Original release date: September 06, 2001
Last revised: --
A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
- Systems running the following products that use Gauntlet Firewall
- Gauntlet for Unix versions 5.x
- PGP e-ppliance 300 series version 1.0
- McAfee e-ppliance 100 and 120 series
- Gauntlet for Unix version 6.0
- PGP e-ppliance 300 series versions 1.5, 2.0
- PGP e-ppliance 1000 series versions 1.5, 2.0
- McAfee WebShield for Solaris v4.1
A vulnerability for a remotely exploitable buffer overflow exists in Gauntlet Firewall by PGP Security.
The buffer overflow occurs in the smap/smapd and CSMAP daemons. According to PGP Security, these daemons are responsible for handling email transactions for both inbound and outbound email.
On September 04, 2001, PGP Security released a security bulletin and patches for this vulnerability. For more information, please see
An intruder can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the corresponding daemon. Additionally, firewalls often have trust relationships with other network devices. An intruder who compromises a firewall may be able to leverage this trust to
compromise other devices on the network or to make changes to the network configuration.
Apply a patch
Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly.
This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this advisory. When vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular vendor is not listed below, we have not
received their comments.
PGP Security has published a security advisory describing this vulnerability as well as patches. This is available from
The CERT Coordination Center thanks PGP Security for their advisory, on which this document is based.
Feedback on this document can be directed to the author, Ian A. Finlay.
Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.
September 06, 2001: Initial release