CERT* Coordination Center
1995 Annual Report (Summary)
1. Introduction
The CERT Coordination Center was formed by the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (ARPA) in November 1988 in response to the needs
exhibited during an Internet security incident. Our charter is to work
with the Internet community in detecting and resolving computer
security incidents as well as taking steps to prevent future
incidents. Our specific mission is to
- Provide a reliable, trusted, 24-hour, single point of contact for
emergencies.
- Facilitate communication among experts working to solve security
problems.
- Serve as a central point for identifying and correcting
vulnerabilities in computer systems.
- Maintain close ties with research activities and conduct research
to improve the security of existing systems.
- Initiate proactive measures to increase awareness and
understanding of information security and computer security issues
throughout the community of network users and service providers.
2. Activities and Services
Incident Response
From January through December 1995, the CERT Coordination Center
received 32,084 email messages and 3,428 hotline calls. We handled
2,412 computer security incidents during this period. More than 12,000
sites were affected by these incidents, which involved 732 break-ins
and nearly that many probes and pranks. Among the most serious
intruder activities for 1995 are the following.
- IP spoofing. There was a surge in IP spoofing this year. The year
began with an advisory about IP spoofing, and attacks continued
throughout the year. In a matter of weeks during the summer, we
received more than 170 reports of IP spoofing attacks or probes, many
resulting in successful break-ins. We found that several sites
believed incorrectly that they were blocking such packets, and other
sites had planned to block them but hadn't yet done so.
- Network File Service (NFS) attacks. This year there was a large
increase in the number of attacks relating to weaknesses in NFS. Many
of the attacks were successful; moreover, programs to automate these
attacks have become widespread in the intruder community. A successful
attack usually results in the intruders gaining root access.
- Network scanning. Intruders have been scanning a large range of
network addresses using Internet Security Scanner (ISS). This tool
interrogates all computers within a specific address range,
determining the security posture of each with respect to several
common system vulnerabilities. Intruders have used the information
gathered from these scans to compromise sites, and we are aware of
many systems that have suffered a root compromise as a result of
information intruders obtained from ISS scans.
- Packet sniffers. This year we continued to receive new incident
reports about sniffers on compromised hosts. These sniffers, used to
collect account names and passwords, frequently have been installed
using a kit. In some cases, the packet sniffer was found to have been
running for months. Occasionally, sites had been explicitly warned of
the possibility of compromise, but the activity continued because the
site did not address the problem in the comprehensive manner we
suggest in our security documents.
- Sendmail attacks. Intruders have been using a variety of
techniques to exploit sendmail, with most of the attacks aimed at
getting root privileges on the victim machine. This year, we released
four CERT advisories and one vendor-initiated bulletin relating to
problems with sendmail. In many cases, intruder attacks were
successful because sites had not installed upgrades and patches nor
taken other precautions such as running the sendmail restricted shell
program (smrsh).
The year ended with a series of attacks on Internet sites that
resulted in our issuing an alert to network service providers and the
network community in general warning them of the intruder activities
listed below (list taken from advisory CA-95:18).
- Using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities
- Exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access
- Exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access
- Installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers
- Launching IP spoofing attacks
Work continues in 1996 on incidents involving all the types of activity noted
in this annual report.
Advisories
Eighteen advisories were published in 1995. Among the criteria for
developing an advisory are the urgency of the problem, potential
impact of intruder exploitation, and existence of a software patch or
workaround. Advisories are sent to the cert-advisory mailing list and
posted to the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce.
We use README files associated with each advisory to keep
information current without changing the original content of an
advisory.
A complete listing of the advisories issued during 1995 can be found
in Appendix A.
Vendor Bulletins
In December 1994, we began publishing CERT vendor-initiated
bulletins. These bulletins contain verbatim text from vendors
describing security problems and their solutions. Our goal is to help
the vendors' security information get wide distribution quickly. The
bulletins are distributed through the same channels as advisories.
Ten bulletins were published in 1995. A complete listing can be found in
Appendix B.
CERT Summaries
This year we began publishing the CERT Summary as part of our ongoing
efforts to disseminate timely information about Internet security
issues. The first CERT Summary was issued on July 26; others followed
on September 26 and November 28. The primary purpose of the summary is
to call attention to the types of attack currently being reported to
the CERT incident handling staff. Each summary includes pointers to
advisories or other publications that explain how to deal with the
attacks.
Training Courses
CERT staff continued to present "Internet Security for System and
Network Administrators" and "Internet Security for Managers." Both
courses help organizations assess and improve their level of computer
and information security.
This year, "Internet Security for System and Network
Administrators" was approved by the SEI Education and Training Review
Board as an SEI course. The course will be presented at the SEI four
times during 1996: February 15, April 11, July 11, and December 11.
3. Research and Development
Information Security Risk Evaluations
During the year, we completed two field tests of an information
security risk evaluation (ISRE) method being developed by the CERT
staff. Both tests were conducted at financial service
organizations. The ISRE includes a security taxonomy, a set of
interviews, and a technology review.
The information security risk evaluation is one component of an
overall information security improvement program under
development. With the risk evaluation as a starting point, this
program will provide practical guidance in addressing the issues and
shortcomings that are identified as risk areas. The objective is to
start a site on an improvement path in a way that ensures a high
probability of success.
4. Advocacy and Community Support
The CERT Coordination Center staff members were invited to give
presentations at several conferences, workshops, and meetings during
1995. This has been found to be an excellent tool to educate attendees
in the area of network information system security and incident
response. Below are some examples of the CERT staff's participation in
external events.
- Avoiding the Crisis in Healthcare Information Security, a
conference sponsored by MIS Training and INFO Security. A CERT staff
member presented "Securing your Interface to the
Internet."
- FBI Academy. A CERT staff member spoke on Internet security issues
and the use of the Internet.
- Institute of Internal Auditors (IAA). At the IAA Advanced
Technology Conference held September 16-20, 1995, a staff member gave
a talk on "Defensive Strategies on the Information
Highway."
- Internet Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security. A
CERT staff member served as the general chair of the three-day
symposium.
- NISSC (National Information Systems Security Conference - formerly
National Computer Security Conference). A CERT member presented
"Internet Sniffer Attacks," which won outstanding paper for
the conference.
- Public meeting on National Information Infrastructure (NII)
Security Issues. A CERT team member testified at a public meeting held
at the Department of Commerce in March. Topics included the risks to
information, educating and setting expectations of users, and how the
government can support availability and reliability in the NII.
- SEC EDGAR Technology Conference. A staff member participated in a
panel entitled "Technical Options for Achieving Fundamental
Objectives."
- Uniforum UNIX show. A CERT staff member presented an all-day
tutorial, "Internet Security for UNIX System and Network
Administrators," to 82 people. He also presented "Managing
the Risk" to more than 50 people during a regular session of the
conference.
- The USENIX Association presented team member Jim Ellis with the
USENIX Lifetime Achievement Award. This award recognizes and
celebrates singular contributions to the UNIX community in both
intellectual achievement and service that are not recognized in any
other forum. For 1995, Ellis and two others received the award for
their work in creating USENET.
Internet Engineering Task Force
The CERT Coordination Center is actively involved in the
security-related work of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). CERT staff member Barbara Fraser is a member of the Security
Directorate, a standards body, and is chair of two workings
groups. The working groups are producing two site security handbooks -
one for system and network administrators, and one for users - and are
developing guidelines for security incident response teams and
technology vendors.
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
The CERT Coordination Center co-sponsored the FIRST Incident
Response
Workshop, which was held in Karlsruhe, Germany, September
18-22, 1995. There were 129 attendees, representing more than 30
response teams from around the world. This annual workshop provides a
forum for teams to exchange information and discuss ways to coordinate
response activities. Topics this year included how to form an incident
response team, communication among teams, recent developments in
network liability, and techniques for tracking incidents.
Appendix A: CERT Advisories Published in 1995
The following advisories were published in 1995. We will continue to
add updated information to CA-95:xx.README files as necessary.
CA-95:01.IP.spoofing.attacks.and.hijacked.terminal.connections
This advisory describes attacks in which intruders create packets with
spoofed IP addresses and exploit applications that use authentication
based on IP. The advisory also discusses a tool intruders use to take
control of open terminal or login sessions.
CA-95:02.binmail.vulnerabilities
This advisory supersedes CA-91:01a and CA-91:13. It addresses
vulnerabilities in some versions of /bin/mail based on BSD 4.3
UNIX. It includes a list of vendor patches and source code for
mail.local.c, an alternative to /bin/mail. Updated information will be
placed in the CA-95:02.README
file.
CA-95:03.telnet.encryption.vulnerability
Description and patch information for a security problem in the
Berkeley Telnet clients that support encryption and Kerberos V4
authentication. **This information is superseded by CA-95:03a.
CA-95:03a.telnet.encryption.vulnerability
Description and patch information for a security problem in the
Berkeley Telnet clients that support encryption and Kerberos V4
authentication. It provides additional information. **This
information supersedes CA-95:03.
CA-95:04.NCSA.http.daemon.for.unix.vulnerability
This advisory provides a patch for a vulnerability in the NCSA HTTP
daemon version 1.3 for UNIX.
CA-95:05.sendmail.vulnerabilities
This advisory supersedes all previous advisories relating to sendmail.
Three vulnerabilities are addressed; vendor vulnerability and
patch information is included, along with a sendmail wrapper.
CA-95:06.satan
An overview of the Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks
(SATAN) based on the CERT staff's review of beta version
0.51. Includes a list of vulnerabilities probed and advice on securing
systems.
CA-95:07.vulnerability.in.satan
This advisory describes precautions to take against a vulnerability in
SATAN 1.0. **Superseded by CA-95:07a.
CA-95:07a.REVISED.satan.vul
This revised advisory supersedes CA-95:07. The revision provides new
information about the problem described in CA-95:07, and includes
precautions to take when running SATAN. A tutorial by the SATAN
authors, "SATAN Password Disclosure," is appended to the advisory.
CA-95:08.sendmail.v.5.vulnerability
This advisory describes a vulnerability in sendmail v.5, which is
still in use and which includes IDA sendmail. Many vendors have
previously fixed the problem; others recently developed patches.
CA-95:09.Solaris.ps.vul
This advisory describes a vulnerability in Solaris that can be
exploited if the permissions on the /tmp and /var/tmp directories are
set incorrectly.
CA-95:10.ghostscript
This advisory describes a vulnerability involving the -dSAFER option
in ghostscript versions 2.6 through 3.22 beta. The advisory includes
instructions for fixing the problem and pointers to version 3.33 of
ghostscript.
CA-95:11.sun.sendmail-oR.vul
This advisory describes a vulnerability in the sendmail -oR option in
SunOS 4.1.X. At the time of the advisory, the vulnerability was being
actively exploited.
CA-95:12.sun.loadmodule.vul
The advisory describes a problem with the loadmodule(8) program in Sun
OS 4.1.X and provides patch information.
CA-95:13.syslog.vul
This advisory describes a general problem with syslog, lists vendor
information about patches, and provides a workaround for solving the
syslog problem in sendmail in particular.
CA-95:14.Telnetd_Environment_Vulnerability
This advisory describes a vulnerability with some telnet daemons and
includes patch information from vendors, along with a workaround.
CA-95:15.SGI.lp.vul
This advisory points out accounts that are distributed without
passwords and urges SGI customers to create passwords for those
accounts.
CA-95:16.wu-ftpd.vul
This advisory describes a vulnerability in the wu-fptd SITE EXEC
command and provides solutions for both Linux users and others.
CA-95:17.rpc.ypupdated.vul
This advisory describes a vulnerability in the rpc.ypupdated program,
for which an exploitation program has been posted to several
newsgroups. The advisory includes vendor information and a workaround.
CA-95:18.widespread.attacks
This advisory warns readers of attacks on hundreds of Internet sites
in which intruders exploit known vulnerabilities, all of which have
been addressed in previous CERT advisories. These advisories are
listed.
Appendix B: CERT Vendor-Initiated Bulletins Issued in 1995
The following vendor-initiated bulletins were published in 1995.
VB-95:01.hp
This bulletin addresses problems with Remote Watch in fileset
WATCH-RUN for releases of HP-UX, in particular HP 9000 series 300/400s
10.2(1) through 10.2(5); 10.0(1) through 10.0(9); and all previous
versions.
VB-95:02.sgi
Vulnerability and patch information for the IRIX 5.2, 6.0, 6.0.1 Desktop
Permissions Tool.
VB-95:03.hp
Sendmail vulnerability and patch information for HP 9000 series
300/400s and 700/800s 8.x and 9.x.
VB-95:04.venema
Vulnerability and patch information for S/Key software enhancements for
FreeBSD 1.1.5.1 and 2.0 and for logdaemon versions prior to 4.9.
VB-95:05.osf
Description of a security hole in all releases of OSF/DCE prior to version
1.1, and information about the fix.
VB-95:06.cisco
Problem description, upgrade information, and workaround for a
vulnerability in Cisco's IOS software versions 10.3(1) through
10.3(2); 10.2(1) through 10.2(5); 10.0(1) through 10.0(9);
and all previous versions.
VB-95:07.abell
Description of a directory and file vulnerability in lsof 3.18 through
3.43, along with instructions on getting later versions.
VB-95:08.X_Authentication_Vul
Vulnerability and patch information for an X authentication vulnerability.
VB-95:09.hp
Vulnerability and patch information for a vulnerability in ftp in
releases 9.X and 10.X of HP-UX (platforms: HP 9000 series 300/400s and
700/800s).
VB-95:10.elm
Vulnerability and patch information for a vulnerability in elm 2.4 PL
24.
VB-95:10a.elm
This updated version of VB-95:10 lists additional FTP sites.
Revised October 14, 1997 (new Web page template)
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