have created an unmoderated mailing list for system and network administrators to discuss helpful techniques and tools.

You can subscribe to the mailing list by sending an email message to majordomo@cert.org. In the body of the message, type

          subscribe snmp-forum

After you receive the confirmation message, follow the instructions in the message to complete the subscription process.

Appendix A. - Vendor Information

This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.  As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will update this section and note the changes in our revision history.  If a particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their comments.

ADTRAN, Inc.

ADTRAN Advisory:
SNMPv1 Request and Trap Handling Vulnerabilities
Revision 1.0
Release Date: 19 February 2002

I. Summary
On February 12, 2002 the CERT®/CC released an advisory related to security vulnerabilities that may exist in network devices using SNMPv1 as the management protocol. In response to this advisory, CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", ADTRAN began executing the tests that elicit these vulnerabilities for all ADTRAN products that feature SNMPv1 capability.

II. Impact
Preliminary test results have indicated multiple ADTRAN products exhibit certain vulnerabilities to SNMP messages. Some of these vulnerabilities can be exploited, resulting in a denial of service or service interruption. These results have not indicated any vulnerability that will allow an attacker to gain access to the affected device.

III. Solution
ADTRAN is currently applying the PROTOS c06-SNMPv1 test suite to all products that feature SNMPv1 capability. Until ADTRAN has completed testing on all of its products and provided patches or fixes to eliminate these vulnerabilities, ADTRAN recommends considering one or more of the following solutions, as identified in CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03, to minimize your network’s potential exposure to these vulnerabilities:
· Disable the SNMP Service
· Ingress filtering
· Egress filtering
· Filter SNMP traffic from non-authorized internal hosts
· Segregate SNMP traffic onto a separate management network
· Restrict SNMP traffic to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
· Change default community strings
ADTRAN’s NetVanta Solutions
ADTRAN’s NetVanta 2000 Series of products can be used to provide most of the solutions identified above, including ingress and egress filtering, filtering SNMP traffic from non-authorized internal hosts, and restricting SNMP traffic to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). For further information on how NetVanta’s VPN and Firewall solutions can secure your network, please see http://www.adtran.com/netvanta2000.

IV. For Further Information
For more information please see http://www.adtran.com/support/snmp.

AdventNet

This is in reference to your notification regarding [VU#107186 and VU#854306] and OUSPG#0100. AdventNet Inc. has reproduced this behavior in their products and coded a Service Pack fix which is currently in regression testing in AdventNet Inc.'s Q.A. organization. The release of AdventNet Inc's. Service Pack correcting the behavior outlined in [... OUSPG#0100] is scheduled to be generally available to all of AdventNet Inc.'s customers by February 20, 2002.

ADVA AG Optical Networking

ADVA Optical Networking is addressing the SNMP vulnerabilities identified in the advisory CA-2002-03  across the entire product line.

ADVA is currently applying the test suite provided by OUSPG (PROTOS c06-snmpv1 test suite) to all of its products.

Following products are tested against possible effects of the vulnerability report VU#854306 - Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 request:

FSP 3000
FSP 2000
FSP II
FSP I
FSP 1000
FSP 500
CELL-ACE
CELL-ACE-PLUS

The ADVA Network Management products:

FSP Element Manager
FSP Network Manager
CELL-SCOPE

are tested against vulnerabilities of the report VU#107186 - Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 trap handling.

The ongoing tests have not unveiled vulnerabilities so far.

Test results and information about product updates will be published on the ADVA Optical Networking web site: http://www.advaoptical.com .

Alcatel

The security of our customers' networks is of highest priority for Alcatel. Alcatel is aware of this industry-wide SNMP security issue and has put measures in place to assess which of its products might be affected. Within this activity, Alcatel is closely working with its customers and CERT to address and fix potential security problems as identified by CERT.

Allied Telesyn International

Please see http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/IAFY-56DKQY.

Alvarion Ltd.

In response to CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03 regarding multiple vulnerabilities in many implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), Alvarion performed a varied and thorough set of tests on its BreezeACCESS and WALKair products. The tests performed are the ones recommended by the PROTOS project paper.

Following these tests, Alvarion found no denial of service, memory corruption, stack corruption or other fatal error conditions in its BreezeACCESS and WALKair products.

In addition, Alvarion's BreezeACCESS and WALKair products implement the following additional security measures which are recommended by the PROTOS project report:

1. Perimeter filtering to SNMP traffic.
2. SNMP device based network access control to filter the traffic.
3. Isolation of SNMP traffic into a separate management VLAN (applicable for BreezeACCESS II, XL and MMDS).

American Power Conversion

American Power Conversion has conducted extensive testing in order to
determine the impact any vulnerabilities within SNMP pose to our customers.
We have determined that exploiting these vulnerabilities in some versions
of our firmware can interfere with the normal operation of APC's
SNMP-enabled products.

Upgrades are available that repair these vulnerabilities.

For details, refer to the APC Knowlege Base document titled " American Power
Conversion Security Bulletin
" available at www.apc.com.

Apple Computer, Inc.

The only product currently shipping with SNMP software is the AirPort Base Station.  The AirPort Base Station has been tested and no security vulnerabilities associated with advisory CA-2002-03 have been found.

Aprisma

As mentioned within Aprisma’s February 2002 CERT advisory statement, we have performed the necessary SPECTRUM (6.0 rev3 and 6.5) tests required to address CERT Advisory CA-2002-03, VU#107186 - PROTOS Test-Suite: c06-SNMPv1.

Aprisma’s comprehensive testing has revealed less than ten SNMP message tests - out of thousands of individual tests conducted - exhibited irregular system behavior. As a result of these findings, Aprisma is issuing the following patches to protect our customers against known SNMPv1 vulnerabilities:

CERT Advisory CA-2002-03
VU#107186 - Multiple Vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 Trap Handling:
·    Patch 71 for SPECTRUM 6.0 rev3
·    Patch 22 for SPECTRUM 6.5 (SPECTRUM infinitya, SPECTRUM integritya, and SPECTRUM xsighta)

For customer convenience, Aprisma has combined previously released patches (Patches 9 and 21 for SPECTRUM 6.5), that help prevent a SNMPv1 trap-related vulnerability, into the aforementioned Patch 22 for SPECTRUM 6.5. 

It is recommended that all SPECTRUM customers, who have not taken alternative measures to secure their SPECTRUM servers from SNMPv1 vulnerabilities, install the appropriate patch immediately when available.  Patches will be made available over the next several weeks.

Asante Technologies, Inc.

Asante manaufactures and supplies a large range of SNMP managed  enterprise LAN switches  and related products. The following products  have been fully tested and are found NOT to be affected by the SNMP  vunerabilities outlined in VU#854306 and VU#107186.

6524 - 24 port 10/100 switch with 2 GBIC's
3524 - 24 port 10/100 stackable switch with 2 GBE slots
8000 - 24 port 10/100 modular stackable switch with 3 GBE slots
6014 - 12 port 10/100 IntraStack Switch
2072 - Chassis based modular solution
Netstacker II - 24 port 10/100 stackable hub with MII slot
FriendlyNET range of products.

Asante is continuing to address possible vulnerabilities across its entire FriendlyNET, IntraCore and all other product lines. Please contact  support@asante.com for further information.

Astracon, Inc.

The Astracon Stinger NetConnect is safe against the vulnerability reported by VU#107186. The Stinger NetConnect processes SNMP responses only. Since the trap demon is never invoked, the Stinger NetConnect will never receive a trap; it is always safe.

The Stinger NetConnect doesn't accept SNMP requests, but can send SNMP version 1 or version 3 requests.  By configuring the NetConnect to use only SNMP version 3, the vulnerabilities caused when using SNMP version 1 in the network will be avoided.

In order to ensure safety against the vulnerability reported by VU#854306 and VU#107186, the test cases at http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/testing/c06/snmpv1/ were executed, with no adverse effect on the NetConnect. The Stinger NetConnect passed all of the test cases.

Avaya

Avaya is addressing the vulnerabilities identified in this advisory. The latest information on the affect of this vulnerability on Avaya products can be found at: http://support.avaya.com/security

AVET Information and Network Security

AVET FireBorder OS (any version, including 1.4) is not vulnerable to the following vulnerabilities: - CAN-2002-0012 - CAN-2002-0013

This is due to several reasons:

- AVET FireBorder OS does not contain SNMP server
- administrator user can not install SNMP server due to lack of privileges
- system architecture would not allow to run arbitrary code in any of running network daemons; theoretically under some circumstances it could be possible to perform remote DoS attack on vulnerable servers; still to install and run SNMP daemon local user would need to bypass default permission and ACL settings.

Avici Systems Inc.

Avici Systems has tested the TSR and SSR product lines, including all associated line card modules according to recommendations issued by CERT, and has found no security vulnerabilities associated with Advisory CA-2002-03 (Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of SNMP).

BinTec Communications AG

BinTec Communications announces that SNMP vulnerabilty VU#854306 reported in
March has been resolved with System Software Release 6.2.1.  If you do not
wish to use the workarounds suggested in March in order to obviate possible
exploits of VU#854306, you can update your system. The software is currently
available as BETA software from www.bintec.net, and the final release is
expected in June.

Please, note that BETA software is susceptible to malfunctions, and that
BinTec Communications does not assume responsibility for any problems
arising from the use of BETA software. If you do not want to use System
Software Release 6.2.1 BETA, you can still use the workarounds suggested in
our initial statement.

BMC Software

BMC Software, Inc. has completed it's analysis of this security advisory
and has posted detailed information to it's web site.  Specific product
information is referenced at the following location:
http://www.bmc.com/info_center_support/snmp_cert_advise041802.html.

BMC's Patrol Agent was found to require a patch to fix problems found
when running the test suite from Oulu University Secure Programming
Group.  Information on this patch can be found by referencing the above
page or reviewing Problem Resolution ID 116035 from the BMC Support
website, http://www.bmc.com/support.html .  The BMC DevCon SNMP forum at
http://devcon.bmc.com/ also has information about the PATROL patches.

Other information about this alert is also available on the BMC Support
website, under News at "SNMP Advisory Posted by CERT", the direct
reference to this page is:
http://www.bmc.com/info_center_support/news_detail/0,2561,18962_0_125215,00.html .

CacheFlow

The purpose of this email is to advise you that CacheFlow Inc. has provided a software update. Please be advised that updated versions of the software are now available for all supported CacheFlow hardware platforms, and may be obtained by CacheFlow customers at the following URL:
http://download.cacheflow.com/
The specific reference to the software update is contained within the Release Notes for CacheOS Versions 3.1.22 Release ID 17146, 4.0.15 Release ID 17148, 4.1.02 Release ID 17144 and 4.0.15 Release ID 17149.

RELEASE NOTES FOR CACHEFLOW SERVER ACCELERATOR PRODUCTS:

RELEASE NOTES FOR CACHEFLOW CONTENT ACCELERATOR PRODUCTS: * SR 1-1647517, VI 13045: This update modified a potential vulnerability by using an SNMP test tools exploit.

3Com Corporation

A vulnerability to an SNMP packet with an invalid length community string has been resolved in the following products. Customers concerned about this weakness should ensure that they upgrade to the following agent versions:

PS Hub 40
2.16 is due Feb 2002

PS Hub 50
2.16 is due Feb 2002

Dual Speed Hub
2.16 is due Jan 2002

Switch 1100/3300
2.68 is available now

Switch 4400
2.02 is available now

Switch 4900
2.04 is available now

WebCache1000/3000
2.00 is due Jan 2002

For updated information on CommWorks Corporation, a 3Com company, visit http://www.commworks.com/Press/Archive/2002/February/CERT_Advisory.asp

In addition, CommWorks' customers should monitor http://totalservice.commworks.com/cert_update.cfm for updated information addressing the CERT advisory, as well as information on available patches for CommWorks' products.

Caldera

Caldera International, Inc. has reproduced faulty behavior in Caldera SCO OpenServer 5, Caldera UnixWare 7, and Caldera Open UNIX 8. We have coded a software fix for supported versions of Caldera UnixWare 7 and Caldera Open UNIX 8 that will be available from our support site at http://stage.caldera.com/support/security immediately following the publication of this CERT announcement. A fix for supported versions of OpenServer 5 will be available at a later date.

Cambridge Broadband Ltd.

Cambridge Broadband's products use the ucd-snmp package, version 4.2.3, with proprietary extensions.  We have tested our build of the software with the OUSPG test suites and determined that it is not susceptible to these vulnerabilities.

Canoga Perkins Corporation

Please see http://www.canoga.com/technical_bulletins.htm

Carrier Access

Carrier Access has reviewed the  released CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03 related to security vulnerabilities that exist in network devices using SNMPv1 as the management protocol.

There are no known format string or buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Denial of service (management) is a known vulnerability of Carrier Access products residing on non-secure networks. Specific testing and a review of test reports have revealed no SNMP V1 security issues.   Carrier Access has documented this finding in a Product Technical Note (PTN-02-003).  To receive a copy of this documentation, please contact Carrier Access customer support center at 1-800-786-9929 or email to "tech-support@carrieraccess.com"

Recommended Actions for Network Security:
. Review and implementation of accepted solutions outlined in section III (Solution) of CERT ® Advisory CA-2002-03
. Filter of SNMP traffic at network access points
. Use of proprietary SNMP Community Strings
. Segregate/Filter Network Management traffic from public domains

Check Point Software Technologies Inc.

Check Point Statement on SNMP Vulnerability Test Suite

Recently, an automated suite has been released which tests products for known SNMP vulnerabilities.

FireWall-1, by default, blocks all SNMP communication to, from, or across a FireWall-1 gateway. SNMP communication is enabled only if the administrator writes a specific rule which allows the communication.

SNMP communication is not required for correct functionality of any Check Point products.

If SNMP monitoring of Check Point firewalls is needed, Check Point recommends that the FireWall-1 rule base tightly restrict SNMP communication and that all relevant operating system security patches be applied.

Check Point knows of no SNMP-related security issues in any of its products, and has conducted an extensive review to ensure that none exist.

CipherTrust, Inc.

This is in reference to your notification regarding VU#107186 and VU#854306. CipherTrust has confirmed that IronMail is not vulnerable to these issues. IronMail allows alert notification via SNMP traps. This allows the IronMail to be integrated into SNMP managed services without being open to vulnerabilities such as these. Specifically, due to the way that IronMail uses SNMP, it does not receive requests or traps.

Cisco Systems

Cisco Systems is addressing the vulnerabilities identified by VU#854306 and VU#107186 across its entire product line.  Cisco has released an advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-malformed-snmp-msgs-pub.shtml

CNT

Overview
On February 12, 2002, the CERT® Coordination Center of Carnegie-Mellon University issued an advisory identifying possible security vulnerabilities of multiple vendor products that utilize the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) for management of those products.  This advisory was based on research done by the University of Oulu in Finland.  The complete advisory may be found on the CERT web site at:    http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-03.html.  If your site uses SNMP-based CNT products in any capacity, we encourage you to read this advisory.

I. Description
The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is a widely deployed protocol that is commonly used to monitor and manage network devices. Version 1 of the protocol (SNMPv1) defines several types of SNMP messages that are used to request information or configuration changes, respond to requests, enumerate SNMP objects, and send unsolicited alerts. The Oulu University Secure Programming Group (OUSPG, http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/) has reported vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 implementations from many different vendors.  OUSPG's research focused on the manner in which SNMPv1 agents and managers handle request and trap messages. By applying the PROTOS c06-snmpv1 test suite (http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/testing/c06/snmpv1/0100.html) to a variety of popular SNMPv1-enabled products, the OUSPG revealed the following vulnerabilities:

VU#107186 - Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 trap handling
SNMP trap messages are sent from agents to managers. A trap message may indicate a warning or error condition or otherwise notify the manager about the agent's state. SNMP managers must properly decode trap messages and process the resulting data. In testing, OUSPG found multiple vulnerabilities in the way many SNMP managers decode and process SNMP trap messages.

VU#854306 - Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 request handling
SNMP request messages are sent from managers to agents. Request messages might be issued to obtain information from an agent or to instruct the agent to configure the host device. SNMP agents must properly decode request messages and process the resulting data. In testing, OUSPG found multiple vulnerabilities in the way many SNMP agents decode and process SNMP request messages.

Vulnerabilities in the decoding and subsequent processing of SNMP messages by both managers and agents may result in denial-of-service conditions, format string vulnerabilities, and buffer overflows. Some vulnerabilities do not require the SNMP message to use the correct SNMP community string.

II. CNT® Products
CNT has a number of products affected by the SNMP vulnerabilities described above.  Each CNT product with SNMP functionality is described below along with the specific vulnerability, or lack thereof, of that product and the recommended procedures to follow with that product.

  • UltraNet® Storage Director
    The UltraNet Storage Director (USD) was tested with the PROTOS test suite.  Two tests caused snmpd on the USD to abort and restart; the snmpd responded to requests specifying a community string beginning with a null; several minor ASN.1 / BER handling discrepancies related to invalid encodings were noted.  Corrective code for the snmpd aborts and the community string handling issue has been developed and successfully tested.  This code will be made available in the USD 2.7 software release, currently scheduled for availability in April 2002.  The ASN.1 / BER invalid encoding handling issues will be addressed in a future release.  CNT recommends upgrading to the USD 2.7 software release as soon as it is available.
  • UltraNet Edge Storage Router
    The UltraNet Edge Storage Router (Edge) was tested with the PROTOS test suite.  Three tests caused the Edge to hang or abort, requiring a reboot. Corrective code for these errors has been developed and successfully tested. The Edge responded to requests specifying a bad SNMP version number; several minor ASN.1 / BER handling discrepancies related to invalid encodings were noted. The responded to bad SNMP version number and the ASN.1 / BER invalid encoding handling issues will be addressed in a future release. This code will be made available in the Edge software release 1.4.1, currently scheduled for release in April 2002.  CNT recommends upgrading the Edge to release 1.4.1 as soon as it is available.
  • Channelink®
    The Channelink product was tested with the PROTOS test suite.  All tests ran successfully.  No failures occurred.  No corrective action is required with the Channelink product.
  • WebView
    The WebView SNMP-based element manager was tested with the PROTOS test suite.  WebView is not affected by the recent SNMP vulnerabilities found by CERT.  No corrective action is required with the WebView product.
  • UltraNet CMF
    The CastleRock software upon which CNT's UltraNet CMF SNMP-based management software is based was tested with the PROTOS test suite.  CastleRock has reported two test failures.  Corrective code for these errors has been developed and is now being tested within UltraNet CMF.  This code will be made available in the CMF release 6.4, currently scheduled for release in early May 2002.  CNT recommends upgrading CMF to release 6.4 as soon as it is available.
III. CNT Product Upgrades
CNT will continue to test new releases of its products against the PROTOS test suite to ensure that additional vulnerabilities are not introduced as a result of any new releases.

To determine whether a new CNT product release is available and how to upgrade to that release when available, contact CNT Technical Support (800-752-8061 or 763-268-6600) or contact your company's CNT Technical Account Engineer (TAE).

Compaq Computer Corporation

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

TITLE: (SSRT0779) Potential Security Vulnerabilities in SNMP
Posted at http://ftp.support.compaq.com/patches/.new/security.shtml

NOTICE: There are no restrictions for distribution of this
Bulletin provided that it remains complete and intact.

RELEASE DATE:   18 FEBRUARY, 2002

    UPDATED:   03 APRIL,    2002 - update Tru64, patch availability
               08 MARCH,    2002 - add StorageWorks products, and
                                   Compaq/Microcom based products.
               05 MARCH,    2002 - update TRU64 Information

SEVERITY: MEDIUM

SOURCE:  Compaq Computer Corporation
        Compaq Global Services
        Software Security Response Team

CROSS REFERENCE:   (SSRT0799, CAN-2002-0012,
                   CAN-2002-0013, CERT CA-2002-03)

PROBLEM SUMMARY:

The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT/cc) has recently issued an
advisory regarding numerous potential vulnerabilities in SNMPv1
implementations. These potential vulnerabilities are applicable to
SNMPv1 trap handling and SNMPv1 Request handling. The CERT article
outlines vulnerabilities that can cause SNMP services to stop
functioning and in some cases may enable "unauthorized access,"
"denial of service attacks" or may cause system instability.

IMPACT:
Compaq NonStop Himalaya Servers:
Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS:
Compaq Tru64 UNIX:
Compaq Insight Management Suite:
Compaq Deskpro, Professional Workstation, Armada, Evo:
Compaq SANworks Hardware:
Compaq StorageWorks Products
Compaq/Microcom Products:

Compaq's findings to date regarding the SNMPv1 issues are as
follows:

________________________________
Compaq NonStop Himalaya Servers:

The Compaq Himalaya NonStop Kernel prohibits execution of code on the
stack or heap by hardware TLB permissions (read/write only),
preventing Trojan horse attacks by embedding code within the buffer
overflow area. However, process ABENDs can occur.

The SNMP agent ABENDs in the c06-snmpv1 buffer-overflow tests.
This affects forwarding trap messages and/or sending info responses
to SNMP managers.

Sub-agents use IPCs to communicate with the SNMP agent, so they
cannot be directly attacked.  More importantly, sub-agents are
confined to information only requests, so they cannot be used to
configure/manage their sub-systems. Our investigation an analysis is
continuing and further updates will be provided.

IPMs to address the ABEND problem of the SNMP are in development and
will be released as soon as verification is complete. Availability of
these IPMs will be announced in future updates. The exposure to
SNMP agent ABENDs can be reduced by running the SNMP agent as a
process-pair or by configuring auto-restart in the Persistence
Manager.

__________________________________
Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS:

There is some impact to the SNMP agent provided with Compaq TCP/IP
Services for OpenVMS. This problem can cause the SNMP agent to ACCVIO
and terminate temporarily denying service to SNMP, but in most cases
after this occurs Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS will restart
the SNMP agent in response to the next SNMP request. There are no
known risks of compromising system security due to this problem.
The SNMP agent executes from a non-privileged process, which
prevents any compromise to system security.

Our investigation and analysis has determined the cause of the
problem. The updated images for Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS
are now in final test. Compaq will provide updates to Compaq TCP/IP
Services for OpenVMS in the next ECO and also in the next release,
Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS V5.3. Contact Compaq's Customer
Support Center if an earlier updated is required.

__________________
Compaq Tru64 UNIX:

UPDATE: 02 April, 2002

There is no known risk of compromising Tru64 UNIX system security
due to the recent SNMP attack.  The SNMP agent provided with
Tru64 UNIX is susceptible to a limited problem - the SNMP
agent may stop responding to SNMP requests, or it may incur a
segmentation fault, generate a core file, and exit. Either scenario
denies SNMP service to SNMP-based network management applications.
However,  we have not found the attack to cause the system to be
unstable, vulnerable to "unauthorized access",  or subject to any
denial of service other than to the SNMP service.

Impacted Tru64 UNIX operating system versions include:
Tru64 UNIX 4.0f, 4.0g, 5.0a, 5.1, 5.1a.

SOLUTION:

  Until the Tru64 UNIX fixes are available in the mainstream release
  patch kits, Compaq is releasing the following Early Release Patch
  Kit(s) (ERPs) publicly for use by any customer.

  The Early Release Patch kits use dupatch to install and will not
  install over any Customer-Specific-Patches (CSPs) which have file
  intersections with the ERPs. Raise an IPMT case to UNIX Support
  Engineering if you need a CSP merged with one of the following
ERPs.

  The fixes contained in the Early Release Patch (ERP) kits will be
  available in the next mainstream patch kit(s) for:
       - Tru64 UNIX 4.0F PK8
       - Tru64 UNIX 4.0G PK4
       - Tru64 UNIX 5.0A PK4
       - Tru64 UNIX 5.1  PK5
       - Tru64 UNIX 5.1A PK2

  ---------------------
  Early Release Patches
  ---------------------

  Tru64 UNIX 4.0F
  PREREQUISITE:    Tru64 UNIX 4.0F with PK7 (BL18) installed
  ERP Kit Name:    DUV40FB18-C0071301-13866-ES-20020401
  Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v4.0f/


  Tru64 UNIX 4.0G
  PREREQUISITE:    Tru64 UNIX 4.0G with PK3 (BL17) installed
  ERP Kit Name:    T64V40GB17-C0012100-13640-ES-20020313
  Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v4.0g/


  Tru64 UNIX 5.0A
  PREREQUISITE:    Tru64 UNIX 5.0A with PK3 (BL17) installed
  ERP Kit Name:    T64V50AB17-C0019600-13593-ES-20020308
  Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v5.0a/


  Tru64 UNIX 5.1
  PREREQUISITE:    Tru64 UNIX 5.1 with PK4 (BL18) installed
  ERP Kit Name:    T64V51B18-C0109002-13712-ES-20020318
  Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v5.1/


  Tru64 UNIX 5.1A
  PREREQUISITE:    Tru64 UNIX 5.1A with PK1 (BL1) installed
  ERP Kit Name:    T64V51AB1-C0014802-13710-ES-20020318
  Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v5.1a/

  MD5 and SHA1 checksums are available in the public patch notice for
  the ERP kits. You can find information on how to verify MD5 and
  SHA1 checksums at:
       http://www.support.compaq.com/patches/whats-new.shtml

________________________________
Compaq Insight Management Suite:

(ProLiants running industry standard operating systems including
Windows 2000, NetWare, Linux, etc)

The Compaq Insight Management Suite utilizes SNMP as a primary
communications method.  Fixes to the operating systems affected will
be provided by the vendors involved.  Check
http://www.compaq.com/manage/security the most up-to-date
information.

_______________________________________________
Deskpro, Professional Workstation, Armada, Evo:

The Deskpro, Professional Workstation, Armada, Evo(Microsoft
operating systems including Windows XP, Windows 2000, Windows 98, and
Windows 95) Compaq Management Agents for Clients utilizes SNMP as an
optional communications method.

Fixes to the operating systems affected
will be provided by Microsoft.  Check
www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-006.asp for the most
up-to-date information.


_____________________________________
Compaq SANworks Management Appliance:

The SANworks management appliance is essentially a Compaq server and
our recommended configuration does not have it connected directly to
the internet.  Therefore, it is less exposed than other servers to
external SNMP security attacks.  However, the appliance is
susceptible to SNMP security attacks from inside the firewall that
could result in the graceful termination of some storage management
applications on the appliance.

Compaq will provide a patch to the appliance as soon as possible.

_____________________________
COMPAQ STORAGEWORKS PRODUCTS:

UPDATE: 08 MARCH, 2002

The following Compaq StorageWorks products have Ethernet
connections that may potentially be exposed to the SNMPv1
vulnerability:

Compaq StorageWorks SAN Switch 8, 8-EL, 16, 16-EL, 2/16, Integrated
32 or 64 Port
Compaq StorageWorks SAN Director 64
Compaq StorageWorks Modular Data Router
Compaq StorageWorks 12 Port Fibre Channel Managed Hub
Compaq StorageWorks 20/40 GB 8 Cassette AutoLoader


RESOLUTION:
Compaq StorageWorks SAN Switch 8, 8-EL,
16, 16-EL, 2/16, Integrated 32 or 64 Port:
There are currently no known issues related to vulnerability
notes VU#854306 or VU#107186 with these products.
They have passed all validation tests conducted to date.

Compaq StorageWorks SAN Director 64:
This product has been evaluated with a SNMP based test program that
attempts to overload the director with SNMP traffic such as GET, Set
and Get Next commands. No problems were found in this testing.
Additionally, Compaq is in the process of evaluating the details of
the SNMP implementation in this product. Any problems identified that
are determined to pose a risk to customer operations will be
documented and addressed in future maintenance releases. Note that
the advisory documented two areas of vulnerability. One area involves
Trap handling on the part of SNMP Management components, and the
other area involves the processing of GET, Set and Get Next commands
on the part of SNMP Agent components. The director implements only
the SNMP Agent components, so none of the problems related to Trap
handling apply. Also, the SNMP Agent on the director management
server is disabled by default.  No SNMP messages are processed by
the management server unless the systems administrator has explicitly
enabled the SNMP Agent.  On the director itself, the SNMP Agent is
enabled by default, but for read access only.

Compaq StorageWorks Modular Data Router:
The potential vulnerability has to do with SNMP Set commands.
The only Set command the MDR allows is to set the trap address.

Compaq StorageWorks 12 Port Fibre Channel Managed Hub:
Compaq is in the process of evaluating the SNMP implementation
in this product.

Compaq StorageWorks 20/40 GB 8 Cassette AutoLoader:
Compaq is in the process of evaluating the SNMP implementation
in this product.

________________________
COMPAQ/MICROCOM PRODUCTS:

UPDATE: MARCH 08, 2002
_________________________________________
Microcom Access Integrator (All Versions)
Compaq-Microcom 6000 Series Remote Access Concentrators(All Versions)

Both products use SNMPv1 protocol as the transport for system
management, either through expressWATCH, or third party SNMP clients.
These products are normally managed over the LAN by clients using IP
ports UDP 161 for SNMP and UDP 162 for SNMP Traps.  The SNMP agents
integrated in these products cannot be disabled. Access to the system
via the PRI, T1 or analog modules do not present a security risk
related to SNMPv1.

Incursions may result in instability of the system requiring a hard
reset of one or more of the systems modules, which will result in
temporary loss of connectivity to dial in clients. Users will be
able to reconnect after the systems has reset.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
Compaq recommends the following precautions in accordance with good
general networking administration practices.

1. Apply perimeter filtering to SNMP traffic. Upstream
internet routers, or Firewall should be configured to filter
UDP ports 161 and 162.

2. Compaq has always recommended that the associated
engines contained in the CM6000 Series reside on an internal
network using a non-routable private addressing scheme.

3. The system should not be managed over the internet or
an non secure LAN.

______________________________
Microcom ISPorte (All Versions)
Compaq Microcom 4000 concentrator

These products make very limited use of the SNMPv1 protocol on
the Ethernet portion of their PRI/T1 modules. In the limited
number of installations where digital calls are being tunneled
to NT servers on the connected LAN, there is a potential for
SNMP packets to reach the PRI/T1 card through it's Ethernet
port. Access to the system via the analog modem modules do
not present security risk related to SNMPv1.

Incursions may result in instability of the PRI/T1 card, resulting
in a loss of connectivity for dial in users. A hard reset is the
only way to correct these failure, but a hard reset will also
disconnect all remaining users. Users will be able to reconnect
after the system resets.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
Compaq recommends the following precautions in accordance with good
general networking administration practices.

1. Apply perimeter filtering to SNMP traffic. Upstream internet
routers should be configured to filter UDP ports 161 and 162.

2. If the system is being used for analog dial in access only,
it should not be connected to the LAN via the Ethernet port on
the PRI/T1 card.

___________________________
Microcom SNMP HDMS+ System (Version 1.3.1)

The great majority of HDMS+ systems installed do not have SNMP
capabilities and are therefore not at risk. These systems can be
identified by the absence of a 10baseT connector on the rear of the
controller card.

A limited number of SNMP HDMS+ systems were produced, this product
uses SNMPv1 protocol as the transport for system management.
Management clients can include either expressWATCH, or third party
SNMP clients.

The product can be managed over the LAN by clients using IP ports
UDP 161 for SNMP and UDP 162 for SNMP Traps, or through a serial
RS232 port using SLIP.  The SNMP agents integrated in these products
cannot be disabled. Access to the system via the analog modem modules
do not present security risk related to SNMPv1.

Incursions may result in instability of the systems management
controller, which may require a hard reset. The reset of this
controller may result in a temporary loss of connectivity for
dial in users. Dial in users will be able to reconnect after
the system has reset.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
Compaq recommends the following precautions in accordance with good
general networking administration practices.

1. Apply perimeter filtering to SNMP traffic. Upstream
internet routers or firewalls should be configured to filter
UDP ports 161 and 162.

2. The system should not be managed over the internet.

3. The system should not be managed over a non secure LAN.
Direct management via a serial RS232 SLIP connection would be
recommended.

For assistance or clarification on any of the recommendation for
Compaq/Microcom products, please call 01-800-652-6672 and from
the menu select 2,3,1 then enter routing code 1851

____________________________________________________________________




NOTE:

Many systems operate behind firewalls and would normally
implement SNMP blocking for SNMP as standard procedure. Based on SNMP
blocking and ingress/egress filtering, the potential Security
vulnerability may only be exploited by users who have access to your
local security domain, therefore the risk is diminished.


SUPPORT:

This advisory bulletin will be updated for the various
products requiring patches and individual patch notifications
will be done through standard "patch notification" procedures
for those products. For further information, contact your normal
Compaq Support channel.


SUBSCRIBE:

To subscribe to automatically receive future Security
Advisories from the Compaq's Software Security Response Team via
electronic mail:

http://www.support.compaq.com/patches/mailing-list.shtml

REPORT:

To report a potential security vulnerability with any Compaq
supported product, send email mailto:security-ssrt@compaq.com
or mailto:sec-alert@compaq.com

Compaq appreciates your cooperation and patience. As always,
Compaq urges you to periodically review your system management
and security procedures. Compaq will continue to review and
enhance the security features of its products and work with
our customers to maintain and improve the security and integrity
of their systems.

"Compaq is broadly distributing this Security Bulletin in order to
bring to the attention of users of the affected Compaq products the
important security information contained in this Bulletin.
Compaq recommends that all users determine the applicability of
this information to their individual situations and take appropriate
action.  Compaq does not warrant that this information is necessarily
accurate or complete for all user situations and, consequently,
Compaq will not be responsible for any damages resulting from
user's use or disregard of the information provided in this
Bulletin."

Copyright 2002 Compaq Information Technologies Group, L.P.
Compaq shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors
or omissions contained herein. The information in this document
is subject to change without notice. Compaq and the names of
Compaq products referenced herein are, either, trademarks
and/or service marks or registered trademarks and/or service
marks of Compaq Information Technologies Group, L.P. Other product
and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks and/or service
marks of their respective owners.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 7.0.1

iQA/AwUBPLQ7jznTu2ckvbFuEQLuTwCgrJV3CBEwYiFEbWsCF0mbHBRVc/oAoNcI
1KxCsylGTohymyn9t4kbuR/C
=F6B1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Computer Associates

Computer Associates has confirmed Unicenter vulnerability to the SNMP advisory identified by CERT notification reference [VU#107186 & VU#854306] and OUSPG#0100. We have produced corrective maintenance to address these vulnerabilities, which is in the process of publication for all applicable releases / platforms and will be offered through the CA Support site. Please contact our Technical Support organization for information regarding availability / applicability for your specific configuration(s).

COMTEK Services, Inc.

In reference to your notification regarding [VU#617947] [OUSPG#0100], vulnerabilities in COMTEK Services' SNMP products are as follows:

NMServer for AS/400 is not an SNMP master and is therefore not vulnerable. However this product requires the use of the AS/400 SNMP master agent supplied by IBM.  Please refer to IBM for statements of vulnerabilities for the AS/400 SNMP master agent.

NMServer for OpenVMS has been tested and has shown to be vulnerable.  COMTEK Services has released a new version (version 3.5) of this product that includes a fix for this problem.  Contact COMTEK Services support@comtekservices.com to arrange to download the new version.

NMServer for VOS has not as yet been tested; vulnerability of this agent is unknown.  Contact support@comtekservices.com for further information on the testing schedule of the VOS product.

Concord Communications, Inc.

Concord's eHealth Console product has some vulnerabilities to the OUSPG test suite. Patches are available.

Concord's SystemEDGE agent has been tested and is not vulnerable on Unix platforms. Under Windows, it is a sub-agent of the Windows SNNMP agent, and therefore the Windows hot fixes should be applied. SystemEDGE is not vulnerable on Win2K and XP with Microsoft's hot fixes.

Please see this page on Concord's web site for more detail and for patch availability: http://www.concord.com/certadvisory.shtml

Conectiva

The ucd-snmp package from Conectiva Linux 5.0, 5.1, 6.0, 7.0, "ferramentas gráficas" and "ecommerce" are affected by this vulnerability. Previous Conectiva Linux are also affected, but they are no longer supported and no update will be provided for them.

New packages will be provided shortly and will be announced to our mailing lists and updates website ( http://distro.conectiva.com.br/atualizacoes/).

Controlware GmbH

Controlware GmbH

In order to determine the impact of these vulnerabilities, Controlware immediately started extensive testing of the effected products. The results of these tests can be viewed on the Website.

Corsaire Limited

Corsaire Limited response to SNMP Vulnerability Test Suite (CERT Advisory CA-2002-03)

Corsaire Limited have analysed the Secure Technical Assistance Centre (STAC) SNMP agent software that is used as part of their managed services solution and can confirm that the agent is not susceptible to any of the vulnerabilities reported.

The STAC SNMP agent software has been entirely developed in-house and does not rely on any third-party libraries. Probing by the PROTOS test suite is correctly recognised as malformed packets and reported as such within the audit trail.

Further information is available from http://www.corsaire.com

Covalent Technologies

Covalent Technologies has tested the Enterprise Ready Server, Managed Server, and Covalent Conductor SNMP module according to recommendations issued by CERT, and has found no security vulnerabilities associated with Advisory CA-2002-03.

Cray Inc.

Cray, Inc. had opened spr 721879 to track this problem. At this time, Cray suggests that Unicos and Unicos/mk sites disable the SNMP daemon.

CSCare, Inc.

As a result of this advisory, CSCare has conducted extensive testing of its products. We have determined that exploiting these vulnerabilities can interfere with the normal operation of Trap Console 1.4b. Results have not indicated any vulnerability that will allow an attacker to gain access to the host computer. It has been determined that Active SNMP 2.0b is not vulnerable.

CSCare has released Trap Console 1.4c update on March 5, 2002. This release containing fixes for all known vulnerabilities is now available for download at http://www.cscare.com/TrapConsole.

For more information, please feel free to contact CSCare by email at info@cscare.com or by phone at 408-490-2736.

Dart Communications

In response to CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03, the PowerTCP SNMP Tool has been reviewed and found vulnerable for issue VU#854306 and VU#107186.  To address these issues, an update of the PowerTCP SNMP Tool will be released on February 28th, 2002.  Details of the specific problems found and the methods used to address these vulnerabilities will be included in the PowerTCP Release History at http://www.dart.com/downloads/update.txt .  If you have any questions concerning PowerTCP SNMP security vulnerabilities, please contact Dart Communications at support@dart.com.

Dartware, LLC

Dartware, LLC (www.dartware.com) supplies two products that use SNMPv1 in a manager role, InterMapper and SNMP Watcher. These products are not vulnerable to the SNMP vulnerability described in [VU#854306 and VU#107186]. This statement applies to all present and past versions of these two software packages.

In addition, our port of net-snmp to MacOS X has been updated to version 4.2.2, and is not susceptible to this attack. More information is available from http://www.dartware.com/net-snmp/

Dell

Title
Dell Response to CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)

Audience
For worldwide distribution provided that the contents are not altered in any way.

Released
April 8, 2002

Updated
April 19, 2002 (Updated the Dell PowerVault section regarding PowerVault 701N and PowerVault 705N)

Reference
CERT Advisory CA-2002-03 - http://www.cert. org/advisories/CA-2002-03.html

Overview
The CERT/CC released an industry-wide SNMP advisory on February 12, 2002. An SNMPv1 test suite provided by the Oulu University Secure Programming Group (OUSPG) has been found to adversely affect many SNMPv1 implementations, causing the potential for “unauthorized privileged access”, “denial-of-service attacks” and general unstable behavior.

Potential Impact
Dell PowerEdge
Dell OpenManage
Dell PowerVault
Dell PowerApp
Dell PowerConnect


Dell PowerEdge, Dell OpenManage
Dell PowerEdge servers running Dell OpenManage software utilize SNMPv1, however this software makes use of the operating system’s master SNMP agent.  After applying the appropriate update(s) from the operating system manufacturer, Dell SNMP agents are not affected.

Solution: Apply the appropriate update(s) provided by the operating system vendor. For more information, click here.


Dell PowerVault
The following Dell PowerVault storage systems have been found vulnerable to the OUSPG SNMPv1 test suite:

Dell PowerVault 701N
Dell PowerVault 705N

Solution: These devices require an update from Dell.

The Dell PowerVault Assist utility that is required to update both PowerVault 701N and PowerVault 705N devices can be found here.
The updated image for both the PowerVault 701N and PowerVault 705N devices can be found here.


Dell PowerApp
The following Dell PowerApp appliance has been found vulnerable to the OUSPG SNMPv1 test suite:

Dell PowerApp 220 (Dell PowerApp.BIG-IP)

Solution: This device requires an update from Dell.

Information regarding the update for non-encrypted devices can be found here.
Information regarding the update for encrypted devices can be found here.


Dell PowerConnect
All Dell PowerConnect devices successfully passed the test cases provided by the OUSPG SNMPv1 test suite.


Operating System Vendor Information
The following Dell supported operating system vendors have released information regarding their SNMPv1 vulnerabilities:

Microsoft®
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-006.asp

Novell®
http://supp ort.novell.com/servlet/tidfinder/2961546

Red Hat®
http:// www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-163.html


Dell Computer Corporation has provided this advisory bulletin in response to the concerns raised by OUSPG and to provide information to users of Dell systems regarding its SNMP implementation.  Dell recommends that user's review this information and determine its applicability to their individual situations.  In addition, Dell does not provide any warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of this information and will not be liable for damages that may result from usage or disregard of the information provided.  The information provided is subject to change.  For further information and related updates, please contact your standard Dell support channel.  Dell retains ownership of its trademarks and service marks as well as the information contained in this advisory bulletin.

Digital Networks

Digital Networks is addressing the vulnerabilities identified in this
advisory.  The latest information on the affect of this vulnerability on
Digital Networks products as well as any remedial software patches can be
found at http://www.digitalnetworks.net/support.

D-Link Systems, Inc.

D-Link has tested our DES-3226, DES-3326, DES-3624i and DES-6000 products and determined that these products are not susceptible to the SNMP vulnerability issue.  Since all D-Link products with SNMP agent use the same code base, D-Link has concluded that all of our products do not have the SNMP vulnerability issue.  However, we continue to evaluate and investigate all D-Link products implemented with SNMP agent.  Upon completion of our evaluation, D-Link will provide and post an update with our thorough test results.

DMH Software

DMH Software applied the OULU University test suite to its various
portable snmp-agent products: SNMPv1, SNMPv2c and SNMPv3.

We found that the following or later releases of DMH portable
snmp-agent products are NOT vulnerable to CERT vulnerability advisory
VU#854306 (Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 request handling)


(1) SNMPv1  Agent version - 2.0.9.1

(2) SNMPv2c Agent version - 3.0.5.3

(3) SNMPv3  Agent version - 4.0.8.2


The above releases, or newer releases, are currently available to our
customers. We strongly recommend our customers to contact us to obtain
an upgrade and update their source code.

Please note that we received notes from some of our customers who
reported that previous releases of DMH snmp-agent products were tested
an found not vulnerable to VU#107186. Nevertheless we recommend an
upgrade to the recent releases.

Efficient Networks, Inc.

Efficient Networks, Inc. has reviewed CERT Advisory CA-2002-03 and is performing the recommended tests to determine if its products are impacted. The following products do not have SNMP management capabilities and are not affected: SpeedStream 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5200, and 5300 series devices, as well as the 5667 bridge product.  Testing is still in progress on other Efficient Networks' products. Efficient Networks will continue to update its statement on this site as additional information becomes available.

EnGarde Secure Linux

EnGarde Secure Linux did not ship any SNMP packages in version 1.0.1 of our distribution, so we are not vulnerable to either bug.

Enterasys

On 12-February-2002, CERT (http://www.cert.org) announced serious vulnerabilities in the SNMP implementations of virtually every networking vendor's equipment. These vulnerabilities were discovered by a Finnish research group known as OUSPG, associated with Oulu University, and are documented in advisory CA-2002-03.

These vulnerabilities exist in all versions of SNMP (v1/v2c/v3) and can be used to cause SNMP implementations to behave in an unpredictable manner, resulting in denials of service or system failures.

Given the serious nature of these vulnerabilities, Enterasys is testing our product line to determine which products are affected. Patches for affected products will be made available to our customers. Please check the Enterasys Support web site periodically for further details and patch information.

Until these patches become available, Enterasys recommends that the following steps be taken to help reduce exposure to these vulnerabilities.

  • Disable SNMP from interfaces through which SNMP commands should not be received, such as those providing connection from the Internet or Extranets.
  • Use Access Control Lists at the access edge to prevent SNMP traffic from unauthorized internal hosts from entering the network.
  • Use management VLANs or out-of-band management to contain SNMP traffic and multicasts. These do not prevent an attacker from exploiting these vulnerabilities, but they may make it more difficult to initiate the attacks.
  • Enable 802.1X port-locking and RADIUS to prevent unauthenticated users from attaching to the network.
  • Use NetSight Policy Manager to automatically restrict the use of SNMP to authenticated, SNMP-authorized personnel.
  • Update Dragon IDS signatures to help identify when these attacks are being used.

Entrada Networks

This is in reference to you notification regarding VU#854306, VU#107186, and OUSPG#0100. Entrada Networks has reproduced this behavior and coded a software release enhancement for the affected products which is currently in regression testing within Entrada Networks' Quality Assurance organization. The release of Entrada Networks software enhancement addressing the behavior outlined in VU#854306, VU#107186, and OUSPG#0100 will be available to Entrada Networks, Sync Research, and Rixon Networks customers with Software Subscription Service on a request basis, no later than April 15, 2002.

Entrada Networks has also produced a document discussing the alternative workarounds or configuration options to address the behavior outlined in VU#854306, VU#107186, and OUSPG#0100.This document is also available on request from customers. Please contact the Technical Support organization at 800-331-8669 for more information.

Entrada Networks is providing the statement below as a response to
be included in your vendor's statement section on SNMP CERT Alert 2002-03.

Entrada Networks Sync Research, Inc. and Rixon Networks, Inc., (both are companies of Entrada Networks)

Entrada Networks, through the companies of Sync Research, Inc. and
Rixon Networks ,has confirmed vulnerability to the SNMP advisory identified
by CERT notification reference [VU#107186 & VU#854306] and OUSPG#0100.

Sync Research also manufactures and supports products formerly
manufactured by Tylink, Inc. and Osicom, Inc.
Rixon Networks, Inc. also manufactures and supports products
formerly manufactured by Osicom, Inc.

Entrada Networks has run all the test cases found in the PROTOS test-suite, c06snmpv1:
   1. c06-snmpv1-req-app-pr1.jar
   2. c06-snmpv1-req-enc-pr1.jar
   3. c06-snmpv1-trap-app-pr1.jar
   4. c06-snmpv1-trap-enc-pr1.jar

   The tests were run with standard delay time between the requests
(100ms).

   Entrada Networks, through their companies of Sync Research and Rixon
Networks, supplies a broad range of networking products, some of which are
affected by the SNMP vulnerabilities identified by CERT Coordination Center.
The manner, in which, they are affected and the actions required to avoid
being impacted by exploitation of these vulnerabilities varies from product
to product.
  
Entrada Networks customers may contact our Technical Support Center
via either telephone 800-331-8669 or via email: mailto:support@sync,com  for
additional information, especially regarding their availability of the
latest enhanced code releases addressing the SNMP vulnerabilities.

   The tests that were run apply to the following Entrada Networks,
Sync Research, and Rixon Networks  products.

   The Sync Research FRADs (3600,3700, 4200, and 4300 series), the
Tylink FRAPs (D-FRAP, M-FRAP, S-FRAP, T-FRAP),
   Sync Research management platform (Envisage for Windows and Envisage
for UNIX) and the Osicom Routermate series.
   The software tested on these products was the latest software
releases that are generally available.

   Entrada Networks is in the process of creating a publication for all
applicable releases / platforms and will be offering this publication
through the Entrada Networks Support site at
<http://www.entradanetworks.com>  or the Sync Research, Inc. site at
<http://www.sync.com> at a future date.

   Please contact our Technical Support organization for information
regarding availability / applicability for your specific configurations.

   Following is a list of companies whose products are addressed by
this preliminary response:

   Sync Research, Inc. (see Entrada Networks)
   Osicom, Inc. (see Entrada Networks)
   Rixon Networks, Inc. (see Entrada Networks)
   Torrey Pines Networks, Inc. (see Entrada Networks)
   Tylink, Inc. (see Entrada Networks)

Equinox Systems

This is in reference to the CERT Advisory CA-2002-03 addressing potential security vulnerabilities that exist in network devices using SNMPv1 as the management protocol.  Equinox has determined that exploitation of these vulnerabilities may interfere with normal operation of our ESP serial hub through malicious use of the management interfaces provided for its Equiview Plus application.  We are evaluating the impact on the ESP and will release appropriate fixes if necessary.  In the interim, Equinox recommends the following mitigation procedures.

In most network environments, firewalls are deployed to prohibit externally originating SNMP traffic and both detect and prevent Denial of Service attacks.  Since the ESP does not currently allow for disabling of SNMP, it is recommended that this device be operated in a secure environment in conjunction with the following SNMP network security safeguards:

1.    Filter SNMP access to managed devices to ensure the traffic originates from known management systems
2.    Use upstream firewall/access lists to deny access to the SNMP agents accessible on the network
3.    Use access profiles to deny SNMP access to unknown users
4.    Use dedicated management VLANs or out-of-band management to contain SNMP traffic and multicasts
5.    Change the default community strings

Equinox will continue to address potential security problems across its product line and provide patches as circumstances dictate.

e-Security, Inc.

e-Security Advisory:
SNMPv1 Request and Trap Handling Vulnerabilities
Revision 1.0
Release Date: March 14, 2002

Summary

On February 12, 2002 the CERT®/CC released an advisory related to security vulnerabilities that may exist in network devices using SNMPv1 as the management protocol. The vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized privileged access, denial of service attacks, or cause unstable behavior.  In response to this advisory, "CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", e-Security began executing the tests that elicit these vulnerabilities for all e-Security products.

The issue centers on the SNMP library that we use in our products to communicate in SNMP versions 1,2 & 3.  Currently, e-Security uses SNMP Research's Emanate 15.2.7 on with our agents (e-Wizard and eSAW) and UC Davis 4.0.1 with our control center (e-Sentinel and OeSP).

Preliminary test results have indicated that e-Sentinel, e-Wizard, OeSP, and e-SAW products exhibited the vulnerabilities in the CERT® Advisory.

Though we were affected with the vulnerabilities in our code, note this should not be viewed as a negative statement on SNMP protocol, as the latest packages from UC Davis and SNMP Research are not vulnerable to these exploits.

Solution

e-Security has applied the PROTOS c06-SNMPv1 test suite to all e-Security products and has released patches to eliminate these vulnerabilities.  Our patches address e-Security products through v.3.1.  Future releases of e-Security products will utilize the latest packages from UC Davis and SNMP Research which have resolved these vulnerabilities.

e-Security also  recommends considering one or more of the following solutions to minimize your network's potential exposure to these vulnerabilities:

· Ingress filtering
· Egress filtering
· Filter SNMP traffic from non-authorized internal hosts
· Change default community strings

For Further Information

Contact e-Security Customer Support at 1-800-474-3131, or you can e-mail us at support@esecurityinc.com.

Evidian Inc.

VU#854306

This advisory is not applicable to OpenMaster for Telecom as it is a management system and not an agent. As a management system, OpenMaster for Telecom processes subsequent SNMP responses or send SNMP requests but doesn't process any SNMP requests.

VU#107186

Evidian will issue a bulletin regarding this advisory once we have completed the investigation.

Extreme Networks

Extreme Networks has identified the vulnerability outlined in this CERT Advisory CA-2002-03 and is in addressing the issue. A technical advisory has been released. Please go to the following web site for information:
http://www.extremenetworks.com/support/techsupport.asp.

F5 Networks

All versions of BIG-IP, 3-DNS, GLOBAL-SITE and EDGE-FX are vulnerable if the SNMP agent is enabled. Most versions have the SNMP agent enabled by default. Patches are available for all affected versions.

SEE-IT is not affected by this vulnerability.

If a customer is unable to install the patch, the SNMP service may be disabled. Below are instructions for obtaining patches and for disabling the SNMP service for each vulnerable product.

BIG-IP

A patch exists to correct this problem. Please see http://tech.f5.com/home/bigip/solutions/security/sol1622.html .

Alternatively, you can simply disable the SNMP service using the instructions below:

  1. Log in to the BIG-IP Configuration utility.
       
  2.  
  3. Navigate to the SNMP section. For version 4.0 and above this is a tab under System Administration.
       
  4.  
  5. De-select the Enable box at the top of the screen and click the Apply button.

This will disable the SNMP service on BIG-IP.


3-DNS

A patch exists to correct this problem. Please see http://tech.f5.com/home/3dns/solutions/security/sol1624.html .

Alternatively, you can simply disable the SNMP service using the instructions below:

  1. Log in to the 3-DNS Configuration utility.
       
  2.  
  3. Navigate to the SNMP section. This is the tab under 3-DNS Sync .
       
  4.  
  5. De-select the Enable box at the top of the screen and click the Apply button.
       
  6.  
  7. Log in to the Command Line Interface of the 3-DNS.
       
  8.  
  9. Run the following command:    

    kill -9 `ps -ax | grep snmpd | awk '{print $1}'`

     

This will disable the SNMP service on 3-DNS.


GLOBAL-SITE

A patch exists to correct this problem. Please see http://tech.f5.com/home/globalsite/solutions/security/sol1626.html.

Alternatively, you can simply disable the SNMP service using the instructions below:

GLOBAL-SITE version 2.2

To disable the SNMP agent for GLOBAL-SITE version 2.2, type the following command from the command prompt:

ITCMconsole service snmpd stop

This command stops the snmpd agent.

ITCMconsole service snmpd disable

This command disables snmpd so it does not start again at the next boot.

To verify the status of snmpd, enter the following command:

ITCMconsole show snmpd status


GLOBAL-SITE version 2.1PTF-01 and earlier:

On versions 2.1 PTF-01 and earlier, snmpd is not running by default so the GLOBAL-SITE Controller should not be affected. However, if you have enabled snmpd manually, you should disable it.


EDGE-FX

A patch exists to correct this problem. Please see http://tech.f5.com/home/edgefx/solutions/security/sol1625.html .

Alternatively, you can simply disable the SNMP service using the instructions below:

There are three SNMP daemons running on the cache. By default, the EDGE-FX Cache runs the snmpd, the edgefxsnmpd, and Inktomi's snmpdm .

Disabling snmpd and edgefxsnmpd

To disable and stop the SNMP agents, you should use the ITCMconsole. Type the following commands from the command prompt:

ITCMconsole service snmpd stop

This command stops the snmpd agent.

ITCMconsole service snmpd disable

This command disables snmpd so it does not start again at the next boot.


To verify the status of snmpd, enter the following command:

ITCMconsole show snmpd status


Once the snmpd and edgefxsnmpd daemons are disabled, no other snmp traffic will be accepted.


Disabling snmpdm

The snmpdm agent, is also enabled by default. This Inktomi specific agent can be disabled or killed. In order to avoid traffic server anomalies, you should not kill this this daemon.

According to CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03 :

"Inktomi Corporation does not believe our [Inktomi] CDS product is vulnerable. Vulnerability would stem from the use of SNMP Research software in the CDS product. However, SNMP Research has stated that their product Emanate, versions 15.x and higher, is not vulnerable. As Inktomi's CDS uses Emanate 15.3, we [Inktomi] conclude that CDS is not vulnerable."

Inktomi's CDS contains the same Traffic Server that EDGE-FX utilizes, which contains the Emanate 15.3 daemon (snmpdm).

If you still want to kill this SNMP agent, you can use the Configuration utility or the command line.

To disable the SNMP agent from the Configuration utility:

  1. From your browser, access the Configuration utility (refer to Accessing the Configuration utility).
       
  2.  
  3. On the Configure tab, click the Server button.
       
  4.  
  5. Scroll to the SNMP section of the Server Basics page.
       
  6.  
  7. Click the SNMP Agent Off radio button.
       
  8.  
  9. Click the Make These Changes button.

To disable the SNMP agent manually:

  1. In a text editor, open the records.config file located in the EDGE-FX Cache’s /config/traffic_server/config directory.
       
  2.  
  3. Edit the following variable:    

    proxy.config.snmp.master_agent_enabled

       

    Set this variable to 0 to disable SNMP on the EDGE-FX Cache node.

  4.  
  5. Save and close the records.config file.
       
  6.  
  7. Make the /usr/local/cache/bin directory the working directory and run the following command to apply the configuration changes.    

    ./traffic_line -x

       

    Note: you can also use the following command to restart the traffic_server: start_traffic_server.

     

SEE-IT

It has been determined that SEE-IT is not vulnerable.

Fluke Corporation

Fluke Networks' response to CERT Advisory 2002-03

           The CERT® Coordination Center recently announced that numerous
           vulnerabilities have been reported in multiple vendors' SNMP
           implementations. For your information, Fluke Networks has created
           the following Q&A which includes a tutorial, Using Fluke Networks
           products to manage SNMP risk on your network.

           Q&A

           What is the actual risk?

           The impact of the vulnerability is different for each vendor and
           their own products. For SNMP agents and Trap listeners running on
           network operating systems, some attacks could bypass system security
           controls. Overall, most attacks resulted in a “denial-of-service” in
           which the entire product or portions of the product stopped working
           properly.

           Which Fluke Networks products are affected?

           Fluke Networks has tested its products that listen for SNMP Traps or
           contain an internal SNMP agent. It has been discovered that some
           circumstances exist that could potentially cause a
           “denial-of-service” condition for a Fluke Networks product, forcing
           the product to “hang” or reboot. However, this situation would only
           affect Fluke Networks products and would not compromise our
           customers’ networks.

           Fluke Networks products that could be affected include the OptiView™
           Integrated Network Analyzer, the OptiView™ Workgroup Analyzer and
           the OptiView™ Link Analyzer.

           As of this writing, there have been no known "denial-of-service"
           incidents reported with Fluke Networks products. To reiterate,
           should such an event occur involving a Fluke Networks product, this
           would not affect the operation of customers' networks or any of
           their network infrastructures. Nor would there be any risk of anyone
           externally gaining access to customer data.

           Future action

           At this time, we plan to resolve all known vulnerabilities in the
           next scheduled software update for the affected products. Customers
           who participate in the Gold Priority Support program will be
           eligible to receive these updates as part of their membership.
           Customers who do not participate in this program should contact our
           Technical Assistance Center (TAC) at 1-800-638-3497 (North America)
           or +1-425-446-4519 (Outside North America).

           Recommendations

           We recommend the following "best practices" to reduce the potential
           risk of SNMP related attacks:   
           1.   Ensure that yourexternal firewalls deny all incoming SNMP traffic.
           2.   Change the default community strings for all SNMP devices. Audit
                your network for devices using the community strings of "public"
                and "private" as well as for those other community strings that
                are set by default by equipment manufacturers.
           3.   Analyze SNMP traffic for patterns of attack.

           Tutorial: Using Fluke Networks products to manage this risk on your
           network

           1. Identify SNMP agents on the network
           The OptiView Integrated Network Analyzer and OptiView Workgroup
           Analyzer have the capability of discovering all devices within a
           broadcast domain that are SNMP enabled.

           On the Setup/Security screen, configure all known and old community
           strings making sure you include strings such as "public", "private"
           and "security".

           Re-run the tests by selecting the "Rerun Test" tab.

           Select the "Discovery" tab and then select the SNMP Agents category
           in the left hand pane. The resulting display shows all SNMP agents
           discovered by the test.

           2. Test your firewall for filtering SNMP traffic
           From a LAN segment outside your firewall, use the OptiView
           Integrated Network Analyzer to query known SNMP agents on the
           protected side of your network. After the "Network-Under-Test"
           interface has a proper IP configuration, enter the IP address of a
           known SNMP agent on the Tools screen.

           Note: Using Fluke Networks’ Protocol Expert™ on the protected side
           of your firewall, allows you to see if the firewall is denying any
           and all SNMP traffic from flowing through the firewall as well as
           preventing SNMP responses from leaving your network.

           Using two OptiView Analyzers, one on either side of the firewall,
           can be used to easily check this condition. Use the Packet Capture
           and Statistics feature to ensure that no SNMP traffic is flowing in
           from outside of the firewall.

           3. Analyze network patterns for SNMP attacks
           Using the OptiView Integrated Network Analyzer, the OptiView
           Workgroup Analyzer or the OptiView Link Analyzer, a combination of
           packet capture and protocol statistics can be used to gather
           evidence of an SNMP attack.

           Select the "Top Hosts" tab to look for nodes that should not be
           sending SNMP queries. Select the "Top Conversations" to check for
           unusual Conversation Pairs within the SNMP traffic.

              Fluke Networks' Copper and Fiber taps can be used to access
           switch-to-switch links and the Switch-TAP™ capability of the
           OptiView™ Inspector Console can be used to program the mirror ports
           of a variety of switches.

           For more information

           For questions, concerns or more information, please contact the
           Fluke Networks TAC at 1-800-638-3497 (North America),
           +1-425-446-4519 (outside North America) or email us at:
           nettech@flukenetworks.com.

Foundry Networks, Inc.

According to testing completed by Foundry engineering using the stress tools recommended by CERT, we determined that NO Foundry devices are affected by any known SNMP security issue. All of Foundry's products use the same SNMP engine with varying SNMP versions (v1, v2c, and v3), and all SNMP versions have been tested.

We are extremely appreciative to CERT's help during our testing period, and would like to wholeheartedly thank everyone involved.

FreeBSD

FreeBSD does not include any SNMP software by default, and so is not vulnerable. However, the FreeBSD Ports Collection contains the UCD-SNMP / NET-SNMP package. Package versions prior to ucd-snmp-4.2.3 are vulnerable. The upcoming FreeBSD 4.5 release will ship the corrected version of the UCD-SNMP / NET-SNMP package. In addition, the corrected version of the packages is available from the FreeBSD mirrors. 

FreeBSD has issued the following FreeBSD Security Advisory regarding the UCD-SNMP / NET-SNMP package:

ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-02:11.snmp.asc.

Future Communications Software

FutureSoft has tested its SNMP Product FutureSoftSNMP Release 5.0.1.0 according to the recommendations issued by CERT, and has found no security vulnerabilities associated with Advisory CA-2002-03 (Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of SNMP).

General DataComm

General DataComm Advisory Bulletin

http://www.gdc.com/products/bulletin.shtml

Ref:  CERT Advisory CA-2002-03
Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)

GDC  TEAM  SNMP

The GDC TEAM applications use the HP OpenView NNM SNMP protocol stack for its SNMP network management communication to its SpectraComm Manager (SCM) card. The SCM contains an SNMP proxy agent.

Recommendations:

1. The SCM does not have a default read/write community name of "private" which makes it less susceptible for hackers to change device configurations or taking down the management or data network. The SCM does have a default read only community name of "public". The customer is advised to change this.

2. The major GDC network management customers usually use a separate private LAN for their management traffic to eliminate the exposure to outside illegal entry.

3. Please read below, obtain and install the HP HPOV patches from the listed sites.

HP HPOV NNM (Network Node Manager)
Some problems were found in NNM product were related to trap handling. Patches in process. Watch for the associated HP Security Bulletin.

----------------------------------------------------------
HP-UX Systems running snmpd or OPENVIEW
----------------------------------------------------------
The following patches are available now:

       PHSS_26137 s700_800 10.20 OV EMANATE14.2 Agent Consolidated Patch
       PHSS_26138 s700_800 11.X OV EMANATE14.2 Agent Consolidated Patch

       PSOV_03087 EMANATE Release 14.2 Solaris 2.X Agent Consolidated Patch

All three patches are available from:

http://support.openview.hp.com/cpe/patches/

In addition PHSS_26137 and PHSS_26138 will soon be available from:

http://itrc.hp.com

NOTE: The patches are labeled OV(Open View). However, the patches are also applicable to systems that are not running Open View.

Any HP-UX 10.X or 11.X system running snmpd or snmpdm is vulnerable. To determine if your HP-UX system has snmpd or snmpdm installed:

       swlist -l file | grep snmpd

If a patch is not available for your platform or you cannot install an available patch, snmpd and snmpdm can be disabled by removing their entries from /etc/services and removing the execute permissions from /usr/sbin/snmpd and /usr/sbin/snmpdm.

Hewlett-Packard Company

HP Support Information Digests

==================================================
o  Security Bulletin Digest Split
  ------------------------------

The security bulletins digest has been split into multiple digests based on the operating system (HP-UX, MPE/iX, and HP Secure OS Software for Linux).  You will continue to receive all security bulletin digests unless you choose to update your subscriptions. 
 
To update your subscriptions, use your browser to access the IT Resource Center on the World Wide Web at:

http://www.itresourcecenter.hp.com/

Under the Maintenance and Support Menu, click on the "more..." link. Then use the 'login' link at the left side of the screen to login using your IT Resource Center User ID and Password.

Under the notifications section (near the bottom of the page), select Support Information Digests.

To subscribe or unsubscribe to a specific security bulletin digest, select or unselect the checkbox beside it. Then click the "Update Subscriptions" button at the bottom of the page.

o  IT Resource Center World Wide Web Service
  -----------------------------

If you subscribed through the IT Resource Center and would like to be REMOVED from this mailing list, access the IT Resource Center on the World Wide Web at:

http://www.itresourcecenter.hp.com/

Login using your IT Resource Center User ID and Password. Then select Support Information Digests (located under Maintenance and Support).  You may then unsubscribe from the appropriate digest.
==================================================


Digest Name:  daily HP-UX security bulletins digest
  Created:  Tue Feb 26  8:45:03 PST 2002

Table of Contents:

Document ID      Title
---------------  -----------
HPSBUX0202-184   Sec. Vulnerability in SNMP (rev. 3)

The documents are listed below.
----------------------------------


Document ID:  HPSBUX0202-184
Date Loaded:  20020212
    Title:  Sec. Vulnerability in SNMP (rev. 3)

TEXT
-----------------------------------------------------------------
**REVISED 03**  HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY SECURITY BULLETIN: #0184,
  Originally issued: 12 Feb. 2002
  Last revised:  24 Feb. 2002
-----------------------------------------------------------------

The information in the following Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible.  Hewlett-Packard Company will not be liable for any consequences to any customer resulting from customer's failure to fully implement instructions in this Security Bulletin as soon as possible.

------------------------------------------------------------------
PROBLEM:  Vulnerabilities in SNMP request and trap handling.

PLATFORM: HP 9000 Series 700 and Series 800 running HP-UX
        releases 10.X and 11.X
        HP Procurve switches
**REVISED 03**
---->>    JetDirect Firmware
        MC/ServiceGuard, EMS HA Monitors

DAMAGE:   Possible denial-of-service, service interruptions,
        unauthorized access.

SOLUTION: Apply patches or implement workarounds.  See below.
       For HP-UX releases:
      PHSS_26137    s700_800  HP-UX 10.20 OV EMANATE14.2 Agent
      PHSS_26138    s700_800  HP-UX 11.X  OV EMANATE14.2 Agent
      PSOV_03087    Solaris 2.X      EMANATE Release 14.2
       For systems running OV NNM:
      PHSS_26286    s700_800  HP-UX  10.20  ovtrapd large trap fix
      PHSS_26287    s700_800  HP-UX  11.X   ovtrapd large trap fix
      PSOV_03100    Solaris 2.X             ovtrapd large trap fix
      NNM_00857     NT 4.X/Windows 2000     ovtrapd large trap fix

MANUAL ACTIONS: Upgrade or workaround action per below.

AVAILABILITY:  Patches for some affected systems are available now.
CHANGE SUMMARY: Rev.01 affected HP Procurve scope expanded,
                     plus Procurve patch availability added.
                     NNM ovtrapd patch availability added.
              Rev.02 SG and EMS found not vulnerable.
              Rev.03 Jetdirect vulnerability updated
------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Background
CERT has issued an advisory:
CERT Advisory CA-2002-03 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv1) containing information about the vulnerabilities.
 
Hewlett-Packard Company will revise this bulletin as new information becomes available.

---------------------------------------------------------
hp Procurve switches
---------------------------------------------------------

We are still in the process of determining which other HP Procurve products are subject to these vulnerabilities. We have created fixes for products below which will resolve these issues.  See Section C below.

Customers can download these patches in the form of software upgrades at:
            http://www.hp.com/rnd/software/switches.htm

                 Product                      Fix revision number
     ----------------------------------       --------------------
     HP Procurve Switch 2524   (J4813A)        F.04.08 or greater
     HP Procurve Switch 2512   (J4812A)        F.04.08 or greater
     HP Procurve Switch 4108GL (J4865A)        G.04.05 or greater
     HP Procurve Switch 4108GL-bundle (J4861A) G.04.05 or greater

Not all HP Procurve products have completed testing, nor are they listed here, and may or may not have these vulnerabilities. This bulletin will again be updated as new information becomes available.

---------------------------------------------------------
NNM  (Network Node Manager)
---------------------------------------------------------

Some problems found in NNM product were related to trap handling.  Patches are available.  See Section C below.

**REVISED 03**
---------------------------------------------------------
-->> JetDirect Firmware
---------------------------------------------------------

 JetDirect Firmware Version      State
  ==========================      =====
--->>   X.08.32 and lower           VULNERABLE
--->>   (where X = A through K)
--->>   X.21.00 and higher          NOT vulnerable
--->>   (where X = L through P)

----------------------------------------------------------
HP-UX Systems running snmpd or OPENVIEW
----------------------------------------------------------
Any HP-UX 10.X or 11.X system running snmpd or snmpdm is vulnerable.  To determine if your HP-UX system has snmpd or snmpdm installed:

  swlist -l file | grep snmpd

B. Fixing the problem
Install the appropriate patch or firmware revision or work around problem as detailed below.

C. Recommended solution
---------------------------------------------------------
hp Procurve switches
---------------------------------------------------------

Customers can download these patches in the form of software upgrades at:
            http://www.hp.com/rnd/software/switches.htm

          Product                      Fix revision number
-----------------------------------     -------------------
HP Procurve Switch 2524    (J4813A)       F.04.08 or greater
HP Procurve Switch 2512    (J4812A)       F.04.08 or greater
HP Procurve Switch 4108GL  (J4865A)       G.04.05 or greater
HP Procurve Switch 4108GL-bundle (J4861A) G.04.05 or greater

---------------------------------------------------------
NNM  (Network Node Manager)
---------------------------------------------------------

Problems found in the NNM product (related only to trap handling) are addressed in patches available at:

http://support.openview.hp.com/cpe/patches/nnm/6.2/s700_800_11.X.jsp

   PHSS_26286    s700_800  HP-UX  10.20  ovtrapd large trap fix
   PHSS_26287    s700_800  HP-UX  11.X   ovtrapd large trap fix
   PSOV_03100    Solaris 2.X             ovtrapd large trap fix
   NNM_00857     NT 4.X/Windows 2000     ovtrapd large trap fix

---------------------------------------------------------
MC/ServiceGuard
---------------------------------------------------------
MC/ServiceGuard is not affected.  Testing has been completed and neither MC/ServiceGuard nor ServiceGuard OPS Edition are negatively impacted.

The ServiceGuard Manager product does not use the cluster SNMP and remains unaffected.

---------------------------------------------------------
Event Monitoring System  (EMS)
---------------------------------------------------------
Testing of the MC/ServiceGuard or ServiceGuard OPS Edition application with package resources defined using EMS High Availability Monitors has been completed and shows no vulnerability to this issue.

**REVISED 03**
  ---------------------------------------------------------
--->> JetDirect Firmware
  ---------------------------------------------------------

  JetDirect Firmware Version      State
  ==========================      =====
--->>   X.08.32 and lower           VULNERABLE
--->>   (where X = A through K)
--->>   X.21.00 and higher          NOT vulnerable
--->>   (where X = L through P)

--->>FIX STATUS: HP is working on a firmware fix.

--->>WORKAROUND: Change the set-community-name and use the
--->>Access Control List as described in "HP Jetdirect Print
--->>Servers - Making HP Jetdirect Print Servers Secure on
--->>the Network":

--->>  http://www.hp.com/cposupport/networking/support_doc/
--->>  bpj05999.html#P88_10129

--->>      LIMITING THE VULNERABILITY

--->>SNMPv1 security relies on the set community name. It is
--->>important that a set-community-name be configured on the
--->>Jetdirect device and that it be kept secret.

--->>Jetdirect Print Servers offer an Access Control List that
--->>can be used to specify which hosts can make SNMP
--->>configuration changes to Jetdirect Print Servers.

--->>The steps above can help prevent exploitation of the
--->>vulnerability.  To eliminate the vulnerability before a fix
--->>is available SNMP can be disabled on the Jetdirect device.

--->>      DISABLING SNMP ON A JETDIRECT PRINT SERVER

--->>1. Update the firmware to the highest level as described in
--->>    the Jetdirect Upgrade Instructions document:

--->> http://www.hp.com/cposupport/networking/support_doc/bpj06917.html

--->>NOTE:    Disabling SNMP may affect device discovery and port
--->>         monitors that use SNMP to get status on the device.
--->>         Use this feature with care.

--->>2.  Telnet to the Jetdirect device (on the latest firmware)
--->>     and type:
--->>                   snmp-config: 0
--->>                   quit

--->>This will completely disable SNMP on the Jetdirect device.


--->>HP always recommends upgrading Jetdirect firmware for the
--->>latest bug fixes and security benefits.  The upgrade firmware
--->>and download utility are available free of charge:

--->>http://www.hp.com/cposupport/networking/support_doc/bpj06917.html

--->>The following is a list of JetDirect Product Numbers
--->>that can be freely upgraded to X.08.32 or X.21.00 or
--->>higher firmware.  The latest firmware revision available
--->>for download is given.  For example, the latest firmware
--->>revision for the J3110A is G.08.32.

--->>EIO (Peripherals Laserjet 4000, 5000, 8000, etc...)
--->>        J3110A 10T                              [G.08.32]
--->>        J3111A 10T/10B2/LocalTalk               [G.08.32]
--->>        J3112A Token Ring (discontinued)        [G.08.32]
--->>        J3113A 10/100 (discontinued)            [G.08.32]
--->>        J4169A 10/100                           [L.21.22]
--->>        J4167A Token Ring                       [L.21.25]
--->>        J6057A 10/100                           [R.22.09]

--->>MIO (Peripherals LaserJet 4, 4si, 5si, etc...)
--->>        J2550A/B 10T (discontinued) [A.08.32]
--->>        J2552A/B 10T/10Base2/LocalTalk (discontinued) [A.08.32]
--->>        J2555A/B Token Ring (discontinued) [A.08.32]
--->>        J4100A 10/100                      [K.08.32]
--->>        J4105A Token Ring                  [K.08.32]
--->>        J4106A 10T                         [K.08.32]

--->>LIO (Peripherals Color Inkjet cp1160, cp1700)
--->>        J6042A 250m 10/100                    [N.21.22]

--->>External Print Servers
--->>        J2591A EX+ (discontinued)               [E.08.32]
--->>        J2593A EX+3 10T/10B2 (discontinued)     [D.08.32]
--->>        J2594A EX+3 Token Ring (discontinued)   [D.08.32]
--->>        J3263A 300X 10/100                      [H.08.32]
--->>        J3264A 500X Token Ring                  [J.08.32]
--->>        J3265A 500X 10/100                      [J.08.32]
--->>        J6038A 310x USB 10/100                  [Q.22.04]

----------------------------------------------------------
HP-UX Systems running snmpd or OPENVIEW
----------------------------------------------------------
The following patches are available now:

PHSS_26137    s700_800  HP-UX 10.20 OV EMANATE14.2 Agent$
PHSS_26138    s700_800  HP-UX 11.X  OV EMANATE14.2 Agent$
PSOV_03087    Solaris 2.X      EMANATE Release 14.2 $

All three patches are available from:

http://support.openview.hp.com/cpe/patches/

In addition PHSS_26137 and PHSS_26138 are now available from:
         http://itrc.hp.com

=================================================
NOTE: The patches are labeled OV (Open View).  However, the patches are also applicable to systems that are _NOT_ running Open View.
=================================================

Workaround for HP-UX Systems:

If a patch is not available for your platform or you cannot install an available patch, snmpd and snmpdm can be disabled by removing their entries from /etc/services and removing the execute permissions from /usr/sbin/snmpd and /usr/sbin/snmpdm.

D. To subscribe to automatically receive future NEW HP Security Bulletins from the HP IT Resource Center via electronic mail, do the following:

Use your browser to get to the HP IT Resource Center page at:

     http://itrc.hp.com

Use the 'Login' tab at the left side of the screen to login using your ID and password.  Use your existing login or the "Register" button at the left to create a login, in order to gain access to many areas of the ITRC.  Remember to save the User ID assigned to you, and your password.

In the left most frame select "Maintenance and Support".

Under the "Notifications" section (near the bottom of the page), select "Support Information Digests".

To -subscribe- to future HP Security Bulletins or other Technical Digests, click the check box (in the left column) for the appropriate digest and then click the "Update Subscriptions" button at the bottom of the page.

or

To -review- bulletins already released, select the link (in the middle column) for the appropriate digest.

To -gain access- to the Security Patch Matrix, select the link for "The Security Bulletins Archive".  (near the bottom of the page)  Once in the archive the third link is to the current Security Patch Matrix. Updated daily, this matrix categorizes security patches by platform/OS release, and by bulletin topic.  Security Patch Check completely automates the process of reviewing the patch matrix for 11.XX systems.

For information on the Security Patch Check tool, see:
http://www.software.hp.com/cgi-bin/swdepot_parser.cgi/cgi/
displayProductInfo.pl?productNumber=B6834AA"

The security patch matrix is also available via anonymous ftp:

ftp.itrc.hp.com:~ftp/export/patches/hp-ux_patch_matrix

On the "Support Information Digest Main" page: click on the "HP Security Bulletin Archive".


E. To report new security vulnerabilities, send email to

security-alert@hp.com

Please encrypt any exploit information using the security-alert PGP key, available from your local key server, or by sending a message with a -subject- (not body) of 'get key' (no quotes) to security-alert@hp.com.

Permission is granted for copying and circulating this Bulletin to Hewlett-Packard (HP) customers (or the Internet community) for the purpose of alerting them to problems, if and only if, the Bulletin is not edited or changed in any way, is attributed to HP, and provided such reproduction and/or distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes.

Any other use of this information is prohibited. HP is not liable for any misuse of this information by any third party.
________________________________________________________________
-----End of Document ID:
HPSBUX0202-184--------------------------------------

Re: Hewlett Packard HP3000 - MPE vulnerable to CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03 SNMP

This is resolved on HP-e3000 MPE/iX systems - fix:
8606-248966 in the following patches to the SNMP Agent:

SNMGDL9 for C.60.00
SNMGDM0 for C.65.00
SNMGDM1 for C.70.00

Hirschmann Electronics GmbH & Co. KG

Hirschmann Electronics GmbH & Co. KG supplies a broad range of networking products, some of which are affected by the SNMP vulnerabilities identified by CERT Coordination Center. The manner in which they are affected and the actions required to avoid being impacted by exploitation of these vulnerabilities, vary from product to product. Hirschmann customers may contact our Competence Center (phone +49-7127-14-1538, email: ans-support@nt.hirschmann.de) for additional information, especially regarding availability of latest firmware releases addressing the SNMP vulnerabilities.

Hitachi Data Systems (HDS)

Hitachi Data Systems (HDS) has evaluated the information about the industry wide SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) vulnerabilities and is conducting the appropriate series of tests to determine the possible exposure on its entire product offering.

While a potential vulnerability has already been assessed in certain product’s configurations, HDS has designed the necessary temporary workaround and made them available to our customers through the local support personnel. As soon as a permanent fix will become available, it will be immediately provided to all our customers.

For further details please contact the Hitachi Data System technical support structure or visit our web site at:

http://www.hds.com/products_services/support/.

IBM Corporation

The AIX operating system is susceptible to the vulnerabilities tested for by the Oulu University PROTOS test suite for all levels of AIX 4.3.x prior to level 4.3.3.51, and AIX 5.1 prior to level 5.1.0.10. APARs were developed and made available last year that closed the vulnerabilities looked for by the test suite. For 4.3.x, the relevant APAR is #IY17630; for 5.1, the appropriate APAR is #IY20943.

To see if your version and level of AIX is vulnerable, enter the command:

          lslpp -l bos.net.tcp.client

If the "Level" stated is lower than those given above, your system is vulnerable, and you are urged to apply the appropriate APAR.

AIX versions prior to 4.3 are also vulnerable, but these versions are no longer supported by IBM.

To remain consistent with IBM's standing agreement with our customers who use zOS and OS/400, IBM asks that these customers contact IBM Service for information regarding this vulnerability.

InfoVista

In reference to CERT Advisory CA-2002-03, Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), InfoVista has reviewed and addressed this advisory that reports how vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized privileged access, denial of service attacks, or unstable behavior.

InfoVista has assessed the InfoVista product portfolio and investigated the impact of this advisory. Tests have been performed against the PROTOS c06-snmpv1 test suite and as a result, InfoVista products fixes are being created, if needed, which will resolve any related issues. Upgrades to our product line that address these issues will be released in the near future.

A status of each InfoVista product is as follows:

InfoVista Server

The InfoVista Server is not affected by trap & agent-side vulnerabilities. The InfoVista Server performs numerous consistency checks on SNMP packets, thus being immune to most attacks. Further evaluation is underway to assess any vulnerability and, if exposures as reported in the advisory are found, fixes will be provided.

Vista Plug-in for NetFlow

The Vista Plug-in for NetFlow version 3.0 includes Emanate 15.2.1.7, which does not address these vulnerabilities. The latest version of Emanate 15.3.1.7, which accounts for these vulnerabilities, will be included in the next version of the Vista Plug-in for NetFlow. A product release schedule will be communicated soon.

Vista Plug-in Family

Full testing of our agents for the vulnerabilities identified in CERT Advisory CA-2002-03, VU#854306 and VU#107186 have been completed. A hotfix for the Vista Plug-in Family that corrects these vulnerabilities is scheduled for release at the end of March.

VistaNotifier

VistaNotifier is not affected by agent-side vulnerabilities. VistaNotifier does consistency checks for traps, while expecting these traps to be in a specific format (from the InfoVista server), thus being immune to most attacks. Further evaluation is underway to assess any vulnerability and, if exposures as reported in the advisory are found, fixes will be provided.

Inktomi Corporation

All releases of Inktomi Traffic Server and Inktomi Media-IXT prior to version 5.2 are vulnerable, releases after 5.2 are not vulnerable. A software patch is available to close the vulnerability. Download and installation instructions are available at:
ftp://traffic_swul:!nc0ming@support.inktomi.com/CA-2002-03/README

Traffic Server deployed as part of the Inktomi Content Networking Platform 1.0 is also vulnerable, and should be immediately updated to v1.1 or 1.1.1. Inktomi CNP customers can get the 1.1.1 release from http://downloads.inktomi.com.

Other Inktomi Products:
Inktomi CDS is not vulnerable. CDS is safe because it does not listen for SNMP requests. Inktomi Enterprise Search is also not vulnerable, because it does not include any SNMP. Finally, Inktomi Media Distribution Network is also safe because it does not include any SNMP.

Innerdive Solutions, LLC

Innerdive Solutions, LLC has two SNMP based products:

1. The "SNMP MIB Scout" (http://www.innerdive.com/products/mibscout/)
2. The "Router IP Console" (http://www.innerdive.com/products/ric/)

The "SNMP MIB Scout" is not vulnerable to either bug.

The "Router IP Console" releases prior to 3.3.0.407 are vulnerable. The release of "Router IP Console" correcting the behavior outlined in OUSPG#0100 is 3.3.0.407 and is already available on our site.  Also, we will notify all our customers about this new release no later than March 5, 2002.

INRANGE Technologies

The CERT Coordination Center has issued a broad based alert to the technology industry, including INRANGE Technologies, regarding potential security vulnerabilities identified in the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), a common networking standard.  The company is assessing the issue with its products.  Updates will be posted to the INRANGE website (http://www.inrange.com) as circumstances dictate.

InterNiche Technologies, Inc.

InterNiche Technologies, Inc.'s SNMPv1 product is not susceptible to problems described in CERT Advisory VU#107186, and the company is in the process of evaluating the behavior of its implementation with respect to Advisory VU#854306.

It is unclear at this point whether the product is vulnerable to attack as described in this second advisory (VU#854306), and if any problems are discovered InterNiche customers will be notified and a fix made available under the terms of their support agreement.

iPlanet

Update on CERT ALERT CA-2002-03
iPlanet has identified a problem in the CERT Alert CA-2002-03, regarding implementations of its directory server and web proxy server.

The SNMP agent (magt) daemon supplied with the Admin Server component of Netscape Directory Server 4.1x,  iPlanet Directory Server 5.0,  iPlanet Directory Server 5.1 and iPlanet Web Proxy Server 3.6 on UNIX platforms is vulnerable to a malformed request. The malformed request will cause the "magt" daemon to abruptly exit, so that it will no longer accept requests.  The "magt" daemon is not included in the Admin Server component of the Netscape Directory Server or iPlanet Directory Server on the Windows NT, Windows 2000 platforms and is not used on AIX platforms, so the Directory Server and Web Proxy Server are not affected on these platforms.

This vulnerability is present in the following versions running on Unix platforms:
Netscape Directory Server 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16
iPlanet Directory Server 5.0, 5.0SP1 and 5.1
iPlanet Web Proxy Server 3.6

We do not believe that this vulnerability affects the overall integrity of the directory server or web proxy server  in any way.

As a general practice, we recommend disabling all services affected by the "magt" daemon that are not explicitly required until a patch is downloaded and installed. If you are not using SNMP to monitor the directory server, we recommend that you do not run the "magt" daemon process. You can also limit your exposure to this vulnerability by using a firewall to restrict access to the UDP port on which "magt" receives incoming SNMP requests.

Patches and Service packs fixing this problem will be posted under http://www.iplanet.com/downloads/patches/.
 
Version Recommended action
Directory Server 4.1x Install standalone "magt" patch
Directory Server 5.0 Upgrade to 5.0SP2 or install "magt" patch
Directory Server 5.0SP1 Upgrade to 5.0SP2 or install "magt" patch
Directory Server 5.1 Install standalone "magt" patch
iPlanet Web Proxy Server 3.6 Install standalone "magt" patch

iPlanet products, such as iPlanet Application Server Enterprise Edition
6.x, bundling the above mentioned products are also affected.  Installing
the appropriate Directory Server patches and/or service pack is
recommended.

iPlanet customers with questions on this advisory are requested to contact iPlanet Technical Support who will provide full support and up-to-date information.

Ipswitch, Inc.

Ipswitch has completed its assessment of WhatsUp Gold in response to the CERT advisory (CA-2002-03).  We have addressed all of the issues highlighted by the CERT advisory's 24,000 test cases via a patch release.

A free patch is currently available to upgrade WhatsUp Gold customers from version 7.01 to 7.02.  You can download the patch from http://www.ipswitch.com/support/whatsup/patch-upgrades.html.

For customers who are currently running WhatsUp Gold version 6.02, a patch will be released shortly to upgrade you to version 6.03.  Please check back with our patch page ( http://www.ipswitch.com/support/whatsup/patch-upgrades.html) over the next couple of weeks.

Thank you for your continued support of WhatsUp Gold and other Ipswitch products.

iTouch Communications

iTouch Communications has confirmed that the following tests failed (software crash) in the MX and InReach Series run-time image Xpcsrv20.sys version  6.3 and NEMC_IR.SYS version 3.0 and earlier:

    1. APP tests, 10545 and 10549
    2. ENC tests 878,7643,7686,7687,7688,13358 & 13486

These issues were fixed in Xpcsrv20.sys version 6.3s15 and NEMC_IR.SYS version 3.0s1 and now  they are fully compliant with the SNMP vulnerability CERT tests.

Customers requesting software updates or more information may contact iTouch Communications at 800-435-7997 (domestic) and 978-952-4888 (International) and select the Customer Service option.

Juniper Networks

This is in reference to your notification regarding CAN-2002-0012 and CAN-2002-0013.  Juniper Networks has reproduced this behavior and coded a software fix.  The fix will be included in all releases of JUNOS Internet software built after January 5, 2002.  Customers with current support contracts can download new software with the fix from Juniper's web site at http://www.juniper.net

Note: The behavior described in CAN-2002-0012 and CAN-2002-0013 can only be reproduced in JUNOS Internet software if "snmp traceoptions flag pdu" is enabled.  Tracing of SNMP PDUs is generally not enabled in production routers.

KarlNet, Inc.

Karlnet Advisory:
SNMPv1 Implementation Vulnerabilities in Karlnet Products
Revision 1.0
Revision Date: 14 March 2002

I  Vulnerabilities Found

Preliminary test results have indicated multiple Karlnet products exhibit certain vulnerabilities to SNMP messages. Some of these vulnerabilities can be exploited, resulting in a denial of service or service interruption.

These results have not indicated any vulnerability that will allow an attacker to gain access to the affected device.

II. Solution

In response to CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), Karlnet Inc. has detected and repaired all of the inconsistencies found by CERT Tests  in our SNMP implementation.  We have ensured that all vulnerabilities found, using test suite, PROTOS c-06-SNMPv1, have  been corrected and implemented in all versions of Karlnet Software 4.01 or greater.

Kentrox,LLC

Kentrox, LLC.. has reviewed CERT Advisory CA-2002-03 and has published the results of our initial evaluation. Kentrox will continue testing products that support SNMP against the PROTOS test suite. As results become available they will be added to the information found at our web site.

The results can be found at: http://www.kentrox.com/cert-CA-2002-03-response.

Lantronix, Inc.

Lantronix is committed to resolving security issues with our products. The SNMP security bug you reported has been fixed in LRS firmware version B1.3/611(020123).

Larscom Incorporated

Larscom Incorporated has completed a preliminary examination of its product line in response to CA-2002-03. Larscom has identified a number of platforms that use SNMP, both V1 and V2. It is felt that those using SNMP V2 are not affected by the referenced vulnerabilities.

A complete report listing the affected products and the recommended circumvention can be found at http://www.larscom.com/support/advisory/cert_ca_2002_03.pdf or can be requested from service@larscom.com.

Lexmark International, Inc.

Lexmark International has tested the current MarkNet network adapters and current Lexmark Utilities (MarkVision Professional) according to recommendations issued by CERT.   Lexmark Utilities are not vulnerable.  Below is a list of tested MarkNet devices and information on obtaining updated network firmware when necessary:

Printer/Network Adapter type Fix Revision (if applicable)
Lexmark E322n Laser Printer 4.20.14 or greater
Lexmark T520n Laser Printer Not vulnerable
Lexmark T522n Laser Printer Not vulnerable
Lexmark T620n Laser Printer Not vulnerable
Lexmark T622n Laser Printer Not vulnerable
Lexmark Optra W810n Laser Printer 3.20.14 or greater
Lexmark W820n Laser Printer Not vulnerable
Lexmark Optra C710nSBE Laser Printer 3.20.14 or greater
Lexmark Optra C710n Laser Printer 3.20.14 or greater
Lexmark C720n Color Laser Printer 3.20.14 or greater
Lexmark C720dn Color Laser Printer 3.20.14 or greater
Lexmark C750n Color Printer Not vulnerable
Lexmark C750dn Color Printer Not vulnerable
Lexmark C910n Color Printer Not vulnerable
Lexmark C910dn Color Printer Not vulnerable
Lexmark Optra Color 45n 3.20.14 or greater
Lexmark Optra T610n Laser Printer 3.20.14 or greater
   
MarkNet N2001e 3.20.14 or greater
MarkNet N2000t 3.20.14 or greater
MarkNet N2002e 3.20.14 or greater
MarkNet N2003fx-MTRJ 3.20.14 or greater
MarkNet N2003fx-SC 3.20.14 or greater
   
MarkNet N2401e 5.20.14 or greater
MarkNet N2501e 5.20.14 or greater
   
MarkNet X2011e 4.20.14 or greater
MarkNet X2012e 4.20.14 or greater
MarkNet X2030t 4.20.14 or greater
MarkNet X2031e 4.20.14 or greater
MarkNet XI 4.20.14 or greater
MarkNet XP 4.20.14 or greater
   
MarkNet Pro network family 2.10.193 or greater
MarkNet S network family 1.10.193 or greater
   
Lexmark X820e MFP Not vulnerable
Lexmark X7500 MFP Not vulnerable

None of the Lexmark network adapters are vulnerable once the community name is changed.  If unable to update to one of the above firmware levels, Lexmark recommends changing the community name.

Firmware updates are available at: http://support.lexmark.com/en/cert_ca-2002-03.html

For questions related to these or other Lexmark devices please contact 1-800-LEXMARK.

Lotus Development Corporation

Lotus Software evaluated the Lotus Domino Server for vulnerabilities using the test suite materials provided by OUSPG.

This problem does not affect default installations of the Domino Server. However, SNMP agents can be installed from the CD to provide SNMP services for the Domino Server (these are located in the /apps/sysmgmt/agents directory). The optional platform specific master and encapsulator agents included with the Lotus Domino SNMP Agents for HP-UX and Solaris have been found to be vulnerable. For those platforms, customers should upgrade to version R5.0.1 a of the Lotus Domino SNMP Agents, available for download from the Lotus Knowledge Base on the IBM Support Web Site (http://www.ibm.com/software/lotus/support/). Please refer to Document #191059, "Lotus Domino SNMP Agents R5.0.1a", also in the Lotus Knowledge Base, for more details.

LOGEC Systems Inc

The products from LOGEC Systems are exposed to SNMP only via HP OpenView. We do not have an implementation of SNMP ourselves. As such, there is nothing in our products that would be an issue with this alert.

Lucent

Lucent is aware of reports that there is a vulnerability in certain implementations of the SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) code.

As soon as we were notified by CERT, we began assessing our product  portfolio and notifying customers with products that might be affected.

Our 5ESS(R) switch and our optical portfolio were not affected.  We have developed, tested, and deployed fixes for most of the impacted products, including our core and edge ATM switches and our edge and broadband access products.  Fixes for the rest of the affected product portfolio will be available shortly.

Customers with questions about product vulnerability and/or the status of fixes for affected products should log in to the customer support section of the Lucent web site at  http://www.lucent.com .  Customers who need help registering for the web site should talk to their Lucent customer teams.

Marconi

Marconi supplies a broad range of telecommunications and related products, some of which are affected by the SNMP vulnerabilities identified here.  The manner in which they are affected and the actions required (if any) to avoid being impacted by exploitation of these vulnerabilities, vary from product to product.  Those Marconi customers with support entitlement may contact the appropriate Technical Assistance Center (TAC) for additional information.  Those not under support entitlement may contact their sales representative.

Mercury Interactive Corporation

Of the Mercury Interactive products, both Topaz and SiteScope have the capability to listen to SNMP traps. In both cases this capability is not installed by default.  In order to eliminate any vulnerabilities we have taken the necessary steps to verify that our products are immune to the issues mentioned in the advisory.

The SiteScope product version 7.5 and onwards, uses Cyberons for Java from Netaphor Software Inc., with the latest patches. These libraries are immune to the issues mentioned in the advisory. More information about this can be found at http://www.netaphor.com/Products/CERTAdvisory.html The Topaz product version 4.1 and onwards, uses the SNMP++ libraries by Agent++, at version 3.1.4b or later. These libraries are immune to the issues mentioned in the advisory. More information about this can be found at http://www.agentpp.com/CERT_SNMPv1_Advisory/body_cert_snmpv1_advisory.html.

Customers using these products, with the capability to listen to SNMP traps, are advised to upgrade to the appropriate version.  Mercury Interactive also recommends considering one or more of the following solutions to minimize your network's potential exposure to these vulnerabilities:

-Ingress filtering

-Egress filtering

-Filter SNMP traffic from non-authorized internal hosts

-Change default community strings

Metrobility Optical Systems

Metrobility Optical Systems has identified some of the vulnerability outlined in CERT Advisory CA-2002-03 and is addressing the issue. A technical advisory has been released. Please go to the following web site for information: http://www.metrobility.com/support/cert.htm.

MG-SOFT Corporation

MG-SOFT is currently performing detailed verification of the SNMP (SNMPv1, SNMPv2c and SNMPv3) engine implementation.

So far we have noticed that our WinSNMP implementation, the core of all our SNMP products, is vulnerable only in one case.  We will post fixed versions of all affected MG-SOFT's SNMP products in few days, on our web site at http://www.mg-soft.com/.

Micromuse

Micromuse has published the following response to this advisory :

       http://www.micromuse.com/supportgate/certadvisoryca2002-03.html

This will be continually updated.

Microsoft Corporation

The following documents regarding this vulnerability are available from Microsoft:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-006.asp

ModLink Networks

We ran all recommended tests and found no problems in handling them. All tests passed, no memory leaks, out of bound array references, or crashing were reported.

Monfox, LLC

Monfox has completed testing of our Java DynamicSNMP(TM) Agent and Manager Development Toolkits in accordance with advisory CA-2002-03. Releases of DynamicSNMP prior to Version 3_3_2 are susceptible to 3 of the test cases under certain conditions.

A new release containing fixes for all known vulnerabilities is now available for download. We will provide patch releases for prior versions upon request in the event that any customer is not in the position to upgrade to the latest version.

For more information, please feel free to contact Monfox by email at info@monfox.com or by phone at 678-771-4239.

Multinet

MultiNet and TCPware customers should contact Process Software to check for the availability of patches for this issue. A couple of minor problems were found and fixed, but there is no security risk related to the SNMP code included with either product.

Muonics

Muonics added SNMP management-role (request originator) capabilities to its MIB Smithy series of products starting with version 2.0. Notification (trap/inform) processing was added in version 2.1 (the current version as of this report). Neither version supports agent-role (request processor) capabilities at this time. However, all PDU types are fully parsed by both versions, including requests, before unsupported PDU types are discarded by the dispatcher layer. Both versions of MIB Smithy SDK, from which all of the MIB Smithy series are derived, have been fully tested with all four of the PROTOS c06-SNMPv1 Test Suites. Version 2.0 binds to any available port for sending requests and receiving responses. Since this was not conducive to testing, a special build was required, with the only difference from the official 2.0 release being a hard-coded binding to ports 161 and 162 as appropriate. Version 2.1 allows configuration of a bind port for receiving notifications, so it was not an issue for that version. After running the full series of tests we found both versions to behave as expected, with no signs of failure. We have thus concluded that Muonics' past and current product versions are not susceptible to the security vulnerabilities associated with CA-2002-03.

VU#107186 - Not Vulnerable
VU#854306 - Not Vulnerable

nCipher Corp.

nCipher Corp. supplies two SNMP products:

1) a SNMP agent bundled with the nForce/nShield and older nFast products (nFast 75, 150 and 300)
2) The SNMP support software bundled with the newer nFast800 products.

The first product (bundled with the nForce, nShield and nFast 75/150/300 range) is a customised NET-SNMP agent version 4.2.1.  This is vulnerable to VU#854306 but not VU#107186.  nCipher has upgraded this software to the NET-SNMP release 4.2.3 and this is now available as a patch release (see below).

The second product (bundled with the nFast800 product) has two operating modes, one for Linux (and, in the near future, Solaris) and one for Windows NT/2000.  In each case, the only agent used is the one currently installed on the OS (NET-SNMP for Linux/Solaris and the Microsoft SNMP agent for Windows); the nCipher-supplied software runs in a separate process.

Customers using this product should therefore ensure that their operating system SNMP agent is patched against this vulnerability.

On Linux or Solaris , this requires installation of the NET-SNMP version 4.2.2 or greater.  Running 'snmpd -v' (make sure it is in your path) will tell you the version of the NET-SNMP agent you are currently running.

On Windows, this will require installation of the forthcoming patch from Microsoft.  If you have not installed the patch from Microsoft and the 'SNMP Service' is running then you are affected.

Again, if upgrading is not currently possible customers are advised to disable the SNMP service if it might be exposed to hostile network traffic, or make use of other suggestions supplied elsewhere in CERT advisory CA-2002-03.

nCipher has released a specific advisory, which may be obtained from http://www.ncipher.com/support/advisories/ - this includes a patch to download that upgrades the nCipher agent to version 4.2.3 of the NET-SNMP kit and fixes the issues listed above.  Installation instructions are contained within the patch file.

NEC Corporation

updated on March 28, 2002

[Server Products]

* EWS/UP 48 Series
    - OS's of all versions are vulnerable.
    - SNMP should be off, if not necessary.
    - The patches are available through anonymous FTP from:
                      FTP server: ftp.biglobe.ne.jp
                      directory:  ~ftp/pub/48pub/security/
      Please refer to the README file in the directory.
    - Detail information in Japanese is at:
      < http://www.mid.comp.nec.co.jp/48info/48patch/ca200203snmpd.html>

[Software Products]

* Network management system:
    + ESMPRO/ServerManager, ESMPRO Manager
        - is vulnerable.
        - The patch will be available in the end of March.
        - Detail information in Japanese is at:
          < http://www.express.nec.co.jp/care/Security/snmp58.html>

    + ESMPRO/ClientManager(MG), ESMPRO/ClientManager SmallBusiness Pack
        - is vulnerable.
        - The patch will be produced.

    + ESMPRO/Netvisor
        - is vulnerable.
        - The patch will be produced.

    + SystemScope/UXServerManager (Viewer,WindowsMG)
        - is vulnerable.
        - The patch will be produced.

    + OpenDiosa/OPBASE Base Manager-L (Windows version)
        - is vulnerable.
        - The patch will be produced.

[Router Products]

* Octpower Series
           IP8800/700 Series (710,720,730,735,740,750)
           IP8800/600 Series (610,620MM,620SM,620SS,630)
           ES8800/1700 Series (1711,1712,1720,1730)
           MegaAccessRouter Series (MA25UX/4EMA155MX/4EMA155SX/4E)
           MegaAccess Series (MA25LU/4EMA155LM/4EMA155LS/4E)
           SH380/200
    - are vulnerable.
    - The patch is available at:
       < http://www.octpower.nec.co.jp/download/index.html>
    - Detail information in Japanese is at:
       < http://www.octpower.nec.co.jp/news/snmp.html>

* CX5200 Series (CX5220,CX5210)
  CX4200 Series (CX4220,CX4210)
    - are vulnerable.
    - To get fixed software, please contact to:
       <mailto: BQOS@ipnw.jp.nec.com>
    - More information (in Japanese):
       < http://www1.ias.biglobe.ne.jp/IPNW/BQOS/whatsnew.html>

[VoIP GW/RAS Products]

* CX3200
    - is vulnerable.
    - To get fixed software, please contact to:
       <mailto: BQOS@ipnw.jp.nec.com>
    - More information (in Japanese):
       < http://www1.ias.biglobe.ne.jp/IPNW/BQOS/whatsnew.html>

[Other Network Equipment Products]

[Devices and other products]

net.com

Network Equipment Technologies, dba net.com
Security Advisory:
SNMPv1 Request and Trap Handling Vulnerabilities
Release Date: 22 February 2002

On February 12, 2002 the CERT®/CC released an advisory related to security vulnerabilities that may exist in network devices using SNMPv1 as the management protocol. In response to this advisory, CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", net.com began executing the tests that elicit these vulnerabilities for all net.com products that feature SNMPv1 capability.

Preliminary analysis indicates that multiple net.com products may exhibit certain vulnerabilities to SNMP messages as described in this Advisory. net.com is currently applying the PROTOS c06-SNMPv1 test suite to all products that feature SNMPv1 capability. Until net.com has completed testing on all of its products and provided patches or fixes to eliminate these vulnerabilities, net.com recommends one or more of the following best practices, as identified in CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03, to minimize your network's potential exposure to these vulnerabilities:
· Disable SNMP on workstations or devices not being managed by SNMP managers.
· Ingress filtering
· Egress filtering
· Filter SNMP traffic from non-authorized internal hosts
· Segregate SNMP traffic onto a separate management network
· Restrict SNMP traffic to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
· Change default community strings

For more information please see: www.net.com/service/

NetSilicon

The PROTOS c-06-SNMPv1 test suite provides evidence that the NetSilicon Softworks SNMP v1/v2/v3 agent Release 2 is not susceptible to the vulnerabilities described in this alert. Existing customers, with support agreements, using Release 1 of the agent can receive a free upgrade to Release 2 via the customer support link of the NetSilicon Softworks web site at http://www.netsilicon.com/Sftwrks/Support/helpdesk.asp.

NET-SNMP

All ucd-snmp version prior to 4.2.2 are susceptible to this vulnerability and users of versions prior to version 4.2.2 are encouraged to upgrade their software as soon as possible (http://www.net-snmp.org/download/). Version 4.2.2 and higher are not susceptible.

Netaphor

NETAPHOR SOFTWARE INC. is the creator of Cyberons for Java -- SNMP Manager Toolkit and Cyberons for Java -- NMS Application Toolkit, two Java based products that may be affected by the SNMP vulnerabilities identified here. The manner in which they are affected and the actions required (if any) to avoid being impacted by exploitation of these vulnerabilities, may be obtained by contacting Netaphor via email at info@netaphor.com Customers with annual support may contact support@netaphor.com directly. Those not under support entitlement may contact Netaphor sales: sales@netaphor.com or (949) 470 7955 in USA.

NetBSD

NetBSD does not ship with any SNMP tools in our 'base' releases. We do provide optional packages which provide various support for SNMP. These packages are not installed by default, nor are they currently provided as an install option by the operating system installation tools. A system administrator/end-user has to manually install this with our package management tools. These SNMP packages include:

  • netsaint-plugin-snmp-1.2.8.4 (SNMP monitoring plug-in for netsaint)
  • p5-Net-SNMP-3.60 (perl5 module for SNMP queries)
  • p5-SNMP-3.1.0 (Perl5 module for interfacing to the UCD SNMP library
  • p5-SNMP_Session-0.83 (perl5 module providing rudimentary access to remote SNMP agents)
  • ucd-snmp-4.2.1 (Extensible SNMP implementation) (conflicts with ucd-snmp-4.1.2)
  • ucd-snmp-4.1.2 (Extensible SNMP implementation) (conflicts with ucd-snmp-4.2.1)
We do provide a software monitoring mechanism called 'audit-packages', which allows us to highlight if a package with a range of versions has a potential vulnerability, and recommends that the end-user upgrade the packages in question.

Netscape Communications Corporation

Netscape continues to be committed to maintaining a high level of quality in our software and service offerings. Part of this commitment includes prompt response to security issues discovered by organizations such as the CERT® Coordination Center.

According to a recent CERT/CC advisory, The Oulu University Secure Programming Group (OUSPG) has reported numerous vulnerabilities in multiple vendor SNMPv1 implementations. These vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized privileged access, denial of service attacks, or unstable behavior.

We have carefully examined the reported findings, performing the tests suggested by the OUSPG to determine whether Netscape server products were subject to these vulnerabilities. It was determined that several products fell into this category. As a result, we have created fixes which will resolve the issues, and these fixes will appear in future releases of our product line. To Netscape's knowledge, there are no known instances of these vulnerabilities being exploited and no customers have been affected to date.

When such security warnings are issued, Netscape has committed to - and will continue to commit to - resolving these issues in a prompt and timely fashion, ensuring that our customers receive products of the highest quality and security.

NetScout Systems, Inc.

NetScout has determined that some of its products were affected by the warning issued by the CERT Coordination Center of vulnerabilities in the processing of Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) messages.  As a result, we have implemented patches, that protect our customers from a potential attack.. 
NetScout customers can obtain necessary patches by going to the Software Download area on our Web site at www.netscout.com/support.  The patches are found in a directory named “SNMP Security Patch.”  Please contact Customer Support if you require assistance.

It is important to note that the NetScout probes are passive devices and as such pose no risk to the network if compromised by an attack exploiting these vulnerabilities.

In an effort to help our customers minimize the risk of this vulnerability to other SNMP enabled devices, NetScout has provided instructions on how our products can be used to help defend against attacks.  These instructions are available on our Web site at http://www.netscout.com/support/alert.htm.


If you have further questions regarding the SNMP vulnerabilities warning, please contact Customer Support at 1-888-357-7667, or 1-978-614-4370 for assistance.

NetScreen

NetScreen's Global PRO and Global PRO Express do not have an SNMP agent or manager and are not sensitive to the issues raised in VU#107186 (CAN-2002-0012), "Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMP v1 trap handling". No change in behavior or operation is required.

NetScreen determined that the SNMP agent within all versions of ScreenOS is sensitive to certain of the issues  described in VU#854306 (CAN-2002-0013), "Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMP v1 request handling". These vulnerabilities can in certain circumstances be exploited to produce a denial of service.  These vulnerabilities cannot be used to gain management control of the device.

NetScreen has developed and tested maintenance releases of ScreenOS software that address these vulnerabilities. All NetScreen security appliances and systems shipped from NetScreen after Wednesday 13 February 2002 have software pre-installed at the factory that addresses these vulnerabilities. Customers may download maintenance releases from the NetScreen support web site (http://www.netscreen.com/support/ ).

Network Appliance

Information about the vulnerability of our systems has been posted on our primary support site: NOW (http://now.netapp.com ). The following field alert has also been issued to our customers:
Field Alert # 120: CERT Advisory CA-2002-03: SNMP Vulnerabilities

Testing shows some NetApp products will be affected by some of the issues listed in the CERT Advisory. Please note that NetCache appliances are only vulnerable if the attack comes from a trusted host.

The following appliances will PANIC when under attack: F85, F87, F820, F840, F880, C1100 series, C3100, C6100. The following appliances were not observed to panic, but they may still be vulnerable to attack: F720, F740, F760, C720, C760. Information about the bug associated with this vulnerability can be found in Bugs Online area of NOW (http://now.netapp.com).

What happens when a filer/cache is hit by these cases?

The NetApp system will PANIC with a PANIC string similar to the following:

PANIC: Protection Fault accessing address 0x00000001 from EIP 0x5f02c9 in process snmpd on release NetApp Release Rxxxxxxxx on Wed Feb 13 02:19:14 2002

What releases have the fix for this issue?

Patches have been built for the following OS levels:

Data ONTAP 5.3.7R3 - Patch is 5.3.7R3D12
Data ONTAP 6.1.1R2 - Patch is 6.1.1R2D16
Data ONTAP 6.1.2R1 - Patch is 6.1.2R1D4
NetCache 5.1 - Patch is 5.1R2D22
NetCache 5.2.1 - Patch is 5.2.1R1D2

The patches for both Data ONTAP and NetCache are available on the NOW site.

What will I see if someone attempts to attack my machine and I have installed an OS with the fix?

You will see a message similar to the following in the messages log and the filer or NetCache will continue to function normally.

Wed Feb 13 21:57:56 GMT [snmpd:warning]: SNMP detected possible buffer overflow attempt, skipping request

For more information visit http://now.netapp.com

Network Associates

PGP is not affected, impacted, or otherwise related to this VU#.

Network Computing Technologies

Network Computing Technologies has reviewed the information regarding SNMP vulnerabilities and is currently investigating the impact to our products.

NETWORK HARMONi, Inc.

Network Harmoni's response to CERT Advisory CA-2002-03
The CERT/CC is part of the Networked Systems Survivability (NSS) Program at the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), Carnegie Mellon University. The primary goal of the NSS Program is to ensure that appropriate technology and systems management practices are used to resist attacks on networked systems and to limit damage and ensure continuity of critical services in spite of successful attacks. On February 12th, 2002, CERT issued two advisories that warn of problems that could arise as the result of improper handling of malformed packets by applications using SNMP protocols.  The Oulu University Secure Programming Group (OUSPG) had discovered that improperly formed packets in the form of trap messages to SMNP managers and request messages to SNMP agents had caused problems in a number of SNMP based products.  A list of vendors, with products based on SNMP, was compiled by CERT, and they were notified directly along with the press and analyst community covering the Network Management space.

Once we were notified of the situation, we immediately began regression testing our agent software against the entire Protos Test Suite: c06-snmpv1 used by Oulu University to discover these two packet handling vulnerabilities.  Because we are not currently offering products that accept trap messages, testing was focused on the ability of our SNMP agents to handle malformed SNMP requests without incident.  It was discovered through our testing that both RMONplus and SLAplus are potentially vulnerable to this method of disruption and will exhibit unpredictable behavior as a result of running this test suite. Rather than issue a patch, we have made modification to both versions of our agent to correct this problem. Customers concerned about vulnerabilities related to CERT Advisory CA-2002-03 should contact NETWORK HARMONi at support@networkharmoni.com for a new build.

Current status (Wednesday 2/20/2002 4:00 PM):
RMONplus & SLAplus (Builds 232 and above)
Sun Solaris - Passed All tests
Windows XP - Passed All tests
Windows 2000 - Passed All tests
Windows NT - Passed All tests
HP-UX - Passed All tests
IBM AIX - Passed All tests
Linux - Passed All tests

Nokia

This vulnerability is known to affect IPSO versions 3.1.3, 3.3, 3.3.1, 3.4, and 3.4.1. Patches are currently available for versions 3.3, 3.3.1, 3.4 and 3.4.1 for download from the Nokia website. In addition, version 3.4.2 shipped with the patch incorporated, and the necessary fix will be included in all future releases of IPSO.

We recommend customers install the patch immediately or follow the recommended precautions below to avoid any potential exploit.

If you are not using SNMP services, including Traps, simply disable the SNMP daemon to completely eliminate the potential vulnerability.

If you are using only SNMP Traps and running Check Point FireWall-1, create a firewall policy to disallow incoming SNMP messages on all appropriate interfaces. Traps will continue to work normally.

Nortel Networks

Nortel Networks is cooperating to the fullest extent with the CERT Coordination Center and customers that potentially could be affected and other companies within the networking industry to assess, address, and resolve the situation.

For specific information on Nortel Networks response to CERT Bulletin CA-2002-03, please visit our web site http://www.nortelnetworks.com/corporate/technology/snpmv1.html

Novell

Novell ships SNMP.NLM and SNMPLOG.NLM with NetWare 4.x, NetWare 5.x and 6.0 systems. The SNMP and SNMPLOG vulnerabilities detected on NetWare are fixed and available for download. The TID (Technical Information Document) number is 2961546, it can be obtained from the url http://support.novell.com/servlet/tidfinder/2961546.

NuDesign Team, Inc.

NuDesign Team, Inc. is a vendor of SNMP Management and Agent software solutions.  We have tested our products and identified vulnerabilities identified by VU#854306, VU#107186, and OUSPG#0100 advisories with our SNMP Agent and SNMP Trap receiving products.  We have applied required corrections, new versions of NuDesign products have completed the regression test cycle and have been made available to our customers on Feb 18, 2002.

For additional information please contact NuDesign Team, Inc. at 416 737 0328 or visit www.NuDesignTeam.com.

OpenBSD

OpenBSD does not ship SNMP code.

Openwave Systems Inc.

Openwave Systems Inc. ackowledges the potential of SNMP vulnerabilities described in [VU#107186 and VU#854306]. Openwave embeds SNMP in their messaging products for the purpose of internal measuring and monitoring of the messaging system. The vulnerabilities listed above can cause denial of service of the SNMP service when specific malformed packets are delivered, but since most customers do not allow SNMP traffic through their firewall, and only utilize SNMP inside their firewall for the purpose of internal monitoring, they should be immune to the SNMP vulnerabilities listed above. Even if SNMP traffic is allowed through the firewall, or no firewall is employed, the SNMP vulnerabilities above can at most cause denial of service of the SNMP services and cannot cause either unprivleged access or denial of service of the messaging products themselves.

A patch will be made available by Openwave to address the SNMP vulnerabilities. Customers can determine if a patch is needed by inspecting their version of snmpdm via the following command:

% ./snmpdm -d


Versions which are 15.3.1.7 or greater have no vulnerability. Customers who require upgrades to their version of snmpdm should contact their Openwave Technical Support representative for availability of a patch on their specific product line.

Some customers additionally use a toolkit delivered by Openwave called the "TACPAC". This toolkit contains a utility called snmptrapd which is also vulnerable to the SNMP issues mentioned above. Customers who use this tool are encouraged to contact their Openwave Technical Support representative to obtain a new version of the tool which removes the vulnerabilities.

Optical Access

Following the release of vulnerability notes VU#107186 and VU#854306, our company OpicalAccess has two product lines of switches and routers with SNMP agent implementations: OptiSwitch and OptiSwitch Master.

Optical Access tested the SNMP agents of our OptiSwitch product line with the original Oulu university test patterns and found them not vulnerable.

The OptiSwitch Master product line uses UCD-SNMP version that was found to be vulnerable. UCD-SNMP version that includes the patch for the reported vulnerabilities will be integrated into the next major release. Until then, The use of ACL for management sessions feature can signifficantly reduce the risk ( without compromising performance).

Oracle Corporation

Oracle Security Alert #30
Dated: 5 March, 2002
SNMP Vulnerability in Oracle Enterprise Manager, Master_Peer Agent

Description

A potential security vulnerability has been discovered in the Oracle Enterprise Manager (EM) SNMP monitoring capability for Oracle Database that may result in a potential Denial of Service (DoS) attack against EM's "master_peer" agent.

EM is comprised primarily of two driver programs, the "Intelligent Agent" that performs core EM functionality and the "master_peer" agent that provides monitoring capability for EM when SNMP is being used.

This potential security vulnerability can manifest only when the SNMP monitoring feature is used in addition to the default functionality provided by EM. The "master_peer" agent of EM, which provides the SNMP monitoring capability, is vulnerable to ill-formed SNMP requests that render it unable to respond to further SNMP requests or send unsolicited SNMP messages.

Note: The "Intelligent Agent" is not affected by this potential security vulnerability. Therefore, EM's core functionality such as job submission, event registration, notifications, etc. is not affected.

Products affected

EM Releases 1.6.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 9.0.1 running on (or "included with"):
- Oracle7 Database, Release 7.3.x
- Oracle8 Database, Releases 8.0.x
- Oracle8i Database, Releases 8.1.x
- Oracle9i Database, Release 9.0.1.x

Platforms affected
Windows and all Unix platforms that support SNMP variants except for IBM AIX.

Workarounds
There are no workarounds to protect against the SNMP vulnerability.

Patch Information
Oracle has fixed the potential vulnerability identified above in patch/bug fix number 2224724. Patches will be available only for supported releases of EM and Oracle Database on all platforms that require a patch.

Download currently available patches for your platform from Oracle's Worldwide Support web site, Metalink, http://metalink.oracle.com . Activate the "Patches" button to get to the patches Web page. Enter the patch/bug fix number indicated above and activate the "Submit" button.

Please check Metalink and/or with Oracle Worldwide Support periodically for patch availability if the patch for your platform is not yet available.

Oracle strongly recommends that you comprehensively test the stability of your system upon application of any patch prior to deleting any of the original file(s) that are replaced by the patch.

Credits

Oracle Corporation thanks CERT of Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute for bringing this potential security vulnerability to Oracle's attention.

OutBack Resource Group, Inc.

OutBack Resource Group, Inc.

OutBack Resource Group, Inc. acknowledges the potential of SNMP
vulnerabilities as identified in the following CERT advisories:

VU#854306 - Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 request handling
VU#107186 - Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 trap handling

OutBack has investigated how these vulnerabilities may impact
OutBack's jSNMP Enterprise product and has determined the following:

VU#854306 - This advisory is not applicable to jSNMP, because jSNMP
does not accept or process SNMP Get, Set, or GetNext PDUs; rather,
jSNMP sends those requests to SNMP agents and processes subsequent
responses.

VU#107186 - jSNMP v3.2 passed the 24,098 applicable tests in the
PROTOS c06-snmpv1 test suite.  jSNMP v3.1 failed only one test with
undesirable behavior.  No consequences, other than potential
denial-of-service, are known.  There have been no reported instances
of this vulnerability being exploited in the jSNMP product.

We recommend that our customers upgrade to the latest available
version of jSNMP.

Up-to-date information is available at www.outbackinc.com or
support@outbackinc.com.

Paradyne

A recent alert issued by CERT states that any device connected to the Internet has potential security vulnerability. The specific root cause relates to SNMP v1, which is implemented in many Paradyne products.  This alert has caused a number of Paradyne customers to call and request an official statement and risk assessment associated with Paradyne's equipment. 

The purpose of this document is to inform you that Paradyne engineering staff is currently assessing the situation to determine if any vulnerabilities exist.  The analysis will take into consideration product features, SNMP v1 issues and the typical usage of our products in DSL and Frame Relay network topologies. In typical configurations, direct connection to the Internet with Paradyne devices and/or management systems is extremely rare.

Please note that while no device is completely secure, Paradyne has implemented several safeguards that protect against intrusion such as that identified by CERT Advisory CA-2002-03.  Prior to the time that Paradyne releases a more comprehensive statement, we recommend that you take the following actions as appropriate:

·  Change community string from public; choose obscure names
·  Use device SNMP access list capability
·  Use firewall at NOC if NOC has access to Internet, same for CEU central site products  (FrameSaver)
·  Utilize inband management (dedicated management PVC) when possible

Taken together, these methods provide a robust security feature set which should minimize the impact of the concerns raised in the CERT alert.  With this said, Paradyne will release a more complete assessment as soon as possible.  This response will consist of an analysis of the overall security risks, recommendations to mitigate these risks and, if necessary, plans for the introduction of new code to close any identified security breaches.

Perle Systems

With regard to CERT Advisory CA-2002-03, it has been recognized by Perle Systems that specific Perle products may be exposed to these SNMP vulnerabilities.  Perle is addressing these vulnerabilities across all affected product lines and has released an advisory and solution guide at: http://www.perle.com/support_services/index.shtml

Powerware Corporation

Powerware Corporation notice regarding CERT SNMP Vulnerability Announcement and popular Powerware Connectivity Devices

Most  customers  operate  firewalls  that block externally originating SNMP traffic,  and  further, detect and prevent Denial of Service attacks. It is these devices that constitute a main focal point of SNMP concern since they represent the vanguard of your network.

Based  upon  SNMP  blocking  and  ingress/egress  filtering,  any  possible potential  security  vulnerability  may only be exploited by users who have access to your local security domain, therefore the risk is diminished.

Testing has revealed the following:

Powerware, to date, knows of no SNMP-related security issues with its legacy, internal and external, ConnectUPS SNMP cards. Testing with the ConnectUPS and BestLink SNMP/Web Card has revealed that the card can, under direct attack, cease to respond to further network requests. This resulting behavior does not affect the operation of the underlying UPS. A firmware patch will be available on the Powerware web site shortly (www.powerware.com).

Qualcomm

WorldMail does not support SNMP by default, so customers who run unmodified installations are not vulnerable.

Quallaby Corporation

QUALLABY's findings to date regarding the recent CERT advisory are as follows:

CERT Advisory CA-2002-03

VU#854306 - Multiple Vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 Request Handling -
This advisory is not applicable to PROVISO as it is a management system and not an agent. As a management system, PROVISO does not accept SNMP requests. PROVISO sends SNMP requests and processes subsequent SNMP responses.

CERT Advisory CA-2002-03

VU#107186 - Multiple Vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 Trap Handling -
This advisory is not applicable to PROVISO as it does not accept SNMP Trap PDU. PROVISO only sends SNMP Traps.

Quick Eagle Networks

Quick Eagle Networks, Inc. is a provider of intelligent WAN access solutions for IP and frame relay networks, and the world leader in multilink access devices. Quick Eagle Networks continues to be committed to ensure a high level of security and reliability of our customer’s networks. Part of this commitment includes prompt responses to security issues discovered by organizations such as the CERT® Coordination Center.

I. Overview

On February 12, 2002 the CERT®/CC released an advisory related to security vulnerabilities that may exist in network devices using SNMPv1 as the management protocol. In response to this advisory (CERT Advisory CA-2002-03: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol), Quick Eagle Networks Inc. began immediately investigating whether these vulnerabilities impact Quick Eagle's products.

II. Test Procedures

Quick Eagle Networks is currently applying the PROTOS c06-SNMPv1 test suite to all products and its variations that feature SNMPv1 capability. The tests evaluate the robustness of the application logic of the SNMPv1 implementation as well as the robustness of the BER decoder of the SNMPv1 implementation.

III. Impact

Preliminary test results have not indicated any vulnerability that will allow an attacker to gain access. In general, Quick Eagle Networks' products use out of band management, eliminating the chances of an attacker to gain access from the outside of a network. While most of Quick Eagle Networks' newer WAN access devices have already passed the test, some of Quick Eagle Networks' older products are still under investigation.

IV. Solution

Until Quick Eagle Networks has completed testing on all of its products and provided patches or fixes to eliminate these vulnerabilities, Quick Eagle Networks recommends considering one or more of the following solutions, as also identified in CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03, to minimize your network’s potential exposure to these vulnerabilities:

· Disable SNMP on the device
· Change the default community strings
· Disconnect the management port. This won’t have any impact on your network traffic as Quick Eagle’s solutions use out of band management.

The recommendations above apply only for those products that are still under evaluation. Please refer to our status report for further information.

IV. Status Reports

For more information please visit http://www.quickeagle.com/support/cert.asp

RAD Data Communications Ltd.

The security of our customer's networks is of highest priority to RAD Data Communications Ltd. ("RAD"). RAD is aware of CERT's Advisories VU#854306 and VU#107186, and is working together with it's partners to assess if any of its products might be affected.

VU#107186: RAD's Network Management System (RADview) is not vulnerable to the extent of working in conjunction with 3rd party products, such as Castle Rock's SNMPc 5, HP's NNM 6.2, Microsoft's Windows NT4 and Sun's Solaris 2.7. Customers are advised to consult the respective responses of these vendors, available at http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/854306 and verify that they comply with each vendor's specific recommendations.

VU#854306: As a first measure, we have requested from 3rd party software developers, the products of which are integrated within RAD's SNMP agents and Network Management station, to provide us with statements as to their products vulnerabilities and their potential impact. We are currently waiting for their conclusions. In parallel, RAD is in process of internally setting up the testing schedules and facilities to ascertain the vulnerability of our products.

Radware

Radware has assessed its SNMP based products against the vulnerabilities identified in CERT Advisory CA-2002-03. The following table identifies by product the currently available software maintenance releases that include the fix for the SNMP vulnerabilities:

           
ProductRelease (HW Platforms)
WSD6.18.02 (H, C)
7.10.08 (AS2, AS1, H, C)
7.20.02 (AS1, H)
7.21.02 (AS2, AS1)
CSD3.30.02 (AS2, AS1)
3.40.01 (AS2, AS1)
FP2.20.09 (AS1, H, C)
LP3.20.09 (AS1, H, C)
CertainT 1002.20.00 (Model A, Model B)

Radware customers can download this software from the following link:

http://www.radware.com/content/support/customers/downloads/index.htm

Radware Channel Partners can download this software from the following link:

http://www.radware.com/content/support/techresources/prodinfo/SWStatusMatrix.htm

For upgrades within the same feature release, e.g. WSD 7.10.07 to WSD 7.10.08, software passwords are not needed.

For upgrades to a new feature release, e.g. WSD 7.10.07 to WSD 7.21.02, a software password is needed and can be obtained by contacting Radware technical support at support@radware.com. The unit must be covered by an active support agreement to obtain a password for a feature release upgrade. Additional requirements, e.g. minimum Boot ROM software version, may exist. Software upgrade instructions can be found at the following link:

http://www.radware.com/archive/support/general/info/upgrades.PDF

Anyone who does not have access to the restricted areas of the Radware web site or has any other questions regarding these maintenance releases and the upgrade process, can contact Radware Technical Support at support@radware.com for assistance.

At all times, Radware recommends taking the following standard security precautions:

  • Disable all remote management access through all unnecessary interfaces using the SNMP or Management Ports Table feature, depending on the specific software release in use.
  • If possible, limit all remote management access to a physically separate port that is connected to a secure management segment.

Redback Networks, Inc.

Redback Networks, Inc. has identified that the vulnerability described in CA-2002-03 may affect its products.  To that end Redback has been providing security workarounds to protect existing installations and will issue software patches to provide a conclusive solution to the problem. The SmartEdge Transport product line is unaffected by this vulnerability. Customers should contact Redback Networks Technical Assistance Center [Domestic TAC number (877) 733 2225; International TAC number is 31-104987777; Web: www.redback.com/support ] for more information and workarounds.

Red Hat

RedHat has released a security advisory at

http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-163.html

with updated versions of the ucd-snmp package for all supported releases and architectures. For more information or to download the update please visit this page.

Riverstone Networks

The Riverstone product line is, under certain circumstances, vulnerable tosome of the SNMP issues described in CERT's VU#854306 (advisory CA-2002-03). Based on current testing the assessment is that the risk to an operational network is low. Patch releases 7.0.2.6 and 8.0.3.3 will correct these vulnerabilities.

Please, implement the following workarounds until these patches are made available:

  • create access control lists to allow only trusted management stations to access the router.

  • create an exclusive management VLAN to manage the router.

  • manage the router through its ethernet management interface.
    or
  • disable SNMP

SecureWorks, Inc.

SecureWorks is not vulnerable to SNMP based attacks.  The SecureWorks iSensor and Secure Operations Center uses a proprietary protocol in order to remotely monitor and configure devices.  Additionally, the SecureWorks iSensor is capable of filtering malformed and/or illegal snmp packets in order to protect against incoming and outgoing SNMP based attacks.

Sierra Wireless

We are not vulnerable.

Sinetica Corporation Limited

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/IAFY-56DKEV

SGI

SGI acknowledges the SNMP vulnerabilities reported by CERT and is currently investigating. No further information is available at this time.

For the protection of all our customers, SGI does not disclose, discuss or confirm vulnerabilities until a full investigation has occurred and any necessary patch(es) or release streams are available for all vulnerable and supported IRIX operating systems.  Until SGI has more definitive information to provide, customers are encouraged to assume all security vulnerabilities as exploitable and take appropriate steps according to local site security policies and requirements.  As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be issued via the normal SGI security information distribution methods including the wiretap mailing list on http://www.sgi.com/support/security/.

Sniffer Technologies

SNMP Request and Trap Handling Security Advisory
Revision 1.0
Release Date: 03/01/02

Sniffer Technologies has prepared this advisory regarding SNMP in Sniffer Technologies products.  This advisory contains specific instructions on how to disable these services where security may be an issue.

An update regarding this issue will be sent to all Sniffer Technologies customers on Wednesday, March 13, 2002.  The Sniffer Technologies team is working diligently to fully resolve this issue.  If you have further questions in the interim, please contact technical support.

What is the SNMP security risk?

On February 12, 2002, The CERT Coordination Center issued a warning that a broad array of network equipment used on the Internet -- including switches, routers, hubs, printers and operating systems -- may be vulnerable to an SNMP-related attack that could cause equipment to fail or allow an attacker to take control of it. Though not mentioned on their list of vendors, our Sniffer Distributed product is another such device that may have this inherent SNMP vulnerability because of its RMON/SNMP capabilities.

There are two areas in our product that can be affected by this security concern.

1. The RMON/SNMP features of our Sniffer Distributed Appliance
2. The Trap Capture application at our SniffView Console

In both cases, these SNMP commands can be disabled on our product if not in use.

Can I avoid using these features in the Sniffer Distributed Product without affecting the capabilities of the Sniffer Product?

Yes, you can disable the SNMP/RMON capabilities of the product and utilize our proprietary method of logging network statistics and Expert Symptom and Diagnosis to disk for reporting with Reporter and/or Sniffer Watch.  This method does not utilize SNMP and therefore is not susceptible to the SNMP vulnerability.  You will still have the same statistics and reports that are available using the SNMP/RMON features of the product, with the addition of the Expert Symptoms and Diagnosis which are unique to our method of logging and reporting.

How do I turn off these SNMP capabilities in the product?

Turning off SNMP at the Sniffer Distributed Appliance:
By default, the SNMP and RMON features of the Sniffer Distributed Appliance are enabled.  To turn off these features, follow the procedures below.

1. Either Start Probe Viewer at the Sniffer Distributed Appliance, or "Configure" an Agent from your SniffView Console.
2. Select the SNMP tab.
3. Disable SNMP Trap
4. Disable SNMP/RMON.
5. Restart the Sniffer Distributed Appliance for changes to take effect.

Turning off the SNMP Trap Capture at the SniffView Console:
By default, when you install the SniffView Console a program called Trap Capture automatically gets installed and runs in the background.   This program can accept SNMP Traps from Sniffer Distributed Appliances as well as other SNMP devices.  Follow the procedures below to turn it off:

1. Start the SniffView Alarm Manager.
2. Select Toggle Trap capture.  The Trap capture program will be disabled. However, if you reboot the PC the SniffView Console is running on it will turn itself back on.  Therefore you must remember to disable it again.

Will these features be disabled in the future?

Yes, the SNMP/RMON features of the product will be disabled by default starting with the Sniffer Distributed v4.1 (with Support for Web Console) version.

What if I require these features?

If you require these features then there are a few steps that you can take to protect yourself from this security concern.

1. Under the SNMP Tab (see above) Change Community name from "public" to something else.
2. Using routers and/or firewalls, control SNMP access to the Sniffer Distributed Appliances or SniffView Console to ensure the traffic originates from known management systems and addresses.
3. Filter SNMP services at your network perimeter (ingress/egress filtering).
4. Segregate network management traffic onto a separate network. (i.e. a VPN) Refer to CERT advisory CA-2002-03 (http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-03.html) for more details and the most recent information regarding recommended solutions.

How will this security concern affect my network?

This issue has the potential to create a denial of service attack. An attacker sending bogus SNMP requests and traps could flood the Sniffer Distributed Appliance and/or SniffView console running the Trap Capture application.  This might cause the system to hang and may require a reboot.

An attacker should not be able to configure or take control of either the Sniffer Distributed Appliance or the SniffView Console.

Has anyone reported an exploitation of this vulnerability on a Sniffer Distributed system?

No.

Have we notified CERT of our concern?

Yes

Where can I find out more information regarding this security concern?
For more information regarding this vulnerability please refer to the following URLs on CERT's web site:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-03.html
http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/snmp_faq.html

SNMP Research International

The most recent releases (15.3.1.7 and above) of all SNMP Research products address the vulnerabilities identified in the following CERT vulnerability advisories:

VU#854306 (Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 request handling)
VU#107186 (Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 trap handling)

A few of the malformed packets sent in these tests result in out of bound array references in allocated memory and minor memory leaks.  No consequences, other than potential denial of service on some platforms, are known.

All customers who maintain a support contract have received either the new release or the appropriate patch sets to their 15.3.1.1 and later source code releases addressing these vulnerabilities.  Users maintaining earlier releases should update to the current release if they have not already done so.  Up-to-date information is available from support@snmp.com.

SonicWALL, Inc.

SonicWALL has tested its products in response to CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03 "Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)," SonicWALL's has found NO evidence of any SNMP vulnerabilities in any SonicWALL Firewall/VPN appliance or Red Creek 3VPN appliances. No updates are required to maintain the integrity of these products.

SonicWALL acknowledges the potential of SNMP vulnerabilities in its SSL offloader products and is currently working to address any potential security issues. However, exposure to vulnerability is extremely low due to the nature of the typical SSL Offloader network configuration. Because the SSL Offloader is located within a secure network environment, rather than at the network perimeter, the only opportunity for attack would be internal. Customers can eliminate the risk by temporarily disabling the SNMP sub-system.

SolarWinds.Net, Inc.

While the SolarWinds tools are not susceptible to the vulnerabilities listed within this advisory, SolarWinds products can be used to determine if SNMP agents contain known vulnerabilities.

SolarWinds supports the recommendations made by CERT regarding SNMP implementations and has released a Router Security Check tool that can be used to check routers and switches for several known SNMP security flaws.

For more information on using the SolarWinds tools to secure your SNMP implementation please visit:
http://www.solarwinds.net/Tools/Security/Security_SNMP.htm

Sonus Networks

Since the release of CERT Advisory CA-2002-03, Sonus Networks has reviewed its product offering and determined a potential issue may exist within its management offering.

The Sonus PSX6000, SGX2000, and Insight products utilize SNMP Research software in the SONScia package that has been identified by its vendor as possibly vulnerable to the exploit.  Sonus product versions 3.2.x, 3.3.x, and 3.4.x all have the affected SONScia package. The issue has been resolved in the upcoming 4.0 versions of the PSX6000, SGX2000, and Insight products and concerned customers are advised to upgrade as the software becomes available.

Sonus PSX6000, SGX2000, and Insight products run on top of Sun Microsystems's Solaris operating environment (versions 2.6 and 2.8). Sun Microsystems has identified these operating environments as vulnerable to the exploit IF they are started or used. Given that Sonus Networks software neither starts nor uses the process in question, snmpdx, Sonus products are not vulnerable to the exploit through this Solaris process.

The Sonus GSX9000 does not use the same third party software as other products from Sonus Networks and at this time we have not found any problems relating to its SNMP operation. Negative testing is a routine portion of GSX9000 SQA and to date has not shown any undesired results. We have recently tested the GSX9000 with OUSPG's PROTOS c06-snmpv1 test suite and those tests passed successfully.

Spider Software

Spider is currently investigating this potential problem and, if applicable, a new version of the SNMP agent will be made available through the standard release process of SpiderTCP.

Spider will notify its customers of any new patches resulting from this investigation through the normal support channel.

Standard Networks, Inc.

Standard Networks offers a "mainframe connectivity" family of products under the "UniGate" brand name. These products contain SNMP agents. After reviewing the recent information regarding SNMP vulnerabilities, performing a source code audit and running a variety of publicly available SNMP exploit suites (including the OUSPG test suite), we believe the UniGate product is not vulnerable to the problems described in VU#854306.

SNMP agent services are enabled by default on UniGate after version 3.6.07. (This version was released in late 1995; anyone with a "Year 2000 Compliant" version runs SNMP services.) It is not currently possible to turn on and shut off SNMP services on a UniGate, but it is possible to change the "inquiry" and "update" strings to unusual values (i.e. "m2H9j3s4") to prevent unauthorized access to the machine. Alternatively, a current version of the UniGate software with SNMP "hardcoded off" (3.99.31) is available from Standard Networks directly for customers who feel they need to have this service disabled immediately. (A future version will allow users to toggle SNMP services on and off.)

Attempts to find or exploit SNMP vulnerabilities on a UniGate platform will often cause the UniGate to log those attempts as "Community Errors" or "Misc Errors" on the "SNMP Statistics" screen and/or as "IP: Fragment Msg too big" errors on the main status screen.

Standard Networks' "OpenIT mainframe connectivity" product will also act as an SNMP agent if SNMP is enabled under Windows NT (rare). OpenIT customers are encouraged to follow "Microsoft Corporation's" latest recommendations regarding Windows NT SNMP issues if they are using this service. It is however possible to immediately disable any active SNMP services on any OpenIT platform by stopping the "SNMP" service from the "Services Control Panel."

No other Standard Networks products (i.e. "EMU Terminal Emulator", "ActiveHEAT Host Access", the "MOVEit" family of secure file transfer products) are affected by this issue.

Customers are encouraged to call Standard Networks immediately (+001 608.227.6100) with any questions or concerns about their specific configuration.

Stonesoft

Stonesoft's StoneGate product does not include an SNMP agent, and is therefore not vulnerable to this. Other Stonesoft's products are still under investigation.  As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be available at

http://www.stonesoft.com/support/techcenter/

Sun Microsystems, Inc.

Sun's SNMP product, Solstice Enterprise Agents (SEA), described here:

http://www.sun.com/solstice/products/ent.agents/
is affected by VU#854306 but not VU#107186.  More specifically the main agent of SEA, snmpdx(1M), is affected on Solaris 2.6, 7, 8.  Sun has released Security Bulletin #00215.

Sun Security Bulletins are available from:

http://sunsolve.sun.com/security
Sun patches are available from:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/securitypatch

Sun products which utilize SNMP are listed in the following SunAlert along
with their vulnerability status:

http://sunsolve.Sun.COM/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert%2F43704

Products listed with a vulnerability status of "Under Investigation" will
be updated as soon as more information becomes available.

Symantec Corporation

Symantec verified that the snmptrap.exe on the Intruder Alert (ITA) 3.6 agent, if configured to accept SNMP traps from Symantec NetProwler, is susceptible to a communications Denial of Service when the PROTOS test suite is directed against it.  The communicator service will be halted, the halt will be logged and the service requires a restart to reinitiate communications.

This should be a very low risk issue to Symantec ITA customers. The snmptrap.exe module is loaded on an ITA agent machine. Depending on customer configuration if the snmptrap module is loaded on an ITA agent located on the internal network of the company then the collector is only vulnerable to an internal attack as long as the firewall rule set blocks snmptrap communications through the firewall.

The functionality of the snmptrap.exe allows smooth integrated alert management of both NIDS and HIDS from a single administrator console. Halting the communicator module disrupts the integrated communications only.  Both the NetProwler and the ITA IDS systems continue to fuction normally but will require monitoring from separate consoles until the communicator service is restarted.

Symantec takes any product issue such as this very seriously.  We have developed a patch for Symantec ITA 3.6 that addresses this problem. The patch is available to Symantec ITA 3.6 customers from the Symantec customer ITA ftp download site as ITA3_6Patch1/061302/.  There is a patch for both domestic and international releases.

Please contact supportsolutions@symantec.com for questions on product upgrades.

TANDBERG

Tandberg have run all the testcases found the PROTOS test-suite, c06snmpv1:

1. c06-snmpv1-req-app-pr1.jar
2. c06-snmpv1-req-enc-pr1.jar
3. c06-snmpv1-trap-app-pr1.jar
4. c06-snmpv1-trap-enc-pr1.jar

The tests were run with standard delay time between the requests (100ms), but also with a delay of 1ms.  The tests applies to all TANDBERG products (T500, T880, T1000, T2500, T6000 and T8000). The software tested on these products were B4.0 (our latest software) and no problems were found when running the test suite.

Tavve Software Company

Tavve Software Company has investigated its products in light of CERT Advisory CA-2002-03 regarding SNMP vulnerabilities.  Tavve's EventWatch, PReView, and Amerigo products always reside within the network management system (NMS) framework supplied by either HP OpenView Network Node Manager or Tivoli NetView; therefore, these Tavve products have no inherent or intrinsic exposure to SNMP vulnerabilities beyond those of the underlying NMS.  We advise our customers to apply any patches for Network Node Manger or NetView made available by HP or Tivoli.  Tavve has created a solution for ePROBE and will make this update available via its Web site ( http://www.tavve.com).

Tivoli Systems

Introduction

This document serves as an update regarding the current status of Tivoli/IBM products’ implementation of Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), Version 1, and the potential vulnerabilities related to the implementation.

Tivoli has identified the following products that implement SNMP v1:

§         Tivoli NetView for Unix

§         Tivoli NetView for Windows

§         Tivoli NetView Mid-Level Manager (MLM)

§         Tivoli Comprehensive Network Address Translator (CNAT)

§         Tivoli NetView for OS/390

§         Tivoli Enterprise Console SNMP Adapter

§         Tivoli Storage Network Manager

§         Tivoli Risk Manager

As an interim step, customers should be directed to secure their networks so as to prevent SNMP access from unknown sources.  The CERT advisory contains substantial information on this topic under the heading of “Ingress Filtering”.

The following products have been identified for having the potential exposure:
This information is current as of March 29, 2002.

Identified Loss of Service
The following products have been identified as containing issues that can result in loss of service:

Tivoli NetView for Unix & Windows

DETAILS

Tivoli NetView for Unix & Tivoli NetView for Windows are vulnerable to a loss of service when subjected to certain SNMP get requests or traps as indicated in CA-2002-03.

STATUS

A fix is available (See the section on ‘Fix Locations’).

Tivoli NetView Mid-Level Manager (MLM) Agent for Solaris, HPUX, Windows and AIX

DETAILS

The Tivoli NetView Mid-Level Manager (MLM) on Solaris, HPUX, Windows and AIX (Version 7.1 and earlier) is vulnerable to a loss of service when subjected to certain SNMP get requests or traps as indicated in CA-2002-03.

STATUS

A fix is currently being tested and will be released.  (See the section on ‘Fix Locations’).

Tivoli Comprehensive Network Address Translator (CNAT)

DETAILS

This product is vulnerable to a temporary loss of service of the AIX system, which causes a loss of connectivity to the portion of the network relying on the CNAT system for NAT routing.

STATUS

A fix is currently being tested and will be released.  The fix will be available on this site (See the section on ‘Fix Locations’).

Tivoli NetView for OS/390 Version 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 

DETAILS:

ABEND in E/AS (Event Automation Services) Trap-to-Alert adapter when Enterprise Object Identification (OID) is very large can occur.

STATUS

A fix is available.

Tivoli Enterprise Console SNMP Adapter

DETAILS

The Tivoli Enterprise Console SNMP Adapter is vulnerable to a loss of service when subjected to certain SNMP get requests or traps.

STATUS

A fix is currently being tested and will be released.   

Tivoli Risk Manager

DETAILS

The Tivoli Risk Manager utilizes the Tivoli Enterprise Console SNMP Adapter, which is vulnerable to a loss of service when subjected to certain SNMP get requests or traps as indicated in CA-2002-03.

STATUS

A fix is currently being tested and will be released.   

Tivoli Storage Network Manager

DETAILS

This condition only affects TSNM's ability to monitor outband events via SNMP traps.  TSNM is capable of managing SANs via both outband mechanisms (SNMP queries to FC switches for topology discovery and receives SNMP traps for outband event detection) and inband mechanisms (managed hosts connected to the SAN via FC HBAs for topology and attribute discovery, and inband FC event detection).  Outband discovery, inband discovery, and inband event detection are not affected by this condition.

STATUS

This will be fixed in the next version of TSNM.

PREVENTION

In addition to the prevention noted above, customers should configure at least one Windows or SUN managed host per SAN to allow inband detection of SAN events.

Fix Locations
Service fixes to those products that have identified the issue will post the files in the following 2 locations:

Web - http://www.tivoli.com/secure/support/documents/security/ca-2002-03.html

FTP - ftp.tivoli.com/support/Support_Notes/SecurityBulletins/

Questions
For any questions, please contact your local call center or open a PMR through the online support page http://www.tivoli.com/support/reporting/.

TMP Consultoria S/C

The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) has issued last week an advisory regarding numerous vulnerabilities affecting most vendors' SNMP implementations. This advisory, which can be accessed on http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-03.html, specifically addressed vulnerabilities on the implementations' handling of SNMPv1 trap and request PDUs (more specifically, the handling of the Trap, Get, Set, and GetNext PDUs).

TMP would like to state that we have evaluated the impact of those vulnerabilities on our WANView line of network management solutions, and that we are in NO WAY vulnerable to any of the issues reported, as follows:

VU#854306 - Multiple Vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 Request Handling: This advisory is not applicable to WANView, because WANView does not accept or process in any way SNMP Get/Set/GetNext PDUs; rather, WANView sends those requests to the monitored equipment, and process subsequent responses.

VU#107186 - Multiple Vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 Trap Handling: This advisory is not applicable to WANView either, because WANView currently does not accept SNMP traps (this has been a product design decision) WANView can be configured to send SNMP traps to other systems, and is not affected in this regard.

In case you have any questions or need further assistance regarding these matters, please contact us at <wanview@tmp.com.br>.

Top Layer Networks

Both of Top Layer's focused security appliances, the IDS Balancer and the Attack Mitigator, do not exhibit the SNMP vulnerabilite(s) Outlined by CERT Advisory CA-2002-03.

Neither of these products require any modification at all in order to be protected. The AppSwitch/AppSafe product is also capable of being so protected, but it may require that one configuration change be made to ensure total protection based on the TopPath version of firmware it is running.

The detail of the configuration change required in the AppSwitch/AppSafe product is discussed below.

CERT's recommended restrictions are as follows:

1.  Disable SNMP V1 access to all applicable network devices
2.  Filter SNMP traffic from non-authorized internal hosts
3.  Segregate SNMP traffic onto a separate management network

Top Layer is well positioned to provide immediate solutions for our customers.  There are two options that users can immediately choose from to protect their TLN security systems from SNMP V1 attacks:

OPTION 1
All currently shipping Top Layer products come pre-configured from the factory or can be configured to meet CERT restriction # 1.  For example, Top Layer's focused security appliances, the IDS Balancer and the upcoming Attack Mitigator products have, as their factory default settings, Access Restrictions for SNMP set to -Denied- thus meeting CERT restriction # 1.

NOTE: The AppSwitch/AppSafe Release 4.1 factory default is for SNMP disabled. Models running Release 3.55 must be explicitly configured to deny access as described above.


OPTION 2
Option #2 is to implement restrictions # 2 and # 3 simultaneously

Restriction # 2
To meet CERT restriction # 2, network managers can set access restrictions for SNMP to an allowed IP host address range via the Web Management Interface supplied with the AppSwitch/AppSafe 3500, the IDS Balancer, and upon general release, the Attack Mitigator. Existing customers can implement this protection themselves in the field today.

Restriction #3
The currently shipping AppSwitch/AppSafe 3500 security device can be configured to restrict SNMP to a single management port via its web management interface.  This meets CERT restriction # 3.

Both the IDS Balancer and the Attack Mitigator are designed with separate management ports for that exclusive use.  These management ports cannot be accessed via "outside" (public network) or "inside" (internal network) LAN connections for greater security and management system integrity. These products meet CERT restriction # 3 -out of the box-.

BOTTOM LINE

Top Layer's standard offerings meet the criteria that allow users to protect against SNMP V1 vulnerability exploits. This is all part of Top Layer's continued commitment to provide our customers with improved performance and greater security against cyber threats.

Toshiba International Corporation

Toshiba International Corporation
SNMPv1 Request and Trap Handling Vulnerabilities

This is in reference to the CERT Advisory CA 2002-03 regarding security vulnerabilities that may exist in network devices using SNMPv1 such as the TIC SNMP enabled product, RemotEye & RemotEyeII.

Patches are being developed to repair these vulnerabilities. Please visit the RemotEyeII web site at http://RemotEye.Tic.Toshiba.com for the expected date for patch availability.

Trend Micro

Trend Micro R&D has determined that Interscan Messaging Services Suite, Scan Mail for Lotus Notes and Scan Mail for Exchange, which all use Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) are not affected by SNMP vulnerabilities listed in the CERT® Advisory CA-2002-03 Multiple Vulnerabilities bulletin of February 27.

Unisphere Networks

CUSTOMER SERVICE TECHNICAL BULLETIN

SUBJECT: CERT Advisory CA-2002-03: Vulnerability in SNMP Implementation
BULLETIN NUMBER: ERX_PSN-005
BULLETIN TYPE: Product Support Notification
AFFECTED PRODUCTS: ERX
ISSUE DATE: 03/08/2002
REVISION: 2.0

PROBLEM DESCRIPTION:
The CERT ® Coordination Center released an advisory on February 12, 2002 entitled, "CERT ® Advisory CA-2002-03 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)". The URL for the full text of the advisory can be found at:

     http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-03.html

AFFECTED PRODUCT(S):
ERX 700/705/1400/1440

SOLUTION:
The following releases of software have been found to suffer no negative effects from execution of the PROTOS c06-SNMPv1 test suite authored by OUSPG, as outlined in CERT Advisory CA-2002-03:

     2-9-1p15-0
     2-10-1p1-0
     3-0-6p6-0
     3-2-3p1-0
     3-3-2p1-0
     3-4-0 REL

Subsequent patches (e.g. 3-0-6p7-0 and greater) and maintenance releases (3-4-1) to those listed above have also tested successfully. All future releases will have been tested against PROTOS c06-SNMPv1 as well. Earlier releases of software will experience higher than average SRP CPU utilization resulting in potential SNMP timeouts while the test suite is running, but recover immediately upon test completion. Packet forwarding during the test is not affected. Affected releases include:

     2-0-0  ­ 2-9-1p14-0
     2-10-0 ­ 2-10-1p0-3
     3-0-0  ­ 3-0-6p5-0
     3-1-0  ­ 3-1-0p2-0
     3-2-0  ­ 3-2-3
     3-3-0  ­ 3-3-2

This Product Support Notification is publicly viewable on the Web at:

     http://support.unispherenetworks.com/websupport/CERT/erx_psn-005.pdf

If you have any questions concerning this notice, or to obtain the latest patch release, please contact Unisphere Networks Customer Service.

     Inside the U.S. call: (800) 424-2344
     Outside the U.S. call: (978) 589-9000
     Via the Web @ http://support.unispherenetworks.com
     Via e-mail @ support@unispherenetworks.com

Uptime Devices, Inc.

Our engineering group downloaded the test suite and ran it against the our products.  Our products passed all tests.

Verilink Corporation

Verilink is aware of the CERT/CC advisory related to security vulnerabilities that may exist in network devices using SNMPv1 as the management protocol, issued February 12, 2002.  Verilink has implemented measures to assess which products may be affected by this advisory and is working closely with its customers to identify the impact and possible solutions.

VERITAS Software

Is VERITAS SANPoint Control affected by the Simple Network Management
Protocol vulnerabilities cited in CERT Advisory CA-2002-03?


TechNote ID: 245634 Last Updated: April 03 2002 01:37 AM GMT
Email this document to a colleague

Caution! The information in this TechNote is based upon certain
assumptions, including product, operating system and platform
versions. You can review this information in the
TechNote Summary portion of this document.
This document (245634) is provided subject to the disclaimer at the
end of this document.


---------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Symptom:

Is VERITAS SANPoint Control affected by the Simple Network Management
Protocol vulnerabilities cited in CERT Advisory CA-2002-03?


Solution:


On February 12, the CERT Coordination Center issued a CERT advisory
citing vulnerabilities with multiple vendors Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) implementations. VERITAS SANPoint Control
(SPC) was tested against the CERT SNMPv1 test suite and it was
determined that SPC was affected by VU#107186 having to do with
SNMPv1 Trap handling. If SPC is installed on a machine outside of a
firewall, or inside of a firewall that does not properly block SNMP
traffic, it could be open to a denial-of-service attack from the
outside.



This problem has been fixed in SPC 2.1.1. For information on how
download the latest release, refer to technote 235218 (link in the
Related sections of this TechNote).



If it is not possible to upgrade, but you feel that your SPC hosts
are at risk, then it will be necessary to disable SNMP traps which
will affect SPC monitoring and reporting capabilities. Disabling
traps will also affect some array monitoring that is done through
traps and may slightly delay status notifications if hardware is
being monitored through SNMP polls. For more information on SPC
monitoring capabilities, refer to the Monitoring and Resolving
Problems on the SAN guide in your SPC documentation set. To disable
SNMP traps, modify the sal.conf file as shown here:



[Exp.SNMPTRAP]

DisableTrap=1



In addition to disabling SNMP traps through the sal.conf file, it is
also necessary to disable the VERITAS Trap Processor.

On Windows:

1. Go to Control Panel>Administrative Tools>Services

2. Double-click on VERITAS Trap Service

3. If the Service Status shows "Started", click the stop button.

4. Change the Startup Type to Disabled

5. Click OK



On Solaris:

Modify the /opt/VRTSspcs/vxspcs script as follows to keep the vxtrapd
daemon from starting (location of this file may vary depending on the
installation directory of the VRTSspcs package):



start_trap ()

{

SAVEDIR=´pwd´

# cd $BASE_DIR/VRTSspcs/trap/bin

# ./vxtrapdstart.sh > /dev/null

cd $SAVEDIR

}



For any additional information on CERT Advisory CA-2002-03, go to the
following link: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-03.html



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TechNote Summary:
TechNote Title: Is VERITAS SANPoint Control affected by the Simple
Network Management Protocol vulnerabilities cited in CERT Advisory
CA-2002-03?
TechNote ID: 245634
Last Updated: April 03 2002 01:37 AM GMT
Related Documents: TechNote: 235218 - What is the latest version of
VERITAS SANPoint Control?
TechPDF: 242640 - VERITAS SANPoint Control 2.1 - Monitoring and
Resolving Problems on the SAN with SANPoint Control 2.1

This information in this TechNote applies to:
Products: SANPoint Control (UNIX Platforms)    1.0, 1.0.1, 2.0,
2.0.1, 2.1, 2.1.1
SANPoint Control for Windows 2000

Subject: SANPoint Control (UNIX Platforms) - Application -
Informational

Languages: English

Operating Systems: Windows 2000 Professional    5.00.2195
Windows 2000 Server    5.00.2195, 5.00.2195 SP 1, 5.00.2195 SP 2,
Windows Powered, Windows Powered SP1, Windows Powered SP2
Windows 2000 Advanced Server    5.00.2195, 5.00.2195 SP 1, 5.00.2195
SP 2, Windows Powered, Windows Powered SP1, Windows Powered SP2
Windows 2000 Datacenter Server    5.00.2195, 5.00.2195 SP 1,
5.00.2195 SP 2
Solaris    2.6, 7, 8
Windows NT    4.0 Serv SP4, 4.0 Serv SP5, 4.0 Serv SP6a


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------


VERITAS Software, 1600 Plymouth Street, Mountain View, California
94043 World Wide Web: http://www.veritas.com
Tech Support Web: http://support.veritas.com
E-Mail for Classic VERITAS Products: support@veritas.com
E-Mail for Classic Seagate Software Products:
helpdesk@support.veritas.com
FTP:ftp://ftp.support.veritas.com or http://ftp.support.veritas.com



THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE VERITAS SOFTWARE KNOWLEDGE BASE IS
PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. VERITAS SOFTWARE
DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
IN NO EVENT SHALL VERITAS SOFTWARE OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF
VERITAS SOFTWARE OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION
OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO
THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.

Vertical Networks, Inc.

The Vertical Networks InstantOffice product was vulnerable to the SNMP issues VU#854306 and VU#107186. This problem was first corrected in InstantOffice version 4.0 Service Pack 1.

VINA Technologies

Vina is addressing the CERT advisory & evaluating the impact over all its products.  Security of our customers networks is of prime importance to us.  Integrator 300 & eLink family products have verified no vulnerability with the fix put in place effective 4/08/2002.  Testing is still in progress for MX 500/550/600 & MBX 1000 products.  Initial results have shown that customers running Frame Relay as WAN protocol are not affected.  Action is being taken to evaluate & fix if any PPP or Cisco HDLC encapsulation vulnerabilities are found by running the  'PROTOS c06-snmpv1 test suite' mentioned in the advisory .  VINA will continue to update its statement on this site as additional info becomes available.

Westhawk, Ltd.

Westhawk has tested their SNMP stack in Java against the VU#107186 vulnerabilities (Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 trap handling).

A number of Java exceptions occurred causing possible denial-of-service, but no unauthorized privileged access. These exceptions have been fixed in release 6.0 of our stack and can be found at http://snmp.westhawk.co.uk/snmp6_0.zip?cert.

The stack is capable of receiving request PDUs and sending a response. However it has no support for building the response (it lacks MIB functionality), so running the request test suite for the VU#854306 (Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 request handling) is currently not applicable.

Wind River Systems, Inc.

Envoy SNMP Agent Source Code v9.0+:
After extensive testing against the PROTOS c06-snmpv1 test suite, we have not been able to reproduce any of the SNMPv1 security problems VU#854306 and VU#107186 in our current SNMP Source Code products: Envoy SNMP v9.0, v9.1, v9.2, and v9.3 Beta.  We ran the tests without seeing any impact on system memory or any other unusual behavior.  We encourage all customers to upgrade to the current version of Envoy SNMP Source Code Agent.

WindNet SNMP Agent Binary Objects v2.0:
Testing against the PROTOS c06-snmpv1 test suite has revealed a vulnerability in the current version of WindNet SNMP v2.0.  The specific impact is a memory leak caused by the exceptional element E-01.  This vulnerability can be demonstrated by test #1421 (among others) in the req-enc test suite.  A fix is currently available from Wind River support and on WindSurf for customers with valid maintenance contracts.  WindNet SNMP Binary v2.0 customers under maintenance can also eliminate the vulnerability by upgrading to Envoy SNMP Source v9.2.  This vulnerability was previously fixed as a "potential leak" in the Envoy v9.0 Agent Source Code release. WindNet SNMP v2.0 is a binary distribution of Envoy v8.0, so it did not include this fix.  No current Envoy Source release (v9.0+) is effected by this vulnerability.

Note: As Wind River's Envoy SNMP is a source code product, customer's modifying Envoy MAY introduce vulnerability to VU#854306 and VU#107186. We are especially seeing problems with buffer overruns in customer community string validation routines.  Wind River recommends individual testing against the test suite of any customer product incorporating a SNMP agent, particularly MODIFIED Envoy SNMP source code.

Wind River customers under support and maintenance have received the current product releases.  Supported customers should Contact Wind River support at support@windriver.com or call (800) 458-7767 with any test reports related to VU#854306 and VU#107186, or for more information.  Customers who need to renew support or wish to upgrade to a supported version (Envoy v9.0+ and WindNet SNMP v2.0) should contact their Wind River Account Manager, or 1-800-545-WIND (1-800-545-9463) if they do not have an Account Manager.

World Wide Packets

World Wide Packets
Product notes and recommendations:

LE-2X and 3X portals, LE-2XX and LE-4XX concentrators
Future software releases of WWP Products will address the vulnerabilities identified in the following CERT vulnerability advisories.  Current target is to provide patch builds by Q2 ’02 that permanently address these issues.  Please contact support@wwp.com for details and status.

VU#854306 (Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 request handling)
VU#107186 (Multiple vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 trap handling)
Until these releases become available, we recommend that the following steps may be taken to help reduce exposure to these vulnerabilities.
In all concentrators:
*Disable SNMP from interfaces through which SNMP commands should not be received, such as those providing connection from the Internet or Extranets.

*Use management VLANs or out-of-band management to contain SNMP traffic and multicasts. These do not prevent an attacker from exploiting these vulnerabilities, but they may make it more difficult to initiate the attacks.
In the snmp.cfg file of all devices, define the community with the IP address of the Management Station.
Example:
Instead of
!snmp_cs_1=1, public, 0.0.0.0, read
!snmp_cs_2=1, private, 0.0.0.0, write
Use
!snmp_cs_1=1, <new public string>, <Mgmt Station Ip Address>, read
!snmp_cs_2=1, <new private string>, <Mgmt Station Ip Address>, write
Note: Even when community strings are changed from their defaults, they will still be passed in plaintext and are therefore subject to packet sniffing attacks. SNMPv3 offers additional capabilities to ensure authentication and privacy as described in RFC2574.
LE-3700 Distributor
*Disable SNMP from interfaces through which SNMP commands should not be received, such as those providing connection from the Internet or Extranets
*Use Access Control Lists at the access edge to prevent SNMP traffic from unauthorized internal hosts from entering the network.
*Use management VLANs or out-of-band management to contain SNMP traffic and multicasts. These do not prevent an attacker from exploiting these vulnerabilities, but they may make it more difficult to initiate the attacks.
*Enable 802.1X port-locking and RADIUS to prevent unauthenticated users from attaching to the network.

Xerox Corporation

Xerox is aware of this advisory. A response regarding all Xerox products that use SNMPv1 is available from our web site: www.xerox.com/security.

Appendix B. - References

  1. http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/
  2. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/854306
  3. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/107186
  4. http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/denial_of_service.html
  5. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1067.txt
  6. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1089.txt
  7. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1140.txt
  8. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1155.txt
  9. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1156.txt
  10. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1215.txt
  11. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1270.txt
  12. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1352.txt

Appendix C. - Background Information

Background Information on the OUSPG

OUSPG is an academic research group located at Oulu University in Finland. The purpose of this research group is to test software for vulnerabilities.

History has shown that the techniques used by the OUSPG have discovered a large number of previously undetected problems in the products and protocols they have tested. In 2001, the OUSPG produced a comprehensive test suite for evaluating implementations of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). This test suite was developed with the strategy of abusing the protocol in unsupported and unexpected ways, and it was very effective in uncovering a wide variety of vulnerabilities across several products. This approach can reveal vulnerabilities that would not manifest themselves under normal conditions.

After completing its work on LDAP, OUSPG moved its focus to SNMPv1.  As with LDAP, they designed a custom test suite, began testing a selection of products, and found a number of vulnerabilities. Because OUSPG's work on LDAP was similar in procedure to its current work on SNMP, you may wish to review the LDAP Test Suite and CERT Advisory CA-2001-18, which outlined results of application of the test suite.

In order to test the security of protocols like SNMPv1, the PROTOS project presents a server with a wide variety of sample packets containing unexpected values or illegally formatted data. As a member of the PROTOS project consortium, the OUSPG used the PROTOS c06-snmpv1 test suite to study several implementations of the SNMPv1 protocol. Results of the test suites run against SNMP indicate that there are many different vulnerabilities on many different implementations of SNMP.

Background Information on the Simple Network Management Protocol

The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is the most popular protocol in use to manage networked devices. SNMP was designed in the late 80's to facilitate the exchange of management information between networked devices, operating at the application layer of the ISO/OSI model. The SNMP protocol enables network and system administrators to remotely monitor and configure devices on the network (devices such as switches and routers). Software and firmware products designed for networks often make use of the SNMP protocol. SNMP runs on a multitude of devices and operating systems, including, but not limited to,

  • Core Network Devices (Routers, Switches, Hubs, Bridges, and Wireless Network Access Points)
  • Operating Systems
  • Consumer Broadband Network Devices (Cable Modems and DSL Modems)
  • Consumer Electronic Devices (Cameras and Image Scanners)
  • Networked Office Equipment (Printers, Copiers, and FAX Machines)
  • Network and Systems Management/Diagnostic Frameworks (Network Sniffers and Network Analyzers)
  • Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS)
  • Networked Medical Equipment (Imaging Units and Oscilloscopes)
  • Manufacturing and Processing Equipment

The SNMP protocol is formally defined in RFC1157. Quoting from that RFC:

Implicit in the SNMP architectural model is a collection of network management stations and network elements. Network management stations execute management applications which monitor and control network elements. Network elements are devices such as hosts, gateways, terminal servers, and the like, which have management agents responsible for performing the network management functions requested by the network management stations. The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is used to communicate management information between the network management stations and the agents in the network elements.

Additionally, SNMP is discussed in a number of other RFC documents:

  • RFC 3000 Internet Official Protocol Standards
  • RFC 1212 Concise MIB Definitions
  • RFC 1213 Management Information Base for Network Management of TCP/IP-based Internets: MIB-II
  • RFC 1215 A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the SNMP
  • RFC 1270 SNMP Communications Services
  • RFC 2570 Introduction to Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework
  • RFC 2571 An Architecture for Describing SNMP Management Frameworks
  • RFC 2572 Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
  • RFC 2573 SNMP Applications
  • RFC 2574 User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)
  • RFC 2575 View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
  • RFC 2576 Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework

The CERT Coordination Center thanks the Oulu University Secure Programming Group for reporting these vulnerabilities to us, for providing detailed technical analyses, and for assisting us in preparing this advisory. 

We also thank Steven M. Bellovin (AT&T Labs -- Research), Wes Hardaker (Net-SNMP), Steve Moulton (SNMP Research), Tom Reddington (Bell Labs), Mike Duckett (Bell South), Rob Thomas, Blue Boar (Thievco), Sunil Chitnis (Foundry Networks), the Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team (psirt@cisco.com) and the many others who contributed to this document.


Feedback on this document can be directed to the authors, Ian A. Finlay, Shawn V. Hernan, Jason A. Rafail, Chad Dougherty, Allen D. Householder, Marty Lindner, and Art Manion.


This document is available from: http://www.preview.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-03.html

CERT/CC Contact Information

Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.

CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.

Using encryption

We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.  Our public PGP key is available from

If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more information.

Getting security information

CERT publications and other security information are available from our web site

* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.


NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.


Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information

Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University.

Revision History

Feb 12, 2002: Initial release
Feb 12, 2002: Corrected vendor appendix formatting issues
Feb 12, 2002: Added vendor statement for Inktomi
Feb 12, 2002: Fixed formatting problem in "Disable stack execution" section
Feb 12, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Juniper
Feb 12, 2002: Fixed broken link in Juniper statement
Feb 12, 2002: Updated Public Thanks section
Feb 12, 2002: Updated Covalent statement
Feb 12, 2002: Updated SNMP Research statement
Feb 12, 2002: Updated CVE and Comtek services links
Feb 13, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Cisco Systems
Feb 13, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Enterasys 
Feb 13, 2002: Updated vendor statement for FreeBSD
Feb 13, 2002: Updated vendor statement for HP
Feb 13, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Microsoft
Feb 13, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Sun
Feb 13, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Tandberg
Feb 13, 2002: Removed vendor statement for Tivoli
Feb 14, 2002: Added vendor statement for Aprisma
Feb 14, 2002: Added vendor statements for MG-Soft and NetScreen
Feb 14, 2002: Added vendor statement for iTouch Communications
Feb 14, 2002: Added vendor statement for F5 Networks
Feb 14, 2002: Added vendor statement for Sierra Wireless
Feb 15, 2002: Added vendor statement for MICROMUSE
Feb 15, 2002: Updated HP statement
Feb 16, 2002: Updated Nortel Networks statement
Feb 16, 2002: Added vendor statement for Foundry Networks
Feb 18, 2002: Added vendor statement for Tivoli
Feb 18, 2002: Added vendor statement for Radware
Feb 18, 2002: Updated Nortel Networks statement
Feb 19, 2002: Updated Nortel Networks statement
Feb 19, 2002: Updated F5 Networks statement
Feb 19, 2002: Updated Compaq statement
Feb 19, 2002: Updated IBM statement
Feb 19, 2002: Added vendor statement for Dell
Feb 19, 2002: Fixed bad link in Enterasys statement
Feb 19, 2002: Updated IBM statement
Feb 19, 2002: Added vendor statement for BMC Software
Feb 20, 2002: Added vendor statement for Wind River Systems
Feb 20, 2002: Added vendor statement for Concord Communications
Feb 20, 2002: Added vendor statement for CommWorks Corporation (a 3Com company)
Feb 20, 2002: Added vendor statement for Lexmark International
Feb 20, 2002: Added vendor statement for Check Point Software Technologies Inc.
Feb 20, 2002: Added vendor statement for Alcatel
Feb 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for Avici Systems Inc.
Feb 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for NuDesign Team Inc.
Feb 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for ADTRAN, Inc.
Feb 21, 2002: Updated NetScreen vendor statement
Feb 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for TMP Consultoria S/C
Feb 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for Xerox Corporation
Feb 21, 2002: Updated Inktomi vendor statement
Feb 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for nCipher Corp.
Feb 21, 2002: Updated Lucent vendor statement
Feb 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for Spider Software
Feb 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for Riverstone Networks
Feb 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for Standard Networks, Inc.
Feb 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for Openwave Systems Inc.
Feb 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for General DataComm
Feb 22, 2002: Added vendor statement for NETWORK HARMONi, Inc.
Feb 22, 2002: Updated HP vendor statement
Feb 22, 2002: Updated Nortel Networks statement
Feb 25, 2002: Added vendor statement for American Power Conversion
Feb 25, 2002: Added vendor statement for Cambridge Broadband Ltd.
Feb 25, 2002: Added vendor statement for Corsaire Limited
Feb 25, 2002: Added vendor statement for SonicWALL, Inc.
Feb 26, 2002: Added vendor statement for Perle Systems
Feb 26, 2002: Added vendor statement for Sonus Networks
Feb 26, 2002: Added vendor statement for Optical Access
Feb 26, 2002: Added vendor statement for INRANGE Technologies
Feb 26, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Redback Networks, Inc.
Feb 26, 2002: Removed "Disable stack execution" section from Solutions
Feb 26, 2002: Added vendor statement for BinTec Communications AG
Feb 26, 2002: Updated vendor statement for IBM
Feb 27, 2002: Updated HP vendor statement
Feb 27, 2002: Added vendor statement for World Wide Packets
Feb 27, 2002: Added vendor statement for Dart Communications
Feb 27, 2002: Added vendor statement for Quallaby Corporation
Feb 27, 2002: Updated iTouch Communications vendor statement
Feb 27, 2002: Added vendor statement for CipherTrust, Inc.
Feb 27, 2002: Added vendor statement for Ipswitch, Inc.
Feb 27, 2002: Added vendor statement for D-Link Systems, Inc.
Mar 01, 2002: Added vendor statement for iPlanet
Mar 01, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Novell
Mar 01, 2002: Updated vendor statement for nCipher Corp.
Mar 01, 2002: Added vendor statement for Extreme Networks
Mar 04, 2002: Added vendor statement for NetSilicon
Mar 04, 2002: Added vendor statement for SecureWorks, Inc. 
Mar 04, 2002: Added vendor statement for Efficient Networks, Inc.
Mar 04, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Novell
Mar 04, 2002: Added vendor statement for Monfox, LLC
Mar 05, 2002: Added vendor statement for Paradyne
Mar 05, 2002: Added vendor statement for Trend Micro
Mar 05, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Dartware, LLC
Mar 05, 2002: Added vendor statement for Quick Eagle Networks
Mar 05, 2002: Added vendor statement for Conectiva 
Mar 05, 2002: Added vendor statement for Asante Technologies, Inc.
Mar 05, 2002: Added vendor statement for SolarWinds.Net, Inc.
Mar 06, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Aprisma
Mar 06, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Ipswitch, Inc.
Mar 06, 2002: Added vendor statement for CSCare, Inc.
Mar 06, 2002: Updated vendor statement for iTouch Communications
Mar 06, 2002: Added vendor statement for Uptime Devices, Inc.
Mar 06, 2002: Added vendor statement for Larscom Incorporated
Mar 06, 2002: Added vendor statement for InterNiche Technologies, Inc.
Mar 07, 2002: Added vendor statement for Network Appliance
Mar 07, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Avaya
Mar 07, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Xerox
Mar 07, 2002: Added vendor statement for Sniffer Technologies
Mar 07, 2002: Added vendor statement for Powerware Corporation
Mar 07, 2002: Added vendor statement for Carrier Access
Mar 07, 2002: Added vendor statement for net.com
Mar 07, 2002: Added vendor statement for Oracle Corporation
Mar 11, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Wind River Systems, Inc.
Mar 12, 2002: Added vendor statement for Apple Computer, Inc.
Mar 12, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Xerox Corporation
Mar 12, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Radware
Mar 13, 2002: Added vendor statement for ADVA AG Optical Networking
Mar 13, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Quick Eagle Networks
Mar 15, 2002: Updated vendor statement for F5 Networks
Mar 18, 2002: Added vendor statement for NEC Corporation
Mar 18, 2002: Added vendor statement for Alvarion Ltd.
Mar 19, 2002: Added vendor statement for e-Security, Inc.
Mar 19, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Concord Communications, Inc.
Mar 19, 2002: Added vendor statement for Equinox Systems 
Mar 20, 2002: Added vendor statement for Controlware GmbH 
Mar 20, 2002: Fixed broken link in NETWORK HARMONi, Inc. vendor statement
Mar 20, 2002: Updated vendor statement for NETWORK HARMONi, Inc.
Mar 21, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Radware
Mar 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for Unisphere Networks
Mar 21, 2002: Added vendor statement for InfoVista
Mar 21, 2002: Updated vendor statement for COMTEK Services, Inc.
Mar 25, 2002: Added vendor statement for ModLink Networks
Mar 25, 2002: Added vendor statement for Kentrox,LLC
Mar 25, 2002: Added vendor statement for KarlNet, Inc.
Mar 25, 2002: Added vendor statement for Hitachi Data Systems (HDS)
Mar 26, 2002: Added vendor statement for NetScout Systems, Inc.
Mar 26, 2002: Added vendor statement for Verilink Corporation
Mar 26, 2002: Added vendor statement for RAD Data Communications Ltd.
Mar 28, 2002: Updated vendor statement for NEC Corporation
Mar 28, 2002: Added vendor statement for Tavve Software Company 
Apr 01, 2002: Updated vendor statement for HP (regarding MPE)
Apr 01, 2002: Added vendor statement for Top Layer Networks 
Apr 03, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Tivoli Systems
Apr 04, 2002: Added vendor statement for VERITAS Software
Apr 05, 2002: Added vendor statement for Evidian Inc.
Apr 05, 2002: Added vendor statement for AVET Information and Network Security
Apr 05, 2002: Added vendor statement for Entrada Networks
Apr 05, 2002: Added vendor statement for Cray Inc.
Apr 08, 2002: Added vendor statement for CNT
Apr 09, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Dell
Apr 09, 2002: Updated vendor statement for American Power Conversion
Apr 10, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Dell
Apr 10, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Compaq Computer Corporation
Apr 12, 2002: Added vendor statement for Canoga Perkins Corporation
Apr 16, 2002: Added vendor statement for Toshiba International Corporation
Apr 19, 2002: Added vendor statement for VINA Technologies
Apr 19, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Dell
Apr 22, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Entrada Networks
Apr 24, 2002: Updated vendor statement for VERITAS Software
Apr 24, 2002: Added vendor statement for OutBack Resource Group, Inc.
Apr 26, 2002: Added vendor statement for Fluke Corporation
Apr 28, 2002: Updated vendor statement for DMH Software
May 16, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Sun Microsystems
May 23, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Xerox Corporation
Jun 11, 2002: Updated vendor statement for BMC Software
Jun 11, 2002: Updated vendor statement for BinTec Communications AG
Jun 11, 2002: Updated vendor statement for Symantec Corporation
Jul 25, 2002: Added vendor statement for Digital Networks
Aug 14, 2002: Added vendor statement for Astracon, Inc.
Aug 21, 2002: Updated vendor statement for ADVA AG Optical Networking
Aug 28, 2002: Updated vendor statement for iPlanet
Sep 23, 2002: Added vendor statement for Mercury Interactive Corporation
Oct 17, 2002: Added vendor statement for Sinetica Corporation Limited
Nov 05, 2002: Added vendor statement for Future Communications Software
May 14, 2003: Added vendor statement for Metrobility Optical Systems 
Jun 11, 2003: Added vendor statement for Muonics
Aug 18, 2003: Added vendor statement for Allied Telesyn International 
Jul 27, 2004: Updated vendor statement for NuDesign, Inc.
May 24, 2005: Updated vendor statement for Hitachi, removed extra line before vul note references
November 7, 2007: Closed anchors
February 13, 2008: Added vendor statement for Westhawk