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CERT® Advisory CA-2002-15 Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in ISC BIND 9
Original release date: June 04, 2002
Last revised: Wed Sep 18 10:40:08 EDT 2002
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
Systems Affected
Overview
A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in version 9 of the Internet
Software Consortium's (ISC) Berkeley
Internet Name Domain (BIND) server. ISC BIND versions 8 and 4 are not
affected. Exploiting this vulnerability will cause the BIND server to
shut down.
I. Description
BIND is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) that is
maintained by the ISC. A vulnerability exists in version 9 of BIND
that allows remote attackers to shut down BIND servers. An attacker
can cause the shutdown by sending a specific DNS packet designed to
trigger an internal consistency check. However, this vulnerability
will not allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or write data to
arbitrary locations in memory.
The internal consistency check that triggers the shutdown occurs when
the rdataset parameter to the dns_message_findtype() function
in message.c is not NULL as
expected. The condition causes the code to assert an error message and
call abort() to shut down the BIND server. It is also possible
to accidentally trigger this vulnerability using common queries found
in routine operation, especially queries originating from SMTP
servers.
A vulnerability note describing this problem can be found at http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/739123. This
vulnerability note includes a list of vendors that have been contacted
about this vulnerability.
This vulnerability is also being referenced as CAN-2002-0400:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0400
II. Impact
Exploitation of this vulnerability will cause the BIND server to
abort and shut down. As a result, the BIND server will not be
available unless it is restarted.
III. Solution
Apply a patch from your vendor
The ISC has released BIND version 9.2.1. The CERT/CC recommends
that users of BIND 9 apply a patch from their vendor or upgrade to BIND 9.2.1.
Appendix A. - Vendor Information
This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
comments.
In relation to this CERT advisory on security vulnerabilities with ISC
BIND 9 implementation, Alcatel has conducted an immediate assessment
to determine any impact this may have on our portfolio. An initial
analysis has shown that none of our products is affected when used as
delivered to customers. The security of our customers' networks is of
highest priority for Alcatel. Therefore, investigations are going on,
in particular for the UMTS GPRS Core Network portfolio, to determine
any impact. Updates will be provided if necessary. Customers may
contact their Alcatel support representative for more details.
The version of BIND that ships in Mac OS X and Mac OS X Server does
not contain this vulnerability.
Wind River Systems, Inc. does not include BIND 9 with any version of
BSD/OS.
SCO OpenServer from Caldera does not ship BIND9, and is therefore not vulnerable.
Caldera Open UNIX does ship BIND9, and is vulnerable. We are investigating.
Caldera OpenLinux does not ship BIND9, and is therefore not vulnerable.
HP Alpha Server Products:
HP Tru64 UNIX:
Tru64 UNIX is not vulnerable to this reported problem. HP Tru64 UNIX ships
with BIND 8.2.2-p5
TCP/IP for HP OpenVms:
TCP/IP for HP OpenVms is not vulnerable to this reported problem.The current
versions of TCP/IP for HP OpenVMS ship BIND 8.2.2-p5
HP NonStop Server:
"HP NonStop Himalaya is not vulnerable to this problem. The 'named'
function of Domain Name Server (T6021) which is implemented for HP NonStop
Himalaya is based on BIND 4.8. NonStop DNS is the only Himalaya software
product that includes 'named'."
Cray, Inc. is not vulnerable since the BIND distributed with Unicos
and Unicos/mk is not based on BIND 9.
djbdns does not have this bug. Unlike BIND 9, djbdns does not
commit hara-kiri when an attacker tries to confuse it, or pokes it
sharply, or simply thinks bad thoughts in its general
direction. djbdns has never used any BIND-derived code. See http://cr.yp.to/djbdns.html .
Guardian Digital does not ship BIND 9 in any versions of EnGarde
Secure Linux, therefore we are not vulnerable. All versions were
shipped with BIND 8.
EDGE-FX contains a vulnerable version of BIND 9. Instructions for obtaining
and installing a patch are available at
ftp://ftp.f5.com/Domestic/Edgefx/named_patch/cert_patch_6_2002.html.
All other F5 Networks products contain BIND 8.2, and are therefore not affected
by this vulnerability.
The FreeBSD base system does not ship with ISC BIND 9. However, ISC
BIND 9 is available in the FreeBSD Ports Collection. It is currently
at version 9.2.1 and is therefore unaffected.
HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY SECURITY BULLETIN: HPSBUX0207-202
Originally issued: 22 July 2002
HP Published Security Bulletin HPSBUX0207-202 with solutions for
HP9000 Series 700/800 running HP-UX release 11.11 (11i) only with the
BINDv920.INETSVCS-BIND fileset installed.
This bulletin is available from the HP IT Resource Center page at:
http://itrc.hp.com "Maintenance and Support" then "Support Information
Digests" and then "hp security bulletins archive" search for bulletin
HPSBUX0207-202.
After analysis of the affected component, IBM has determined that the
AIX bind deamon is not vulnerable to the attack as described in the
CERT advisory.
Inktomi Inktomi Traffic Server DNS proxy does not include BIND9 and is
therefore not vulnerable.
This vulnerability was found through routine bug analysis. BIND 9 is
designed to exit when it detects an internal consistency error to
reduce the impact of bugs in the server. ISC strongly reccomends that
all BIND 9 users upgrade immediately to 9.2.1. BIND 9.2.1 can be found
at http://www.isc.org/products/BIND/bind9.html.
Mandrake Linux 8.x ships with BIND9 and as such updated packages will
be available as early as possible.
Microsoft has reviewed the information and can confirm that our
products are not affected by this vulnerability.
sent on June 3, 2002
[Server Products]
* EWS/UP 48 Series operating system
- is NOT vulnerable.
NetBSD has not included Bind 9 in the base system of any release or
-current development branch.
Bind 9 is available from the 3rd
party software system, pkgsrc. Users who have installed net/bind9 or
net/bind9-current should update to a fixed
version. pkgsrc/security/audit-packages can be used to keep up to date
with these types of issues.
All NetApp products do not contain any BIND code, so no NetApp product
is vulnerable to this problem.
Nortel Networks is reviewing its portfolio to determine if any
products are affected by the vulnerability noted in CERT Advisory
CA-2002-15. A definitive statement will be issued shortly.
Red Hat distributed BIND 9 in Red Hat Linux versions 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3.
We are currently working on producing errata packages, when complete these
will be available along with our advisory at the URL below. At the
same time users of the Red Hat Network will be able to update their systems
using the 'up2date' tool.
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2002-105.html
IRIX does not ship with BIND9 and is not vulnerable.
Sun does not ship BIND 9 with any version of Solaris at this time and
is therefore not affected by this issue.
We are affected by the bind9 DoS issue as well. All of our currently
supported SuSE Linux products come with a bind9 package. We will
release an announcement for the issue, coordinated with your timeframe
and not before we see your official announcement.
The Unisphere Networks ERX family of edge routers does not implement a
DNS server or named daemon within the Unison OS. Additionally, the
DNS client found on the ERX is not based on the ISC BIND
code. Unisphere Networks has no reason to expect a similar problem
exists in the DNS client implementation found on the ERX.
The CERT Coordination Center thanks the Internet Software
Consortium for notifying us about this vulnerability.
Author: Ian
A. Finlay
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-15.html
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
-
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.
CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other
hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
Using encryption
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by
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If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
information.
Getting security information
CERT publications and other security information are available from
our web site
* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the
Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is"
basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind,
either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not
limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or
merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the
material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any
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infringement.
Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University.
Revision History
June 04, 2002: Initial release
June 11, 2002: Added vendor statement for djbdns
June 11, 2002: Added vendor statement for Inktomi Corporation
June 11, 2002: Updated vendor statement for F5 Networks, Inc.
Aug 08, 2002: Added vendor statement for Hewlett Packard
Sep 18, 2002: Added vendor statement for Alcatel
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